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Economics
Abstract
The decisions made by petroleum producers in the world oil market are both dynamic and
strategic, and are thus best modeled as a dynamic game. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I
review the literature on the world oil market and discuss my research on econometric modeling of
the world oil market as a dynamic game. My research on econometric modeling of the world oil
market as a dynamic game research builds on the previous literature by combining three erstwhile
separate dimensions of modeling the world oil market: dynamic optimization, game theory, and
econometrics.
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I develop and estimate a structural econometric model
of the dynamic game among petroleum-producing firms in the world petroleum market. My model
incorporates the dynamic behavior and strategic interactions that arise as petroleum-producing
firms make their investment, production, merger, and acquisition decisions. I allow firms that are
at least partially state-owned to have objectives other than profit maximization alone. I use the
structural econometric model to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC membership, a ban on
mergers, the privatization of state-owned oil companies, and demand shocks on the petroleum
industry. Although I do not assume or impose that OPEC producers collude to maximize joint
profits, but instead infer the strategy and payoffs for OPEC firms from the data, I find that OPEC
behaves in such a way that is consistent with its mission and also with cartel behavior. Results of
counterfactual simulations also show that a ban on mergers would decrease average firm payoff for
both OPEC and non-OPEC firms, and decrease consumer surplus.
Gasoline taxes have been touted by many economists as an efficient and relatively simple tool to
address environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption. Never-
theless, rather than removing subsidies and increasing gasoline taxes, many countries still subsidize
gasoline, which may have the opposite effect of exacerbating air pollution and other problems as-
iii
sociated with gasoline consumption. The Iranian government has heavily subsidized petroleum
products since the early 1980s. As a result of these energy subsidies and artificially low national
energy price, Iran is one of the most energy-intensive countries in the world. The Iranian gov-
ernment has recently taken a series of measures to reform and cut back on the energy subsidies.
In the third chapter of my dissertation, I evaluate the effects of the Iranian subsidy reform on air
quality using a regression discontinuity design. My results provide evidence across multiple dif-
ferent empirical specifications that the subsidy reform in Iran led to improvements in air quality.
In particular, the first subsidy reform event, which increased gasoline prices and implemented a
gasoline consumption quota; and the second subsidy reform event, which increased energy prices
and decreased energy subsidies, both led to declines in concentrations of CO, O3, and NO2. In
contrast, the fourth subsidy reform event, which increased fuel prices but removed the gasoline
consumption quota, was less effective in reducing air pollution.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
ECONOMETRIC MODELING OF THE WORLD OIL MARKET AS A DYNAMIC
GAME
1.1 Introduction
The decisions made by petroleum producers in the world oil market are both dynamic and strategic,
and are thus best modeled as a dynamic game. In this chapter, we review the literature on the world
oil market and discuss our research on econometric modeling of the world oil market as a dynamic
game. Our research on econometric modeling of the world oil market as a dynamic game research
builds on the previous literature by combining three erstwhile separate dimensions of modeling the
world oil market: dynamic optimization, game theory, and econometrics.
In Lin Lawell (2019), we develop and estimate an empirical dynamic model of the world oil
market based on optimal control theory, and use this model to test for market power.
In Kheiravar et al. (2019) , we develop and estimate a structural econometric model of the dy-
namic game among petroleum-producing firms based on dynamic programming and game theory,
and we apply this model to firm-level panel data on oil and gas exploration, development, produc-
tion, mergers, acquisitions, and reserves. We then use the structural econometric model to analyze
the effects of government policies, changing geopolitical landscapes, and new technologies on the
petroleum industry.
Our results show that dynamic behavior and strategic interactions are important aspects of the
world oil market that must be accounted for in empirical analyses of the world oil market.
The balance of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, we explain why the world oil
market should be modeled as a dynamic game. We review the related literature in Section 1.3. In
Section 1.4, we discuss our research in Lin Lin Lawell (2019), in which we develop an empirical
dynamic model of the world oil market based on optimal control theory. In Section 1.5, we discuss
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our research in Kheiravar et al. (2019), in which we develop and estimate a structural econometric
model of the dynamic game among petroleum-producing firms based on dynamic programming
and game theory. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The world oil market as a dynamic game
The decisions made by petroleum producers in the world oil market are both dynamic and strategic.
The production decisions of oil and gas producers are dynamic because petroleum is a nonrenew-
able resource; as a consequence, current extraction and production affect the availability of reserves
for future extraction and production. The exploration, development, merger, and acquisition deci-
sions of petroleum producers are dynamic because they are irreversible investments, because their
payoffs are uncertain, and because petroleum producers have leeway over the timing of these in-
vestment decisions. Since the profits from investment and production decisions depend on market
conditions such as the oil price that vary stochastically over time, an individual firm operating in
isolation that hopes to make dynamically optimal decisions would need to account for the option
value to waiting before making these irreversible investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The decisions of petroleum-producing firms are not only dynamic but strategic as well. Petroleum
producers consider not only future market conditions but also their competitors’ investment and
production activities when making their current decisions. Since the production decisions of other
firms affect the prices of oil and natural gas, and therefore affect a firm’s current payoff from
production, and since the investment and production decisions of other firms affect future values
of state variables which affect a firm’s future payoff from producing and investing, petroleum-
producing firms must anticipate the production and investment strategies of other firms in order to
make a dynamically optimal decision. As a consequence, there are strategic interactions between
petroleum-producing firms.
Because the decisions made by petroleum producers in the world oil market are both dynamic
and strategic, they are best modeled as a dynamic game. In our previous work in Lin (2011a),
we show that assuming the world oil market is static and perfectly competitive yields unrealistic
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empirical results, and therefore that econometric models of the world oil market should incorporate
the dynamic and strategic dimensions of the world oil market.
1.3 Related literature
Economists have long been interested the world oil market. The theoretical model of optimal non-
renewable resource extraction was first examined by Hotelling (1931), who developed the insight
that dynamic optimization and dynamic behavior are critical for analyzing the world oil market.
The dynamic optimization model and framework for the world oil market developed by Hotelling
(1931) has since been expanded upon by many others to allow for such features as stock effects
in extraction costs (Solow and Wan, 1976; Hanson, 1980; Farzin, 1992); exploration (Pindyck,
1978b; Pesaran, 1990); market imperfections (Stiglitz, 1976; Khalatbari, 1977; Sweeney, 1977;
Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani, 1991); technological progress (Farzin, 1992, 1995; Lin et al., 2009;
Lin and Wagner, 2007); outward-shifting demand (Chapman, 1993; Chapman and Khanna, 2000);
uncertainty (Hoel, 1978; Pindyck, 1980a); risk (Young and Ryan, 1996); drilling activity (Ander-
son et al., 2018); stochastic and volatile output price and production cost (Almansour and Insley,
2016); tax policy (Leighty and Lin, 2012); and oil contracts (Ghandi and Lin, 2012; Ghandi and
Lin Lawell, 2019)
Gaudet (2007) provides a recent review of factors that can potentially help bridge the gap be-
tween the basic Hotelling rule of natural resource exploitation and the historical behavior resource
prices. Lin (2009b) shows that even the most basic Hotelling model yields insights.
Recognizing the importance of strategic interactions in addition to dynamic behavior in the
world oil market, the dynamic optimization model and framework for the world oil market devel-
oped by Hotelling (1931) has also been expanded upon to allow for such features as Nash-Cournot
behavior (Salant, 1976; Ulph and Folie, 1980) and OPEC behavior (Hnyilicza and Pindyck, 1976;
Pindyck, 1978a; Cremer and Weitzman, 1976). Until recently, much of the empirical literature on
the world petroleum market was from over three decades ago (Adelman, 1962; Kennedy, 1974;
Nordhaus, 1980; Gately, 1984; Griffin, 1985; Lin, 2011a; Espinasa et al., 2017). Cremer and
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Salehi-Isfahani (1991) provide a survey of models of the oil market. Many previous empirical
studies of world petroleum market use a static model. Lin (2011a) shows that assuming the world
oil market is static and perfectly competitive yields unrealistic empirical results, and therefore that
econometric models of the world oil market should incorporate the dynamic and strategic dimen-
sions of the world oil market.
There is also a literature analyzing strategic behavior in the world petroleum market, and par-
ticularly the behavior of OPEC (Griffin, 1985; Matutes, 1988; Golombek et al., 2014; Gulen,
1996; Farzin, 1985; Alhajji and Huettner, 2000a,b; Kaufmann et al., 2004; Almoguera et al., 2011;
Hochman and Zilberman, 2015; Okullo and Reyne`s, 2016; Baumeister and Kilian, 2017; Genc,
2017; Asker et al., 2018; Ghoddusi et al., 2017). For detailed background information on the
world energy industry, see the classic text by Dahl (2015). For a detailed review of the literature
on oil market modeling and OPEC’s behavior, see Al-Qahtani et al. (2008).
1.4 An empirical dynamic model of the world oil market
The mission of OPEC is to ”coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries”
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2017); however, it is unclear whether
OPEC behaves as a cartel. As a step towards better understanding and modeling the world oil
market and OPEC in particular, our work in Lin Lin Lawell (2019) estimates a Hotelling model of
the world oil market and tests whether OPEC countries colluded and whether non-OPEC countries
behaved as price takers or oligopolists over the period 1970-2004.
Our research in Lin Lawell (2019) makes several important contributions to the existing litera-
ture. First, it takes to data the theoretical model of optimal nonrenewable resource extraction that
was first examined by Hotelling (1931), and later expanded upon by many others (see e.g., Cremer
and Weitzman, 1976; Solow and Wan, 1976; Pindyck, 1978a,b, 1980a; Hanson, 1980; Pesaran,
1990; Farzin, 1992, 1995; Lin, 2009b; Lin et al., 2009; Lin and Wagner, 2007; Leighty and Lin,
2012; Ghandi and Lin, 2012; Anderson et al., 2018; Ghandi and Lin Lawell, 2019).
Unlike many previous empirical studies of the petroleum market, which use a static model,
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in Lin Lawell (2019) we estimate a Hotelling model of the world petroleum market, which is a
dynamic model. The dynamics in Lin Lawell (2019) arise from the nonrenewable nature of the
resource.
A second contribution is that our work in Lin Lawell (2019) builds upon existing empirical
studies of nonrenewable resource markets by addressing the identification problem that arises in
empirical analyses of supply and demand. Because the observed equilibrium prices and quanti-
ties are simultaneously determined in the supply-and-demand system, instrumental variables are
needed to address the endogeneity problem (Lin, 2011a).
The third contribution is that our work in Lin Lawell (2019) develops a Hotelling model that
enables one to test for the market conduct of OPEC and non-OPEC producers.
Our empirical dynamic model in Lin Lawell (2019) is based on taking an optimal control
theory-based Hotelling model to data. In particular, we use the first-order conditions from an
optimal control theory model of optimal nonrenewable resource extraction under different market
conditions to formulate a general supply-side first-order condition that we then estimate with data.
According to our results in Lin Lawell (2019), results of the analysis by decade support OPEC
countries colluding as the dominant cartel producer and non-OPEC countries behaving as an
oligopolistic fringe. Market demand has become more inelastic over time over the period of study.
The estimated shadow prices are jointly significant, which is consistent with the hypothesis that a
Hotelling model, which accounts for the nonrenewable nature of the resource, is a more appropri-
ate model for the world oil market than a static model is. Our results in Lin Lawell (2019) therefore
show that dynamic behavior and strategic interactions are important aspects of the world oil market
that must be accounted for in empirical analyses of the world oil market.
1.5 A structural econometric model of the dynamic game among petroleum-producing firms
In Kheiravar et al. (2019), we develop and estimate a structural econometric model of the dynamic
game among petroleum-producing firms in the world petroleum market. Our model allows firms
that are at least partially state-owned to have objectives other than profit maximization alone. We
5
apply this model to panel data on firm-level oil and gas exploration, development, production,
mergers, acquisitions, and reserves along with data on oil and gas prices to study the behavior of
the top 50 oil and natural gas producing companies in the world.
We then use the parameters estimated from our structural econometric model to simulate coun-
terfactual scenarios to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC membership, the privatization of
state-owned oil companies, a ban on mergers, and demand shocks on the petroleum industry. There
are several advantages to using a dynamic structural model to analyze the investment, produc-
tion, merger, and acquisition decisions of petroleum-producing firms. First, unlike reduced-form
models, a structural approach explicitly models the dynamics of these decisions. The production
decisions of oil and gas producers are dynamic because petroleum is a nonrenewable resource;
as a consequence, current extraction and production affect the availability of reserves for future
extraction and production. The exploration, development, merger, and acquisition decisions of
petroleum producers are dynamic because they are irreversible investments, because their payoffs
are uncertain, and because petroleum producers have leeway over the timing of these investment
decisions. Since the profits from investment and production decisions depend on market conditions
such as the oil price that vary stochastically over time, an individual firm operating in isolation that
hopes to make dynamically optimal decisions would need to account for the option value to waiting
before making these irreversible investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
A second advantage of our model of the dynamic game between petroleum producers is that
it models the strategic nature of the decisions of petroleum-producing firms. Petroleum producers
consider not only future market conditions but also their competitors’ investment and production
activities when making their current decisions. Since the production decisions of other firms affect
the prices of oil and natural gas, and therefore affect a firm’s current payoff from production, and
since the investment and production decisions of other firms affect future values of state variables
which affect a firm’s future payoff from producing and investing, petroleum-producing firms must
anticipate the production and investment strategies of other firms in order to make a dynamically
optimal decision. As a consequence, there are strategic interactions between petroleum-producing
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firms.
A third advantage of our structural model is that it enables us to estimate the effect of each state
variable on the expected payoffs from exploration, development, production, merger, and acquisi-
tion decisions, and therefore enables us to estimate parameters that have direct economic interpre-
tations. Our dynamic model accounts for the continuation value, which is the expected value of
the value function next period. With the structural model we are able to estimate parameters in the
payoffs from exploration, development, production, merger, and acquisition, since we are able to
structurally model how the continuation values relate to the payoffs from each of these decisions.
A fourth advantage of our structural model is that we are able to model the interdependence of
petroleum-producing firms’ value functions. When one firm merges with or acquires another firm,
the value of the other firm with which it merges or acquires is given by that other firm’s value
function, which is the present discounted value of the entire stream of per-period payoffs of that
other firm, and which accounts for the options that that other firm has to explore, develop, pro-
duce, merge, and acquire. Thus, a firm’s value function depends on the expected value of other
firms with which it has the option to merge or acquire. Therefore, the firms’ value functions are
interdependent.
A fifth advantage of our structural model is that we can use the parameter estimates from our
structural model to simulate various counterfactual scenarios. We use our estimates to simulate
counterfactual scenarios to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC membership, the privatization
of state-owned oil companies, a ban on mergers, and demand shocks on the petroleum industry.
We build on the literature on structural econometric models of dynamic games. In Lin (2013),
we develop and estimate a structural model of the multi-stage investment timing game in offshore
petroleum production. When individual petroleum-producing firms make their exploration and de-
velopment investment timing decisions, positive information externalities and negative extraction
externalities may lead them to interact strategically with their neighbors. If they do occur, strate-
gic interactions in petroleum production would lead to a loss in both firm profit and government
royalty revenue. The possibility of strategic interactions thus poses a concern to policy-makers
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and affects the optimal government policy. In Lin (2013), we examine whether these inefficient
strategic interactions take place on U.S. federal lands in the Gulf of Mexico. In particular, we ana-
lyze whether one firm’s production decisions and profits depend on the decisions of firms owning
neighboring tracts of land. The empirical approach is to estimate a structural econometric model
of the firms’ multi-stage investment timing game.
In our model of the dynamic game among petroleum-producing firms in the world petroleum
market in Kheiravar et al. (2019), a firm’s decisions may depend on the decisions of other firms
through several channels. First, aggregate output of oil and natural gas affect the prices of oil and
natural gas faced by each firm; as a consequence, owing to market power, each firm’s production
decisions affect the prices faced by all firms. Second, aggregate output, aggregate reserves, and
aggregate capital expenditures affect each firm’s policy functions. Thus, each firm’s decisions
depend on the aggregate output and capital expenditure of all other firms, and on the aggregate
reserves of all other firms. Third, aggregate output affects the transition densities for the global
state variables. Thus, production decisions of each firm affect future values of the state variables,
which then affect the payoffs and decisions of all firms. There are several sources of uncertainty in
our model of a dynamic game in Kheiravar et al. (2019). First, future values of the state variables
are stochastic. Second, each player receives private information shocks. Third, there are shocks
to oil demand and regional natural gas demand. Fourth, merger and acquisition costs are private
information to each firm, and are not observed by either other firms or the econometrician.
We assume that each firm optimizes its behavior conditional on the current state variables, other
firms’ strategies and its own private shocks, which results in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE).
In a Markov perfect equilibrium, the optimal strategy for each firm should therefore yield an ex-
pected present discounted value of the entire stream of per-period payoffs at least as high as the
expected present discounted value of the entire stream of per-period payoffs from any alternative
strategy. We estimate the structural econometric model in two steps. In the first step, we character-
ize the equilibrium policy functions for the firms’ decisions regarding exploration, development,
production, merger, and acquisition as functions of state variables by using reduced-form regres-
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sions correlating actions to states. We also estimate the transition density for the state variables.
We then calculate value functions using forward simulation following methods in Hotz et al. (1994)
and Bajari et al. (2007). In the second step, using the condition for a Markov perfect equilibrium,
we find the parameters that minimize any profitable deviations from the optimal policy as given by
the policy functions estimated in the first step.
An innovation we make in our econometric method arises since a firm’s own value function
depends on the expected value of the value function of other firms that the firm may acquire or
with which the firm may merge. We address the endogeneity of value functions using a fixed point
algorithm.
We use the structural econometric model to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC member-
ship, the privatization of state-owned oil companies, a ban on mergers, and demand shocks on the
petroleum industry.
1.6 Conclusion
The decisions made by petroleum producers in the world oil market are both dynamic and strategic,
and are thus best modeled as a dynamic game. In this chapter, we review the literature on the world
oil market and discuss our research on econometric modeling of the world oil market as a dynamic
game. Our research on econometric modeling of the world oil market as a dynamic game research
builds on the previous literature by combining three erstwhile separate dimensions of modeling the
world oil market: dynamic optimization, game theory, and econometrics.
Our results show that dynamic behavior and strategic interactions are important aspects of the
world oil market that must be accounted for in empirical analyses of the world oil market.
In ongoing and future work, we hope to use our structural econometric model to better un-
derstand how government policies, changing geopolitical landscapes, and disruptive technologies,
such as shale oil and gas, and new batteries for electric vehicles, impact future business models,
the competition of fuels, and the composition of future energy demand. We would also like to
use our structural econometric model to analyze how industry will respond to regulatory and/or
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societal demands for reduced greenhouse gas emissions and improved environmental quality; to
examine how the oil industry might transition to more sustainable fuels; and to better understand
what is required for early alternative fuel transitions to succeed. In future work, we hope to use
our structural econometric model modeling outcomes to help inform decision-making and policy
design. In particular, we hope to help petroleum firms better respond to government policies, and
to help policy-makers better design sustainable energy policies.
The results of our research will be of interest to academics, policy-makers, entrepreneurs, and
business practitioners, including oil companies, alike.
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CHAPTER 2
A STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE DYNAMIC GAME BETWEEN
PETROLEUM PRODUCERS IN THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET
2.1 Introduction
Fossil fuels supply more than 80 percent of the energy consumed in the world (U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration, 2013). Oil and natural gas provide a large share of energy consumption,
and getting access to secure sources of oil and natural gas is of huge importance for any econ-
omy (Finley, 2012). The production and consumption of oil and natural gas raise concerns about
climate change, fossil fuel price volatility, energy security, and possible fossil fuel scarcity.
In this paper, we develop and estimate a structural econometric model of the dynamic game
among petroleum-producing firms in the world petroleum market. Our model incorporates the
dynamic behavior and strategic interactions that arise as petroleum-producing firms make their
investment, production, merger, and acquisition decisions. We allow firms that are at least partially
state-owned to have objectives other than profit maximization alone. We apply our model to annual
firm-level panel data on oil and gas exploration, development, production, mergers, acquisitions,
and reserves along with data on oil and gas prices to study the behavior of the top 50 oil and natural
gas producing companies in the world. We then use the parameters estimated from our structural
econometric model to simulate counterfactual scenarios to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC
membership, a ban on mergers, the privatization of state-owned oil companies, and demand shocks
on the petroleum industry.
There are several advantages to using a dynamic structural model to analyze the investment,
production, merger, and acquisition decisions of petroleum-producing firms. First, unlike reduced-
form models, a structural approach explicitly models the dynamics of these decisions. The produc-
tion decisions of oil and gas producers are dynamic because petroleum is a nonrenewable resource;
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as a consequence, current extraction and production affect the availability of reserves for future
extraction and production. The exploration, development, merger, and acquisition decisions of
petroleum producers are dynamic because they are irreversible investments, because their payoffs
are uncertain, and because petroleum producers have leeway over the timing of these investment
decisions. Since the profits from investment and production decisions depend on market conditions
such as the oil price that vary stochastically over time, an individual firm operating in isolation that
hopes to make dynamically optimal decisions would need to account for the option value to waiting
before making these irreversible investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
A second advantage of our structural model of the dynamic game between petroleum produc-
ers is that it models the strategic nature of the decisions of petroleum-producing firms. Petroleum
producers consider not only future market conditions but also their competitors’ investment and
production activities when making their current decisions. Since the production decisions of other
firms affect the prices of oil and natural gas, and therefore affect a firm’s current payoff from
production; and since the investment and production decisions of other firms affect future values
of state variables which affect a firm’s future payoff from producing and investing, petroleum-
producing firms must anticipate the production and investment strategies of other firms in order to
make a dynamically optimal decision. As a consequence, there are strategic interactions between
petroleum-producing firms. In addition, the uncertainty over the production and investment strate-
gies of other firms is another reason there is an option value to waiting before investing (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994).
A third advantage of our structural model is that it enables us to estimate the effect of each
state variable on the expected payoffs from exploration, development, production, merger, and
acquisition decisions, and therefore enables us to estimate parameters that have direct economic
interpretations. Our dynamic model accounts for the continuation value, which is the expected
value of the value function next period. With the structural model we are able to estimate param-
eters in the payoffs from exploration, development, production, merger, and acquisition, since we
are able to structurally model how the continuation values relate to the payoffs from each of these
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decisions.
A fourth advantage of our structural model is that we are able to model the interdependence
of petroleum-producing firms’ value functions. When one firm merges with or acquires another
firm, the value of the other firm with which it merges or acquires is given by the other firm’s value
function, which is the present discounted value of the entire stream of per-period payoffs of the
other firm, and which accounts for the options that the other firm has to explore, develop, produce,
merge, and acquire. Thus, a firm’s value function depends on the expected value of other firms
with which it has the option to merge or acquire. As a consequence, the firms’ value functions are
interdependent.
A fifth advantage of our structural model is that we can use the parameter estimates from our
structural model to simulate various counterfactual scenarios. We use our estimates to simulate
counterfactual scenarios to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC membership, a ban on mergers,
the privatization of state-owned oil companies, and demand shocks on the petroleum industry.
Although we do not assume or impose that OPEC producers collude to maximize joint prof-
its, but instead infer the strategy and payoffs for OPEC firms from the data, we find that OPEC
behaves in such a way that is consistent with its mission and also with cartel behavior. Results of
counterfactual simulations also show that a ban on mergers would decrease average firm payoff for
both OPEC and non-OPEC firms, and decrease consumer surplus.
The balance of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the previous literature.
Section 2.3 presents our structural econometric model. We describe our data in Section 3.4. We
present our results in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents our counterfactual simulations. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Models of the world petroleum market
We build on the empirical literature on the world petroleum market, much of which is from over
three decades ago (Adelman, 1962; Kennedy, 1974; Nordhaus, 1980; Gately, 1984; Griffin, 1985;
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Lin, 2011b; Espinasa et al., 2017). Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1991) provide a survey of models
of the oil market. Many previous empirical studies of world petroleum market use a static model;
one exception is Lin Lawell (2019). Unlike previous empirical studies of the petroleum market
that use a static model, we estimate a dynamic model of the world petroleum market.
We also build on the literature analyzing strategic behavior in the world petroleum market, and
particularly the behavior of OPEC (Griffin, 1985; Matutes, 1988; Golombek et al., 2014; Gulen,
1996; Farzin, 1985; Alhajji and Huettner, 2000a,b; Kaufmann et al., 2004; Almoguera et al., 2011;
Fang et al., 2014; Hochman and Zilberman, 2015; Okullo and Reyne`s, 2016; Baumeister and Kil-
ian, 2017; Genc, 2017; Ghoddusi et al., 2017; Asker et al., 2018; Lin Lawell, 2019). For detailed
background information on the world energy industry, see the classic text by Dahl (2015). For a
detailed review of the literature on oil market modeling and OPEC’s behavior, see Al-Qahtani et al.
(2008).
Our dynamic model of oil production builds on the theoretical model of optimal nonrenew-
able resource extraction that was first examined by Hotelling (1931), and then expanded upon by
many others (see e.g., Solow and Wan (1976); Hanson (1980); Pesaran (1990); Pindyck (1978b,
1980b); Farzin (1992, 1995); Young and Ryan (1996); Lin and Wagner (2007); Lin (2009b); Lin
et al. (2009); Gao et al. (2009); Leighty and Lin (2012); Almansour and Insley (2016); Zhang and
Lin Lawell (2017); Brown et al. (2017); Ghandi and Lin Lawell (2019); Anderson et al. (2018);
van Veldhuizen and Sonnemans (2018)).
2.2.2 Models of mixed oligopoly and state-owned firms
The second strand of literature upon which we build is that on mixed oligopoly and state-owned
firms. A mixed oligopoly is defined as an oligopolistic market structure with a relatively small
number of firms for which the objective of at least one firm differs from that of other firms (de Fraja
and Delbono, 1990), as opposed to a private oligopoly in which all firms have the objective of profit
maximization. Usually in a mixed oligopoly there is a public firm competing with a multitude of
profit-maximizing firms (Poyago-Theotoky, 2001). A market in which there are both private and
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public firms is then a mixed oligopoly because the firms owned by private agents aim to maximize
profits, whereas the publicly owned firms are interested in optimizing social targets (de Fraja and
Delbono, 1990).
de Fraja and Delbono (1989) study a situation in which private and public firms pursue different
objectives and compete both using only market instruments. Fjell and Pal (1996) consider a mixed
oligopoly model in which a state-owned public firm competes with both domestic and foreign
private firms. White (1996) and Poyago-Theotoky (2001) analyze output subsidies in the presence
of a mixed oligopoly. de Fraja and Valbonesi (2009) find that behavior which would be deemed
anti-competitive for a profit maximizing oligopolist may be in line with the objective function of
a public, welfare-maximizing supplier. Lutz and Pezzino (2014) show that mixed competition is
always socially desirable compared to a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the
short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. Bennett and La Manna (2012) find that whenever
a mixed oligopoly is viable, then aggregate output, aggregate costs, and welfare are the same
with and without the public firm. Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) compare price and quantity
competition in a mixed oligopoly in which one state-owned public firm competes against private
firms.
In comparing private and state-owned oil firms, Ohene-Asare et al. (2017) find that private
oil companies outperform state-owned oil companies and that state-owned firms suffer from scale
inefficiencies. Cabrales et al. (2017) assess the impact of domestic fuel subsidies and employment
on the performance of national oil companies by developing a model that clarifies the trade-offs
among non-commercial objectives and the market value, production, and reinvestment of national
oil companies.
A related literature is that on the objectives of state-owned firms. Chen and Lin Lawell (2019)
develop and estimate a random coefficients mixed oligopolistic differentiated products model to
analyze supply, demand, and the effects of government policy in the Chinese automobile market,
a market that includes both private and state-owned firms. Their structural econometric model of a
mixed oligopolistic differentiated products market allows different consumers to vary in how much
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they like different car characteristics on the demand side, and state-owned automobile companies
to have different objectives than private automobile companies on the supply side.
Ghandi and Lin (2012) model the dynamically optimal oil production on Iran’s offshore Soroosh
and Nowrooz fields, which have been developed by Shell Exploration through a buy-back service
contract. In particular, they examine the National Iranian Oil Company’s (NIOC) actual and con-
tractual oil production behavior and compare it to the production profile that would have been
optimal under the conditions of the contract. They find that the contract’s production profile is
different from optimal production profile for most discount rates, and that the NIOC’s actual pro-
duction rates have not maximized profits.
2.2.3 Dynamic structural econometric models
Structural econometric models of dynamic behavior have been applied to bus engine replacement
(Rust, 1987), nuclear power plant shutdown decisions (Rothwell and Rust, 1997), water manage-
ment (Timmins, 2002), air conditioner purchase behavior (Rapson, 2014), wind turbine shutdowns
and upgrades (Cook and Lin Lawell, 2019), copper mining decisions (Aguirregabiria and Luengo,
2016), long-term and short-term decision-making for disease control (Carroll et al., 2019a), the
adoption of rooftop solar photovoltaics (Feger et al., 2017; Langer and Lemoine, 2018), supply
chain externalities (Carroll et al., 2019b), vehicle scrappage programs (Li and Wei, 2013), vehi-
cle ownership and usage (Gillingham et al., 2016), agricultural productivity (Carroll et al., 2018),
organ transplant decisions (Agarwal et al., 2018), and the spraying of pesticides (Sambucci et al.,
2019).
Structural econometric models of dynamic games include the model developed by Pakes, Os-
trovsky, and Berry (2007), which has been applied to the multi-stage investment timing game
in offshore petroleum production (Lin, 2013), to ethanol investment decisions (Thome and Lin
Lawell, 2019), and to the decision to wear and use glasses (Ma et al., 2019); and the model de-
veloped by Bajari et al. (2015), which has been applied to ethanol investment (Yi and Lin Lawell,
2019a,b). Structural econometric models of dynamic games have also been applied to fisheries
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(Huang and Smith, 2014), dynamic natural monopoly regulation (Lim and Yurukoglu, 2018), Chi-
nese shipbuilding (Kalouptsidi, 2018), the market for smartphones and tablets (Kehoe et al., 2018),
industrial policy (Barwick et al., 2018), and coal procurement (Jha, 2019).
Lin (2013) develops and estimates a structural model of the multi-stage investment timing
game in offshore petroleum production. When individual petroleum-producing firms make their
exploration and development investment timing decisions, positive information externalities and
negative extraction externalities may lead them to interact strategically with their neighbors. If
they do occur, strategic interactions in petroleum production would lead to a loss in both firm profit
and government royalty revenue. The possibility of strategic interactions thus poses a concern to
policy-makers and affects the optimal government policy. Lin (2013) examines whether these in-
efficient strategic interactions take place on U.S. federal lands in the Gulf of Mexico. In particular,
she analyzes whether a firm’s production decisions and profits depend on the decisions of firms
owning neighboring tracts of land. The empirical approach is to estimate a structural econometric
model of the firms’ multi-stage investment timing game. Lin (2009a) uses a reduced-form model
to examine whether strategic interactions take place during petroleum exploration.
In this paper, we apply the structural econometric model of a dynamic game that was developed
by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). This model has been applied to the cement industry (Ryan,
2012; Fowlie et al., 2016), to the production decisions of ethanol producers (Yi et al., 2019),
to migration decisions (Rojas Valde´s et al., 2018, 2019), to the global market for solar panels
(Gerarden, 2019), to the digitization of consumer goods (Leyden, 2019), and to climate change
policy (Zakerinia and Lin Lawell, 2019).
Ryan (2012) uses a structural econometric model to measure the welfare costs of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments on the US Portland cement industry. Unlike typical static cost analy-
ses, which ignore the sunk costs of entry and investment, Ryan (2012) explicitly accounts for the
dynamic effects resulting from a change in the cost structure resulting from the regulation. His re-
sults show that the Clean Air Act Amendments increased the sunk costs of entry, which negatively
affected potential entrants and partially benefited incumbents because of lower ex post competition.
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Fowlie et al. (2016) build on this structural econometric model to analyze market-based emissions
regulation.
Yi, Lin Lawell, and Thome (2019) use a structural econometric model of a dynamic game to
analyze the effect of government subsidies and the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) on the US
ethanol industry. They use the estimated parameters to evaluate three different types of subsidy: a
production subsidy, an investment subsidy, and an entry subsidy, each with and without the RFS.
While conventional wisdom and some of the previous literature favor production subsidies over
investment subsidies, and while historically the federal government has used production subsidies
to support ethanol, their results show that, for the ethanol industry, investment subsidies and entry
subsidies are more cost-effective than production subsidies for inducing investment that otherwise
would not have occurred.
2.3 Methodology
We model the dynamic game among the top 50 petroleum producers in the world. Exploration and
development are important components of the petroleum production process. Exploration entails
making capital expenditures to invest in drilling rigs needed for exploratory drilling. Develop-
ment entails making capital expenditures to invest in production platforms needed to develop and
extract the reserve (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Lin, 2013). In addition to production and invest-
ment, petroleum-producing firms also engage in mergers and acquisitions. We therefore focus on
modeling the production, investment, merger, and acquisition decisions of petroleum-producing
firms.
In particular, each period, each petroleum producer decides how much oil and natural gas to
produce; how much to spend on each type of capital expenditure (exploration, development, and
acquisition); whether to acquire another firm or be acquired by another firm; and whether to merge
with another firm. The actions ai of each firm i are assumed to be functions of a set of state
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variables and private information:
ai = σi(s, εi), (2.1)
where s is a vector of publicly observable state variables and εi is a vector of private information
shocks to firm i which are not observed by either other firms or the econometrician. These private
information shocks include idiosyncratic firm-specific shocks to merger and acquisition costs.
We include the following firm-specific state variables: oil and natural gas reserves; cumulative
oil and natural gas output; cumulative exploration, acquisition, and development expenditure; per-
centage of state ownership; whether the firm is a member of OPEC; whether the firm merged in
the previous year; and whether the firm acquired another firm in the previous year. We include the
following global state variables: average industry rate of return on capital for mining and quarry;
average capital compensation on other machinery and equipment; world population; world GDP;
world motor vehicles; world road sector gasoline fuel consumption; and world electricity produc-
tion from oil and natural gas sources.
The production, investment, merger, and acquisition decisions of a petroleum-producing firm
i affect firm i’s own per-period payoff pii(s, a, εi; θ); the per-period payoff of other firms; and the
distribution of future state variables, including firm-specific state variables such as firm i’s own oil
and natural gas reserves, as well as global state variables that affect all firms.
The firm-specific state variables for whether the firm merged in the previous year, and for
whether the firm acquired another firm in the previous year evolve deterministically as a function
of the firm’s merger and acquisition decisions in the previous year. The transition densities for
each of the remaining state variables are stochastic, and depend on the lagged value of that state
variable and also potentially on the lags of other state variables and lagged actions.
In our transition densities for oil and natural gas reserves, we do not assume any fixed finite
amount for the reserves. This is consistent with the common practice in the natural resource eco-
nomics literature of modeling potential reserves as infinite; potential reserves are probably infinite,
although the amount that is economical to extract is finite, and technological progress and new dis-
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coveries will always make more reserves available and feasible for extraction (Farzin, 1992; Lin,
2009b). Thus, for the transition densities for oil and natural gas reserves, we allow the distribution
of reserves the next period to depend on the reserves, production, exploration, development, and
merger and acquisitions this period, and we let the data tell us what the transition density is. Our
econometric model allows for reserves to increase or decrease over time.
We model the oil market as a world market. The world demand for oil is given by:
Qoil = Doil(poil)
= α10 + α11poil +X
′
oilα1x + ν1, (2.2)
whereQoil is world oil quantity; poil is world oil price; Xoil is a vector of demand shifters for world
oil; and ν1 is a shock to oil demand.
Unlike the oil market, the natural gas market is not necessarily a world market. Due to the lack
of a global pipeline network, the market for natural gas is mostly defined by proximity to supply
sources and the availability of a pipeline. We consider 6 separate regional markets r for natural
gas: Africa; Asia and Oceania; Eurasia; Europe; the Middle East; and the Americas. The regional
demand for natural gas in each region r is given by:
Qngr = Dngr(pngr)
= α20r + α21rpngr +X
′
ngrα2xr + ν2r , (2.3)
whereQngr is regional natural gas quantity for region r; pngr is regional natural gas price for region
r; Xngr is a vector of demand shifters for regional natural gas in region r; and ν2r is a shock to
regional natural gas demand in region r.
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The prices of oil and natural gas are determined by the following inverse demand functions:
poil = D
−1
oil (Qoil)
= −α10
α11
+
1
α11
Qoil − 1
α11
X ′oilα1x −
1
α11
ν1 (2.4)
pngr = D
−1
ngr(Qngr)
= −α20r
α21r
+
1
α21r
Qngr −
1
α21r
X ′ngrα2xr −
1
α21r
ν2r . (2.5)
We assume the costs of oil and natural gas production for each company i are given by the
following production cost functions:
ci,oil(qi,oil, zi,oil; δ11, δ12, δ13, δ14) = δ11qi,oil + δ12q
2
i,oil + δ13zi,oil + δ14qi,oil · zi,oil + δ15qi,oil · qi,ng
(2.6)
ci,ng(qi,ng, zi,ng; δ21, δ22, δ23, δ24) = δ21qi,ng + δ22q
2
i,ng + δ23zi,ng + δ24qi,ng · zi,ng + δ25qi,ng · qi,oil,
(2.7)
where qi,oil and qi,ng =
∑6
r=1 qi,ngr are firm i’s oil and natural gas production output, respectively;
zi,oil and zi,ng are firm i’s oil and natural gas reserves, respectively; and δ11, δ12, δ13, δ14, δ21, δ22,
δ23, δ24, and δ5 ≡ (δ15 + δ25) are among the parameters θ to be estimated.
We allow for nonlinearities with respect to both output and reserves in the oil and natural gas
production costs in equations (2.6) and (2.7) so that oil and natural gas production may exhibit
increasing or decreasing returns to scale, or both. We allow the costs and marginal costs of produc-
tion to potentially depend on the stock of reserves remaining in the ground, a dependence natural
resource economists refer to as ’stock effects’, by including oil and natural gas reserves and their
interactions with oil and natural gas output in the respective production cost functions. There are
several possible reasons why marginal production costs may increase when there are fewer re-
serves remaining in the ground. First, oil (or natural gas) extraction costs may increase as less oil
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(or natural gas) reserve remains in the ground if the resource needs to be extracted from greater
depths as it is being depleted. Second, costs may increase if well pressure declines as more of the
reserve is depleted. Third, since different grades of oil (or natural gas) may differ in their extrac-
tion costs, and since production may move towards more expensive grades as the stock of cheaper
grades diminishes, the marginal cost of extraction may increase as the stock of cheaper grades and
therefore the total stock decreases (Lin, 2009b; Zhang and Lin Lawell, 2017).
Since we cannot separately identify the coefficient δ15 on the interaction between oil and natural
gas output in the oil production cost from the coefficient δ25 on the interaction between oil and
natural gas output in the natural gas production cost, we estimate one coefficient on the interaction
between oil and natural gas output in the oil and natural gas production cost: δ5 ≡ (δ15 + δ25),
which represents any cost synergies from joint production and other supply-side links in oil and
natural gas (Roberts and Gilbert, 2018).
The per-period production profit p¯ii (s, a; θ) for company i from the production of oil and nat-
ural gas is thus given by:
p¯ii (s, a; θ)
=
(
D−1oil (Qoil) qi,oil − δ11qi,oil − δ12q2i,oil − δ13zi,oil − δ14qi,oil · zi,oil − δ15qi,oil · qi,ng
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from production of oil
+
(
6∑
r=1
D−1ngr(Qngr) qi,ngr − δ21qi,ng − δ22q2i,ng − δ23zi,ng − δ24qi,ng · zi,ng − δ25qi,ng · qi,oil
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from production of natural gas
.
(2.8)
In addition to producing oil and natural gas, firms can invest in capital using three forms of
capital expenditure: exploration, development, and acquisition capital expenditure.1 Let xi be the
1Acquisition capital expenditures include expenditures for acquiring machinery and any other type of asset.
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total capital expenditure of firm i, which is given by:
xi = xi,exp + xi,dvp + xi,acq, (2.9)
where xi,exp, xi,dvp, and xi,acq are firm i’s exploration, development, and acquisition capital expen-
ditures, respectively.
In addition to production and investment, petroleum-producing firms also make decisions about
mergers and acquisitions. There are several possible reasons for mergers and acquisitions in the
petroleum industry that are captured by our model. First, owing to nonlinearities with respect to
both output and reserves in the production profit function in equation (2.8), oil and natural gas
production may exhibit increasing or decreasing returns to scale, or both. As a consequence, firms
may benefit from changing their scale via mergers and acquisitions. Second, there may be other
synergies between firms as well, including cost synergies, knowledge synergies, organizational
synergies, and management synergies. As we explain below, these additional synergies are cap-
tured in our policy functions and transition densities. Third, firms may benefit from any increase
in market power as a result of a merger or acquisition. Market power motivations are captured in
part by the inverse demand function and any resulting markup from market power. Fourth, some
firms may be particularly well suited for mergers and acquisitions, as captured in our model by
idiosyncratic private information shocks to the costs and benefits of mergers and acquisitions that
firms receive.
Firm i’s payoffs Φi(s, ai, σ−i, εi; θ) from mergers and/or acquisition are given by:
Φi(s, ai, σ−i, εi; θ) =

−ΓBi + EVj(s;σ, θ) · η1 if firm i acquires firm j
ΓSi if firm i is acquired by firm j
−Λi + EVj(s;σ, θ) · η2 if firms i and j merge into one firm,
where σ−i are the strategies played by all firms other than firm i; ΓBi is the fixed cost to firm i of
acquiring other firm; ΓSi is the fixed benefit to firm i from being acquired; Λi is the fixed cost to
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firm i of merging; and EVj(s;σ, θ) is the expected value of the value function Vj(s;σ, θ) for firm
j, which depends on the strategies σ played by all firms. Firm i’s idiosyncratic fixed payoffs ΓBi ,
ΓSi , and Λi of acquiring, being acquired, and merging, respectively, are private information to firm
i, and are thus included in the vector εi of private information shocks to firm i.
Using the inverse demand for oil and natural gas given by equations (2.4) and (2.5), we calcu-
late the consumer surplus from oil and natural gas consumption, CSoil and CSngr respectively, as
follows:
CSoil =
∫ Qoil
0
D−1oil (x)dx− poilQoil
=
(−α10 −X ′oilα1x − ν1
α11
)
Qoil +
1
2α11
Q2oil − poilQoil (2.10)
CSngr =
∫ Qngr
0
D−1ngr(x)dx− pngrQngr
=
(−α20r −X ′ngrα2xr − ν2r
α21r
)
Qngr +
1
2α21r
Q2ngr − pngrQngr . (2.11)
Total consumer surplus CS from oil and natural gas consumption is therefore given by:
CS = CSoil +
6∑
r=1
CSngr . (2.12)
We assume that private firms care solely about profit, while firms that are at least partially
state-owned may also put some weight on the consumer surplus faced by that firm. The consumer
surplus CSi faced by a firm i is not the same as world consumer surplus CS, however. We define
the consumer surplus for oil faced by firm i as the world consumer surplus for oil times firm i’s oil
production as a fraction of world oil production (where world oil production is total oil production
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over the top 50 firms). For each natural gas region, we define consumer surplus for natural gas in
that region faced by firm i as the world consumer surplus for natural gas in that region times firm
i’s natural gas production in that region as a fraction of total natural gas production in the region
(where total natural gas production in a region is the natural gas production in that region summed
over the top 50 firms).
The consumer surplus CSi faced by firm i is therefore given by the following weighted sum
of the consumer surplus from oil and the consumer surplus from natural gas in each region, where
the weights are given by firm i’s respective share in the total production of oil and regional natural
gas:
CSi = CSoil
qi,oil
Qoil
+
6∑
r=1
CSngr
qi,ngr
Qngr
. (2.13)
The per-period payoff pii(s, a, εi; θ) for each firm i is therefore as follows:
pii(s, a, εi; θ) = (1−Oi,state) p¯ii(s, a; θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production profit
+Oi,state
(1− ρ
CS
) p¯ii(s, a; θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production profit
+ρ
CS
CSi

+ ω1Oi,state + ω2Oi,OPEC + Φi(s, ai, σ−i, εi; θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M&A
− xi︸︷︷︸
capex
+δ0, (2.14)
where Oi,state denotes the fraction of state ownership in firm i; ρCS is the weight that a firm that
is at least partially state-owned puts on consumer surplus; Oi,OPEC denotes a dummy variable for
whether firm i is an OPEC member; and δ0 is a constant.
Identification of the weight ρCS that a state-owned firms put on consumer surplus comes from
variation in the fraction of state ownership among firms. Identification of the cost parameters
comes from the realized firm behavior, including the realized behavior of private firms which care
solely about profit.
Although the mission of OPEC is to ‘coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member
Countries’ (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2017), it is unclear whether
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OPEC behaves as a cartel (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016, 2017; Lin Lawell, 2019; Parnes, 2018).
Thus, rather than assume or impose that OPEC producers collude to maximize joint profits, we
instead allow the strategies and payoffs for OPEC and non-OPEC firms to differ, and infer the
strategy and payoffs for OPEC firms from the data. In particular, we estimate the oil and natural
gas policy functions for OPEC firms and non-OPEC firms separately, and we include a dummy
variable Oi,OPEC for whether firm i is an OPEC member in the per-period payoff function.
As the per-period payoff pii(s, a, εi; θ) for each firm i is linear in parameters θ, we can write the
per-period payoff as the following:
pii(s, a, εi; θ) = Ψi(s, a, εi) · θ. (2.15)
The expected present discounted value Vi(s;σ, θ) of the entire stream of per-period payoffs for
firm i as a function of its strategy σ is given by:
Vi(s;σ, θ) =E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtpii(s, a, εi; θ)
]
=E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtΨi(σ(st, εt), st, εit)
]
· θ
=Wi(s;σ) · θ, (2.16)
where the vector of terms Wi does not depend on the vector of parameters θ.
We cannot directly estimate the parameters in the unconditional distributions for the idiosyn-
cratic firm-specific fixed payoffs ΓBi , Γ
S
i , and Λi to each firm i of acquiring, being acquired, and
merging, respectively, since firms only undertake actions of acquiring, being acquired, and merging
when the respective firm-specific fixed payoffs are sufficiently favorable.
Thus, we instead estimate the conditional expectations of the idiosyncratic firm-specific fixed
payoffs ΓBi , Γ
S
i , and Λi to each firm i of acquiring, being acquired, and merging as functions of the
probabilities pB, pS , and pM of acquiring another firm, being acquired by another firm, and merg-
ing with another firm. Since these strategy probabilities capture the relevant information faced
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by a firm at a specific state, the conditional distributions of the fixed payoffs of acquiring, being
acquired, and merging are also each a function of these probabilities (Ryan, 2012); if another al-
ternative becomes more attractive, which would be reflected in a higher choice probability for this
alternative, the draw of the fixed payoffs of acquiring, being acquired, and merging should repre-
sent such preference. In particular, we estimate the conditional expectations of the idiosyncratic
firm-specific fixed payoffs ΓBi , Γ
S
i , and Λi to each firm i of acquiring, being acquired, and merging
each as second-order polynomials of the probabilities pB, pS , and pM of acquiring another firm,
being acquired by another firm, and merging with another firm.
We assume that each firm chooses its production, investment, and merger and acquisition strat-
egy to maximize the expected present discounted value Vi(s;σ, θ) of its entire stream of per-period
payoffs, conditional on the current state variables, other firms’ strategies, and its own private
shocks, which results in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). The optimal strategy σ∗i (s) for each
firm i should therefore satisfy the following condition that, for all state variables s and alternative
strategies σ˜i(s), the optimal strategy σ∗i (s) yields an expected present discounted value of the en-
tire stream of per-period payoffs at least as high as the expected present discounted value of the
entire stream of per-period payoffs from any alternative strategy σ˜i(s):
Vi(s;σ
∗
i (s), σ−i, θ, εi) ≥ Vi(s; σ˜i(s), σ−i, θ, εi). (2.17)
In our dynamic game, a firm’s decisions may depend on the decisions of other firms through
several channels. First, aggregate output of oil and natural gas affect the prices of oil and natural
gas faced by each firm; as a consequence, owing to market power, each firm’s production decisions
affect the prices faced by all firms. Second, aggregate output, aggregate reserves, and aggregate
capital expenditures affect each firm’s policy functions. Thus, each firm’s decisions depend on the
aggregate output and capital expenditure of all other firms, and on the aggregate reserves of all
other firms. Third, aggregate output affects the transition densities for the global state variables.
Thus, production decisions of each firm affect future values of the state variables, which then affect
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the payoffs and decisions of all firms.
There are several sources of heterogeneity among firms in our model of the dynamic game
between petroleum producers in the world petroleum market. First, firms differ in whether they
are private or at least partially state-owned. We allow firms that are at least partially state-owned to
have objectives other than profit maximization alone. Second, firms differ in their values of firm-
specific state variables, the evolution of which may depend in part on previous actions they have
taken. These firm-specific state variables include oil and natural gas reserves; cumulative oil and
natural gas output; cumulative exploration, acquisition, and development expenditure; percentage
of state ownership; whether the firm is a member of OPEC; whether the firm merged in the previous
year; and whether the firm acquired another firm in the previous year. Third, firms differ in their
idiosyncratic firm-specific fixed payoffs ΓBi , Γ
S
i , and Λi of acquiring, being acquired, and merging,
respectively. Fourth, firms differ in their idiosyncratic draws from the mixed strategies given by
their policy functions.
There are several sources of uncertainty in our model of a dynamic game. First, future values
of the state variables are stochastic. Second, there are shocks to oil demand and regional natural
gas demand. Third, merger and acquisition costs are private information to each firm i, and are not
observed by either other firms or the econometrician. Fourth, the actual actions drawn from the
mixed strategies given by the policy functions are stochastic.
The structural parameters θ to be estimated include the parameters in the per-period payoff
function; and the distributions of the fixed payoffs to merging, acquiring, and being acquired.
Finding a single equilibrium is computationally costly even for problems with a simple struc-
ture. In more complex problems – as in the case of our dynamic game between petroleum producers
in the world petroleum market, where many agents and decisions are involved – the computational
burden is even more important, particularly if there may be multiple equilibria. Bajari, Benkard,
and Levin (2007) propose a method for recovering the dynamic parameters of the payoff function
without having to compute any single equilibrium. The crucial mathematical assumption to be
able to estimate the parameters in the payoff function is that, even when multiple equilibria are
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possible, the same equilibrium is always played.
We estimate the structural econometric model in two steps. In the first step, we characterize
the equilibrium policy functions for the firms’ decisions regarding exploration, development, pro-
duction, merger, and acquisition as functions of state variables by using reduced-form regressions
correlating actions to states. We also estimate the transition density for the state variables. We then
calculate value functions using forward simulation following methods in Hotz et al. (1994) and
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). In the second step, using the condition for a Markov perfect
equilibrium in equation (2.17), we find the parameters θ that minimize any profitable deviations
from the optimal policy as given by the policy functions estimated in the first step.
An innovation we make in our econometric method arises since a firm’s own value function
Vi(s;σ, θ) depends on the expected value of the value function EVj(s;σ, θ) of other firms that the
firm may acquire or with which the firm may merge. We address the endogeneity of value functions
using a fixed point algorithm.
2.4 Data
We construct an annual firm-level panel data set of the top 50 oil and natural gas producing com-
panies each year. The original source of data is the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly published by
Energy Intelligence Group, which reports annual information on different operational criteria as
well as financial and other measures of size for each of the top 50 oil and natural gas producing
companies. This data set includes firm-level data on oil and natural gas output, oil and natural gas
reserves,2 capital expenditures, and percentage of state ownership. Each year, the top 50 firms are
determined by production as reported in the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly.
The top 50 oil and natural gas producing firms supply a significant share of global supply of
oil. As seen in Figure 2.1 in Appendix A, on average over 70% of the global supply is produced
by the top 50 oil and natural gas producing firms.
2The reserves data reflect ’proved reserves’, which U.S. Energy Information Administration (2018a) defines as
’volumes of oil and natural gas that geologic and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recov-
erable in future years from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions’.
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We use membership information from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) to construct a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a firm if it is a state-owned
company owned by an OPEC member country.
We obtain annual oil and natural gas prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
We obtain average hourly earning of workers in oil and gas extraction industry from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We also use data on financial indicators averaged over 10 OECD countries as reported in the
EU KLEMS database. These indicators include industry rate of return on capital in mining and
quarry; average capital compensation on transport equipment in mining and quarry; average capital
compensation on other machinery and equipment in mining and quarry; average capital compen-
sation on total non-residential investment in mining and quarry; and average capital compensation
on other assets in mining and quarry. Capital compensation is the price of capital times the quan-
tity of capital, which under constant returns to scale is the value added minus labor compensation.
We use capital compensation as our measure of capital costs, including costs of drilling rigs and
production platforms, in the oil and gas industry.
We use data on world GDP, world population, world electricity production from oil and natural
gas, world road sector fuel consumption, and world motor vehicles from the World Bank.
Unlike the oil market, the natural gas market is not necessarily a global market. Due to the
lack of a global pipeline network, the market for natural gas is mostly defined by proximity to
supply sources and the availability of a pipeline. In order to estimate separate natural gas demand
functions for 6 different regional markets, we collect and construct regional natural gas prices
using data from the EIA, and regional population and GDP data from the World Bank. Our 6
regional natural gas markets are Africa; Asia and Oceania; Eurasia; Europe; the Middle East; and
the Americas.
Africa accounts for about 2.8% of global natural gas consumption, the lowest natural gas con-
sumption share out of all our 6 regions. We use data from Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Libya, Mozambique, and Nigeria to construct an average natural gas price for Africa.
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The Asia and Oceania region accounts for just below 15% of global natural gas consumption.
We use data from Australia, Brunei, Burma, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia to construct an aver-
age natural gas price for Asia and Oceania.
Eurasia accounts for over 20% of global natural gas consumption and is home to a significant
share of the world’s natural gas resources, which makes this region a net natural gas exporter.
We use data along from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan to construct an average natural gas price for Eurasia.
European Union (EU) countries account for about 20% of global natural gas consumption.
Russia is the major supplier of EU natural gas imports. We use data from EU members and Turkey
to construct an average natural gas price for Europe.
The Middle East accounts for just below 10% of global natural gas consumption, but is home
to a significant share of the world’s natural gas resources, which makes the region a net exporter of
natural gas. We use data from Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and Yemen to construct an average
natural gas price for the Middle East.
North and South America together account for about 32% of global natural gas consumption,
and aside from the insignificant liquefied natural gas imports from outside of the continent, it is
disconnected from natural gas markets in other parts of the world. Over the last decade, the North
American natural gas market has been experiencing a boom as a result of the boost in shale gas
extraction in the United States. We use data from Canada, Mexico, United States, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago to construct an average natural gas price
for the Americas.
Since we only observe total annual natural gas production for each firm, but do not observe
each firm’s natural gas production in each of the 6 regional natural gas markets, we make the
following assumptions about each firm’s share of natural gas production in each regional market.
We assume that oil and gas companies that are not state-owned divide up their total natural gas
production each year to each region according to each region’s average share of total natural gas
consumption.
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For oil and gas companies that are at least partially state-owned, if the state-owned company is
in a country that does not export natural gas, then we assume that the state-owned company only
sells to its own regional market.
For oil and gas companies that are at least partially state-owned and are in a country that
exports natural gas, we assume that each year these state-owned companies allocate the production
that is not already allocated to their own region to all regions (including their own) according to
the respective region’s average natural gas import shares. The regional average natural gas import
shares are calculated as follows: for each region-year, we calculate what fraction of total natural
gas imports (over all regions in the world) that year is imported into that region. We then average
each region’s annual fraction of imports over all years.
Thus, we assume that a state-owned company that is in a country that exports natural gas
allocates a portion (equal to one minus its export share) of its natural gas production to its own
region, and then allocates the remaining export share to all regions (including its own) according
to the 6 regional natural gas import shares. The state-owned company’s own region is double
counted because the company may be exporting to another country in its own region.
Our data includes all acquisitions made by the top 50 firms, even if the firm being acquired
by a top 50 firm was itself not among the top 50 firms. In addition, during the time period of our
data set, any top 50 firms that were acquired were only ever acquired by other top 50 firms. We
therefore observe and model all acquisition activity of the top 50 firms, even if the acquiree was
not a top 50 firm.
During the time period of our data set, there were 3 mergers among the top 50 firms. Conoco
and Phillips merge in 2000 to become ConocoPhillips. Exxon and Mobil merge in 1998 to become
ExxonMobil. Sidanco and Tyumen Oil merge in 2002, after which they drop out of the top 50
firms.
While we do not observe and therefore do not explicitly model mergers between a top 50 firm
and a firm that is not among the top 50 firms, we do observe and model the resulting effects of
these unobserved mergers on the state variables (including reserves) and actions of the top 50 firm
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involved in the merger. In particular, unobserved mergers with non-top 50 firms are captured by
the error terms in our policy functions and transition densities, and their effects on state variables
and actions are therefore accounted for in our model. Although mergers with a firm that is not
among the top 50 firms are not directly included in our per-period payoff function, but only indi-
rectly through their effects on state variables and actions, this is justified by our assumption that,
conditional on the state variables and actions we do observe, the expected value of the opportunity
to merge with a non-top 50 firm is negligible relative to the other terms we include in the per-period
payoff function, as the expected value of non-top 50 firms is smaller than those of top 50 firms,
and, when weighted by the probability of merging with a non-top 50 firm, is even smaller still.
Summary statistics for the action variables, firm-level state variables, and price variables over
the years 2000-2005 are presented in Tables 2.1 to 2.3; summary statistics for the same variables
over the entire period of the data set are in Tables 2.12 to 2.14 in Appendix A. Summary statistics
for the regional and global state variables are in Table 2.4.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Oil demand
We use annual oil production data of the top 50 producers over the period 1987-2011 along with
oil price data to estimate the oil demand equation (2.2).
Because observed equilibrium prices and quantities are simultaneously determined in the supply-
and-demand system, instrumental variables are needed to address the endogeneity problem (Man-
ski, 1995; Goldberger, 1991; Angrist et al., 2000; Lin, 2011b). We instrument for oil price using
either real average weekly earnings for support activities in oil and gas extraction or lagged real
average weekly earnings for support activities in oil and gas extraction. These variables are sup-
ply shifters that affect the costs of producing oil but not the demand for oil, and therefore serve
as good instruments for oil price. The first-stage F-statistics are over 12 in both specifications
of oil demand, and the instruments pass tests of underidentification and weak-instrument-robust
inference.
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Estimation results for oil demand are reported in Table 2.15 in Appendix A. The coefficient on
crude oil price is significant and negative in both specifications of the model, which makes sense
as it indicates a downward sloping demand curve for crude oil. Demand for oil is increasing with
world GDP per capita, which has a significant coefficient in both specifications of the model.3
Our estimated price elasticity of oil demand ranges from -0.18 to -0.32, which is in the range of
previous estimates of price elasticity of oil demand in the literature. For example, Cooper (2003)
estimates that the long-run price elasticity of oil demand falls within the range -0.18 to -0.45 for
the G7 group of countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. As expected, since we estimate the price elasticity for the residual demand for oil
sold by the top 50 producers, our estimated price elasticity of this residual oil demand is more
elastic than global demand. For example, Caldara et al. (2018) derive VAR-consistent elasticities
of of -0.14 for global oil demand.
We use specification (2) for our structural model, since using the lagged real average weekly
earnings for support activities in oil and gas extraction as an instrument may more convincingly
satisfy the exclusion restriction, since the realized oil price and oil market in one year is unlikely to
have had an effect on real average weekly earnings for support activities in oil and gas extraction
in the previous year.
2.5.2 Regional natural gas demand
Unlike the global market for oil, natural gas markets are more regional due to lack of a global nat-
ural gas pipeline networks and natural gas prices change regionally. We estimate regional natural
gas demand functions for 6 regions: Africa; Asia and Oceania; Eurasia; Europe; the Middle East;
and the Americas. We use data on regional natural gas prices and quantity along with regional
GDP and population to estimate the regional natural gas demand equation (2.3) for each region.
We instrument for natural gas prices using average capital compensation and lagged real aver-
3When included, natural gas prices do not have any significant effect on oil demand. Thus, because we are limited
in the number of regressors we can include owing to our small sample size, we do not include natural gas prices in our
specification of oil demand.
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age weekly earnings for oil and gas extraction as well as support activities in oil and gas extraction,
and total natural gas reserves. These variables are supply shifters that affect the costs of producing
natural gas but not demand for natural gas, and therefore serve as good instruments for natural gas
price.
Tables 2.16- 2.21 in Appendix A report the estimated results for regional natural gas demand for
each region respectively. The first-stage F-statistics as well as the p-values for underidentification,
weak-instrument-robust inference, and overidentification tests are also reported. The specifications
used in our structural model are indicated with a dagger (†).
While regional natural gas demand is weakly downward sloping for each region, there is vari-
ation in the demand parameters across regions, which provides support for our estimating separate
regional natural gas demand functions for each of the 6 regions. As seen in the first column of
Table 2.18, the coefficient for natural gas price is negative and significant for the Eurasian natural
gas market. The coefficient on regional GDP is also positive and significant for all regions.
The weak instrument robust inference tests test whether the coefficient on price (the endoge-
nous regressor) is significant. The null hypothesis tested is that the coefficient on price in the
structural equation is equal to zero, and, in addition, that the overidentifying restrictions are valid.
Thus, when we pass both the weak instrument robust inference test (p-value≤ 0.05) and the overi-
dentification test (p-value > 0.05), as is the case with Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Americas,
the coefficient on price is significant.4
Taken together, our results show a significant negative elasticity of demand for regional natural
gas in Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Americas.
2.5.3 Policy functions
Each period, each petroleum producer decides how much oil and natural gas to produce and how
much to spend on each type of capital expenditure. Using our panel data on the top 50 petroleum
4When included, oil price does not have any significant effect on natural gas demand. Thus, because we are
limited in the number of regressors we can include owing to our small sample size, we do not include oil price in our
specifications of regional natural gas demand.
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producers, we estimate policy functions for these decision variables which correlate actions to
states. We include dummies for having merged or acquired in the previous year as regressors to
capture any synergies or returns to scale in production and/or investment resulting from mergers
and acquisitions. The estimation results are reported in Table 2.22 in Appendix A.
Although the mission of OPEC is to ‘coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member
Countries’ (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2017), it is unclear whether
OPEC behaves as a cartel (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016, 2017; Lin Lawell, 2019; Parnes, 2018).
Thus, rather than assume or impose that OPEC producers collude to maximize joint profits, we
instead allow the strategies and payoffs for OPEC and non-OPEC firms to differ, and infer the
strategy and payoffs for OPEC firms from the data. Thus, since OPEC firms may have different
production policies from non-OPEC firms, we estimate the oil and natural gas production policy
functions for OPEC firms separately; these results are reported in Table 2.23 in Appendix A.
Comparing the oil production policy functions for non-OPEC firms in Table 2.22 in Appendix
A with those for OPEC firms in Table 2.23 in Appendix A, we find that the magnitude of the
coefficient on oil reserves is smaller for OPEC firms than for non-OPEC firms, while the magnitude
of the coefficient on cumulative oil output is larger for OPEC firms than for non-OPEC firms. Thus,
oil reserves has a smaller marginal correlation with oil production for OPEC firms than for non-
OPEC firms, while cumulative oil output has a larger marginal correlation with oil production for
OPEC firms than for non-OPEC firms. This suggests that the oil production strategy for OPEC
firms depends less on oil reserves and more on cumulative (or historical) oil output than does the
oil production strategy for non-OPEC firms.
In addition to production and investment, each firm also decides whether to acquire another
firm or be acquired by another firm, and whether to merge with another firm. In order to estimate
the policy function for merger and acquisition decisions, we define a merger and acquisition action
variable which takes the value of 1 for merger, 2 when a firm acquires another firm, and 0 otherwise.
We use a multinomial logit regression model to estimate this policy function. Since OPEC firms
and firms that are 100% state-owned never merge or acquire, we exclude these firms from the
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estimation. Estimation results for policy function on merger and acquisition are reported in Table
2.24 in Appendix A. We use specification (4) in the structural estimation.
For firms that do not merge or acquire, these firms may choose to be acquired by another firm.
We use a logit regression model to estimate this policy function, once again excluding OPEC firms
and firms that are 100% state-owned, since they are never acquired by others, and also excluding
firms that merge or acquire. Estimation results for policy function for being acquired are reported
in Table 2.25 in Appendix A. We use specification (2) in the structural estimation.
2.5.4 Transition densities
The firm-specific state variables for whether the firm merged in the previous year, and for whether
the firm acquired another firm in the previous year evolve deterministically as a function of the
firm’s merger and acquisition decisions in the previous year. The transition densities for each of
the remaining state variables are stochastic, and depend on the lagged value of that state variable
and also potentially on the lags of other state variables and lagged actions.
We estimate the transition densities for firm-level oil reserves and natural gas reserves by re-
gressing reserves on lagged reserves, lagged output, lagged capital expenditures in exploration,
lagged capital expenditures in development, lagged percent state ownership, lagged dummy for
merger, and lagged dummy for acquisition, all at the firm level. Similarly we estimate a transition
density for percentage of state ownership. The results are presented in Table 2.26 in Appendix A.
In our transition densities for oil and natural gas reserves, we do not assume any fixed finite
amount for the reserves. This is consistent with the common practice in the natural resource eco-
nomics literature of modeling potential reserves as infinite; potential reserves are probably infinite,
although the amount that is economical to extract is finite, and technological progress and new dis-
coveries will always make more reserves available and feasible for extraction (Farzin, 1992; Lin,
2009b). Thus, for the transition densities for oil and natural gas reserves, we regress reserves on
lagged reserves, lagged output, lagged exploration capital expenditure, lagged development cap-
ital expenditure, lagged percent state ownership, lagged dummy for merger, and lagged dummy
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for acquisition, and we let the data tell us what the transition density is. Our econometric model
allows for reserves to increase or decrease over time.
The results for the transition density for world population, which depends on lagged world
population, are presented in Table 2.27. The results for the transition density for world GDP per
capita, which depends on lagged world GDP per capita, are presented in Table 2.28 in Appendix
A.
The results for the transition density for regional population, which depends on lagged regional
population, for each of the 6 regions of the world are presented in Table 2.29. The results for the
transition density for regional GDP, which depends on lagged regional GDP, for each of the 6
regions of the world are presented in Table 2.30 in Appendix A.
The transition densities for average industry rate of return on capital, average capital compen-
sation on other machinery and equipment, average capital compensation on total non-residential
investment, world road sector gasoline fuel consumption, world motor vehicles, world electricity
production from natural gas sources, and world road sector gasoline from oil sources are in Tables
2.31 to 2.37, respectively, in Appendix A. For each of these state variables, we regress the state
variable on the lagged value of the state variable, as well as on the lagged values of other rele-
vant state variables and lagged values of aggregate reserves and aggregate production variables. In
some cases, relevant state variables were dropped due to collinearity.
The lagged values of aggregate reserves and aggregate production are significant in most tran-
sition densities, which means that the investment and production decisions of other firms affect the
future values of state variables that affect a firm’s future payoff from producing and investing, and
therefore that firms must anticipate the production and investment strategies of other firms in order
to make a dynamically optimal decision. There is thus an important strategic component in firms’
production and investment decisions.
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2.5.5 Structural parameters
The structural parameters θ we estimate include the parameters in the per-period payoff function,
and the distributions of the fixed payoffs to merging, acquiring, and being acquired. We set the
discount factor β to 0.9.
Our estimates of the parameters in the per-period payoff function are presented in Table 2.5.
Our estimated parameters in the per-period payoff function show that there are nonlinearities with
respect to both output and reserves in the production profit function. Thus, oil and natural gas
production may exhibit increasing or decreasing returns to scale, or both. As a consequence, firms
may benefit from changing their scale via mergers and acquisitions.
The coefficient δ5 in oil and natural gas production cost on the interaction between oil and
natural gas output is significant and negative, which is evidence of cost synergies between oil and
natural gas production, which may include joint production and other supply-side links in oil and
gas (Roberts and Gilbert, 2018).
Both the percentage of state ownership and being an OPEC member have a significant positive
effect on the per-period payoff. While our model allows firms that are at least partially state-owned
to have different objectives from private firms, we find that state-owned firms do not put any weight
on consumer surplus, as we estimate ρCS to be a precise zero.
Our estimates of the distribution of fixed payoffs to merger and acquisition are presented in
Table 2.6. The fixed benefits from being acquired, the fixed costs of acquiring another firm, and
the fixed costs of merging each have a significant and positive mean, but a large significant standard
deviation as well. Thus, the idiosyncratic fixed payoffs to merger and acquisition vary greatly by
firm and year.
Welfare statistics, including firm payoffs for all firms, OPEC firms, and non-OPEC firms; and
consumer surplus are presented in Table 2.38 in Appendix A. The expected firm payoff is signif-
icant and positive on average, but can be negative for some firms in some years. Expected total
consumer surplus is several orders of magnitude larger than expected total firm payoff.
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2.5.6 Model validation
To assess the goodness of fit of our structural econometric model, we compare the actual values
of the action variables observed in the data with the action variables predicted by our structural
econometric model for the period 2000-2005. Summary statistics of the actual values of the action
variables observed in the data over the period 2000-2005 are presented in Table 2.1. Summary
statistics of the action variables predicted by our structural econometric model for the period 2000-
2005 are presented in Table 2.39 in Appendix A. When comparing the summary statistics of the
actual and model predicted action variables, it appears that our structural econometric model does
a fairly good job matching the actual data.
Our econometric estimation entails finding the parameters θ that minimize any profitable devi-
ations from the optimal strategy as given by the estimated policy functions. Table 2.40 in Appendix
A presents each firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation from
their estimated optimal strategy under our estimated structural parameters. We define and calcu-
late a firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation as the fraction
of alternative strategies simulated that would yield a payoff, as evaluated using our estimated struc-
tural parameters, more than one billion dollars per year higher than would the optimal strategy as
given by our estimated policy functions. One billion dollars per year is roughly 7% of the expected
maximum firm payoff.
There are 65 firms that appear in the top 50 oil and natural gas producing companies for at least
1 year over the period 2000 to 2005. As seen in Table 2.40 in Appendix A, most of the firms do
not have any economically significant profitable deviations from their estimated optimal strategy
under our estimated parameters, which suggests that our parsimonious model does a fairly good
job explaining the behavior of these firms. The probability of having an economically significant
profitable deviation is statistically significant at a 5% level and greater than 0.1 for only a few
firms: Chevron, ExxonMobil, Gazprom, and the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC).
To examine how a firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation
relates to observable firm characteristics, we analyze the firm-level determinants of any statistically
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significant non-zero probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation. To do
so, we regress the probabilities of having an economically significant profitable deviation that are
significant at a 5% level on whether the firm is an OPEC member, its state ownership, its initial
oil reserves, and its initial natural gas reserves. In this regression, the value of the dependent
variable is zero for firms whose probability of an economically significant profitable deviation is
not significant at a 5% level. As seen in Table 2.41 in Appendix A, a firm’s probability of having
an economically significant profitable deviation is positively correlated with the firm’s natural gas
reserves. Thus, our model does not perfectly explain the behavior of firms with large natural gas
reserves, and therefore may better explain the world oil market than natural gas markets. In future
work we hope to better incorporate and model additional complexities of the natural gas industry,
and to obtain more recent data to enable us to include shale as well.
Our measure of profitable deviations might be a conservative upper bound, since some of the
alternative strategies that we find to yield profitable deviations for a firm might not actually be
feasible for the firm, for example owing to capital or liquidity constraints that we do not observe,
assume, impose, or explicitly model.5 Thus, our parsimonious model appears to do a fairly heroic
and remarkable job of modeling the notoriously complex world petroleum market.
2.6 Counterfactual Simulations
We use the estimated parameters from our structural econometric model to run counterfactural
simulations to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC membership, a ban on mergers, the privati-
zation of state-owned oil companies, and demand shocks on the petroleum industry over the period
2000-2005. For each counterfactual scenario, we compare the production, investment, mergers and
acquisitions, firm payoffs, and consumer surplus under that counterfactual scenario with those un-
5The alternative strategies σ˜i(s) we simulate are pertubations to the optimal strategy σ∗i (s) that shift the estimated
production or investment policy function upwards or downwards by up to two times the observed standard deviation of
the respective production or investment action variable in the data; and that shift the estimated policy functions for the
merger and acquisition probabilities upwards or downwards by up to 0.20. Not all of these alternative strategies might
actually be feasible for a firm. It may not be feasible, for example, for some firms to increase their oil production
by two times the standard deviation of oil production over all top 50 firms. Similarly, as another example, it may
not be feasible for some firms to increase their exploration capital expenditure by two times the standard deviation of
exploration capital expenditure over all top 50 firms .
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der the base-case status quo simulation of no counterfactual change using two-sample t-tests.
There are several channels through which each counterfactual change may affect firm payoffs,
consumer surplus, and welfare. First, the counterfactual change (e.g., in OPEC membership) may
affect firm payoffs directly. Second, the counterfactual change may affect production, investment,
and merger and acquisition decisions which affect firm payoffs and consumer surplus. Third,
changes in actions and/or state variables resulting from the counterfactual change may affect future
values of the state variables, which may affect future actions and/or welfare. Our estimates of the
changes in firm payoffs, consumer surplus, and welfare that arise in each counterfactual simulation
capture all channels through which the counterfactual scenario may affect firm payoffs, consumer
surplus, and welfare.
In analyzing the short-run effects of the counterfactual scenarios, we assume that the counter-
factual changes we simulate are ones that firms and consumers neither anticipate nor expect to be
permanent; and that the counterfactual scenario does not change which equilibrium is played. We
therefore assume that the oil and natural gas demand functions, policy functions, transition densi-
ties of unaffected state variables, and structural parameters we estimate themselves do not change
under the different counterfactual scenarios.
2.6.1 OPEC membership scenarios
We simulate a counterfactual OPEC membership scenario in which all firms are members of
OPEC.
When simulating the effects of counterfactual changes in OPEC membership, we assume that
the oil and natural gas demand functions; the policy functions for OPEC and non-OPEC firms as
a function of state variables; the evolution of state variables as a function of lagged state variables
and lagged actions; and parameters in the per-period payoff function for OPEC and non-OPEC
do not change when OPEC membership changes, but instead that what changes is whether a par-
ticular firm is an OPEC firm or not, and therefore whether the appropriate policy function that
governs a particular firm’s decision-making is that for an OPEC or non-OPEC firm, and whether
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the appropriate per-period payoff is that for an OPEC or non-OPEC firm.
Table 2.7 presents results of two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the counterfactual
OPEC membership scenario to the welfare from the base-case status quo simulation. Table 2.8
presents results of two-sample t-tests comparing each of the action variables (output, investment,
and mergers and acquisitions) from the counterfactual OPEC membership scenario to the action
variables from the base-case status quo simulation.
According to the results, including all firms in OPEC causes firms to decrease oil production,
leading to increases in the average firm payoff, increases in oil prices, and decreases in consumer
surplus.
Our result that including all firms in OPEC increases average firm payoff is consistent with
OPEC’s mission to ‘coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and en-
sure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of
petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital for those invest-
ing in the petroleum industry’ (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2017).
Our result that including all firms in OPEC causes firms to decrease oil production, leading to
increases in the average firm payoff, increases in oil prices, and decreases in consumer surplus is
also consistent with the assessment of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2018b) that
’Crude oil production by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an
important factor that affects oil prices. This organization seeks to actively manage oil production
in its member countries by setting production targets. Historically, crude oil prices have seen
increases in times when OPEC production targets are reduced. OPEC member countries produce
about 40 percent of the world’s crude oil. Equally important to global prices, OPEC’s oil exports
represent about 60 percent of the total petroleum traded internationally. Because of this market
share, OPEC’s actions can, and do, influence international oil prices.’
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2.6.2 Ban on mergers
We also simulate a counterfactual scenario in which mergers between top 50 firms are banned.6
When simulating the effects of a counterfactual merger ban, we assume that the oil and nat-
ural gas demand functions; the policy functions for production, investment, and acquisitions as
functions of state variables, which include lagged merger and acquisition decisions; the transition
densities for state variables as functions of lagged state variables and lagged actions, which include
lagged merger and acquisition decisions; and the parameters in the per-period payoff function do
not change as a result of the counterfactual merger ban. We therefore interpret this merger ban as
a ban on mergers that firms neither anticipate nor expect to be permanent.
Table 2.9 presents results of two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the merger ban
scenario to the welfare from the base-case status quo simulation. Table 2.10 presents results of
two-sample t-tests comparing each of the action variables (output, investment, and mergers and
acquisitions) from the merger ban scenario to the action variables from the base-case status quo
simulation.
According to the results, banning mergers would decrease oil and natural gas output, decrease
investment, increase acquisitions, decrease average firm payoff for both OPEC and non-OPEC
firms, and decrease consumer surplus. We also find that the negative effect of a merger ban on
average firm payoff is more severe for non-OPEC firms than for OPEC firms, in both absolute and
percentage change terms.
The result that banning mergers has a larger negative effect on non-OPEC firms than on OPEC
firms is likely because OPEC firms do not engage in mergers; thus, banning mergers by non-OPEC
firms imposes a constraint on non-OPEC firm decision-making that has a larger negative effect on
non-OPEC firms.
6As we do not observe and therefore do not explicitly model mergers between a top 50 firm and a firm that is not
among the top 50 firms, we are unable to run a counterfactual simulation banning mergers between a top 50 firm and
a firm that is not among the top 50 firms. Unobserved mergers with non-top 50 firms are captured in our structural
model by the error terms in our policy functions and transition densities.
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2.6.3 Privatization scenarios
We simulate three counterfactual privatization scenarios. In the first privatization scenario, we
simulate all firms having 0% state ownership (i.e., all firms privatized). In the second privatization
scenario, we simulate all firms as being 50% state-owned. In the third privatization scenario, we
simulate all firms being 100% state-owned.
When simulating counterfactual privatization scenarios, we assume that the oil and natural gas
demand functions; the policy functions for firms that are 100% state-owned and firms less than
100% state-owned as a function of state variables; the evolution of state variables as a function
of lagged state variables and lagged actions; and parameters in the per-period payoff function for
state-owned and non-state-owned firms do not change when state ownership changes, but instead
that what changes is the firm’s state ownership, and therefore whether the appropriate policy func-
tion that governs a particular firm’s decision-making is that for firm that is 100% state-owned or
not, and whether the appropriate per-period payoff is that for a state-owned and non-state-owned
firm.
Table 2.11 presents results of two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the privatization
scenarios to the welfare from the base-case status quo simulation.
According to the results, privatizing all firms decreases average firm payoff for both OPEC and
non-OPEC firms. Since the percentage of state ownership has a significant positive effect on a
firm’s per-period payoff, privatizing all firms decreases the average firm payoff.
Making all firms 50% state-owned decreases average firm payoff for OPEC firms and increases
average firm payoff for non-OPEC firms. Since the percentage of state ownership has a significant
positive effect on a firm’s per-period payoff, decreasing the percentage state ownership of OPEC
firms from 100% to 50% decreases the average firm payoff for OPEC firms. In contrast, since the
average state ownership of non-OPEC firms in our data set is 36.69%, making all firms 50% state-
owned increases the average state ownership of non-OPEC firms in our data set, thus increasing
average firm payoff for non-OPEC firms.
Making all firms 100% state-owned increases has no significant effect on the average firm
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payoff for OPEC firms, but increases the average firm payoff for non-OPEC firms. Since OPEC
firms are already all 100% state-owned, making all firms 100% state-owned does not change the
percentage state ownership of OPEC firms. Since the percentage of state ownership has a signifi-
cant positive effect on a firm’s per-period payoff, increasing the percentage state ownership of all
non-OPEC firms to 100% increases the average firm payoff for non-OPEC firms.
2.6.4 Demand shock
We also simulate counterfactual shocks to oil demand and natural gas demand. For example,
demand shocks may arise due to disruptive technologies, such as shale oil and gas and new batteries
for electric vehicles. We specify these shocks as shocks that change the constant in the oil and
natural gas demand functions.
In the counterfactual demand shock simulations, we evaluate the short-run effects of shocks
to demand that neither firms nor consumers anticipate nor expect to be permanent. We assume
that the oil and natural gas demand functions, policy functions, transition densities of unaffected
state variables, and structural parameters we estimate themselves do not change under the demand
shock.
In the first counterfactual scenario, the constant in oil demand decreases by 10% and the con-
stant in regional natural gas demand decreases by 10% for each region. In the second counterfac-
tual scenario, the constant in oil demand decreases by 25% and the constant in regional natural
gas demand decreases by 25% for each region. In the third counterfactual scenario, the constant
in oil demand decreases by 10%. In the fourth counterfactual scenario, the constant in oil demand
decreases by 25%.
We also simulate a set of counterfactual scenarios, one for each region, in which the constant in
regional natural gas demand decreases by 25% for that region only; and another set of counterfac-
tual scenarios, one for each region, in which the constant in regional natural gas demand increases
by 25% for that region only.
Tables 2.42-2.44 in Appendix B present results of two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare
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from the demand shock scenarios to the welfare from the base-case status quo simulation.
According to the results, whether they increase or decrease demand, shocks to oil and/or natural
gas demand may increase or decrease firm payoffs, and tend to decrease consumer surplus, at least
in the short run.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we develop and estimate a structural econometric model of the dynamic game among
petroleum-producing firms to analyze the effects of economic factors, strategic factors, and gov-
ernment policy on the world petroleum market. Our parsimonious model does a fairly heroic
and remarkable job of modeling the notoriously complex world petroleum market and generat-
ing results that align with economic theory and/or previous assessments – anecdotal, qualitative,
empirical, or otherwise – of the industry.
According to the results of our structural econometric model, oil and natural gas production
may exhibit increasing or decreasing returns to scale, or both. As a consequence, firms may benefit
from changing their scale via mergers and acquisitions. In addition, we find evidence of cost
synergies between oil and natural gas production, which may include joint production and other
supply-side links in oil and gas (Roberts and Gilbert, 2018).
We also find that both the percentage of state ownership and being an OPEC member have a
significant positive effect on the per-period payoff. However, while our model allows firms that
are at least partially state-owned to have different objectives from private firms, we find that state-
owned firms do not put any weight on consumer surplus.
We use the estimated parameters from our structural econometric model to run counterfac-
tual simulations to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC membership, a ban on mergers, the
privatization of state-owned oil companies, and demand shocks on the petroleum industry.
Although the mission of OPEC is to ‘coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member
Countries’ (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2017), it is unclear whether
OPEC behaves as a cartel (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016, 2017; Lin Lawell, 2019; Parnes, 2018).
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Thus, rather than assume or impose that OPEC producers collude to maximize joint profits, we
instead allow the strategies and payoffs for OPEC and non-OPEC firms to differ, and infer the
strategy and payoffs for OPEC firms from the data. In particular, we estimate the oil and natural
gas policy functions for OPEC firms and non-OPEC firms separately, and we include a dummy
variable Oi,OPEC for whether firm i is an OPEC member in the per-period payoff function.
Our results for the oil production policy functions for OPEC and non-OPEC firms suggest that
the oil production strategy for OPEC firms depends less on oil reserves and more on cumulative
(or historical) oil output than does the oil production strategy for non-OPEC firms. While we do
not assume or impose that OPEC producers collude to maximize joint profits, nor do we explicitly
model any particular repeated game strategy, trigger strategy, or other strategy that might support
collusion, our result that the oil production policy function for OPEC firms depends more on cumu-
lative (or historical) oil output than does the oil production strategy for non-OPEC firms is possibly
consistent with a repeated game strategy that depends on a long history of play. By allowing the
Markov state-space strategy of OPEC firms to depend on aggregated and cumulative measures of
historical play, our model may capture and therefore allow for the reduced-form implications of a
number of repeated game strategies, trigger strategies, or other strategies that might support collu-
sion (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998; Maskin and Tirole, 2001; Doraszelski and Escobar, 2010). We
hope to allow for more complicated repeated game strategies, trigger strategies, or other strategies
that might support collusion, including tit-for-tat strategies whose reduced-form implications may
not be fully captured by a Markov state-space strategy that depends on aggregated and cumulative
measures of historical play rather than the entire history of past play, and to develop techniques for
estimating dynamic games that allow for such strategies, in future work.
Our estimated structural parameters show that being an OPEC member has a significant posi-
tive effect on the per-period payoff. While we remain agnostic in this paper as to what this dummy
variable for being an OPEC member represents in the per-period payoff, it is possible that what is
captured in this significant positive effect may include some measure of the joint per-period pay-
offs to OPEC firms and/or some measure of transfers or benefits from joint profit maximization
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among OPEC firms.
According to the results from our counterfactual OPEC membership scenario, including all
firms in OPEC increases the average firm payoff. This result is consistent with OPEC’s mission
to ‘coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure ... a steady
income to producers’ (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2017). Our result
that including all firms in OPEC causes firms to decrease oil production, leading to increases in the
average firm payoff, increases in oil prices, and decreases in consumer surplus is also consistent
with the assessment of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2018b) that OPEC ’seeks
to actively manage oil production in its member countries by setting production targets’ and that
’Historically, crude oil prices have seen increases in times when OPEC production targets are
reduced.’
Thus, although it is unclear whether OPEC behaves as a cartel (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016,
2017; Lin Lawell, 2019; Parnes, 2018), and even though we do not assume or impose that OPEC
producers collude to maximize joint profits, but instead infer the strategy and payoffs for OPEC
firms from the data, we find that OPEC behaves in such a way that is consistent with its mission
to increase the average firm payoff of its member countries, and that is also consistent with cartel
behavior of decreasing oil production in order to increase oil price. It is important to note that we
generated outcomes for production, firm payoffs, oil prices, and consumer surplus that were con-
sistent with cartel behavior without assuming joint profit maximization, but rather with a dummy
variable for being an OPEC member in the per-period payoff function and with policy functions
that differed between OPEC and non-OPEC firms. Thus, while our results may be consistent
with cartel behavior, they may also be consistent with alternative non-collusive stories for why the
strategies and payoffs for OPEC and non-OPEC firms differ and may lead to outcomes that are
beneficial to OPEC firms, harmful to consumers, and consistent with cartel behavior.
According to the results from our counterfactual merger ban scenario, a ban on mergers would
decrease average firm payoff for both OPEC and non-OPEC firms, and also decrease consumer
surplus. This is consistent with theoretical predictions that mergers in nonrenewable resource
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oligopolies can be profitable (Benchekroun et al., 2019). We find that banning mergers has a
larger negative effect on non-OPEC firms than on OPEC firms, likely because OPEC firms do not
engage in mergers, so banning mergers by non-OPEC firms imposes a constraint on non-OPEC
firm decision-making that has a larger negative effect on non-OPEC firms.
According to the results from our counterfactual privatization scenarios, privatizing all firms
decreases the average firm payoff for both OPEC and non-OPEC firms. Making all firms 50%
state-owned decreases the average firm payoff for OPEC firms, but increases the average firm
payoff for non-OPEC firms. Making all firms 100% state-owned has no significant effect on the
average firm payoff for OPEC firms, but increases the average firm payoff for non-OPEC firms.
The intuition for our privatization results is as follows: since the percentage of state ownership has
a significant positive effect on a firm’s per-period payoff, increasing the percentage state ownership
increases the average firm payoff.
We also find that, whether they increase or decrease demand, shocks to oil and/or natural gas
demand may increase or decrease firm payoffs, and tend to decrease consumer surplus. Thus, while
shocks to oil and/or natural gas demand may or may not benefit firms, they tend to have adverse
effects on consumers, at least in the short run. We hope to further analyze the effects of demand
shocks on the world petroleum market in future work.
There are several potential avenues for future work that we hope to pursue. First, as mentioned,
we hope to further analyze the effects of demand shocks on the world petroleum market in future
work. Second, in future work we hope to obtain international data on annual firm-level crude oil
and natural gas storage to enable us to analyze the role of crude oil and natural gas storage on
price dynamics, including the possible role of crude and natural gas storage as a buffer to demand
shocks (Williams and Wright, 1991). Third, we hope in future work to complement our analysis of
mergers and acquisitions by further analyzing other forms of cooperation between firms, including
production sharing or service-type contracts between state-owned oil companies and international
oil companies (Ghandi and Lin, 2012, 2014; Ghandi and Lin Lawell, 2019). Fourth, as we found
that firms that are at least partially state-owned do not put any weight on consumer surplus, we
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hope to further analyze other alternative objectives for state-owned firms, as well as alternative
means of calculating the consumer surplus for the set of consumers each state-owned firm may
care about, in future work.
Fifth, in future work we hope to further analyze the strategies and behavior of OPEC and OPEC
firms. For example, as mentioned, we hope in future work to develop techniques for estimating
dynamic games to allow for more complicated repeated game strategies, trigger strategies, or other
strategies that might support collusion, including tit-for-tat strategies whose reduced-form impli-
cations may not be fully captured by a Markov state-space strategy that depends on aggregated and
cumulative measures of historical play rather than the entire history of past play. Sixth, in future
work we hope to incorporate and model additional complexities of the natural gas industry, and to
obtain more recent data to enable us to include shale gas and shale oil as well. Seventh, in future
work we hope to develop techniques for analyzing counterfactual scenarios that might change the
equilibrium being played. Eighth, in future work we hope to further model additional complexi-
ties of mergers and acquisitions, building on the stochastically alternating-move game of dynamic
oligopoly of mergers the hard disk drive industry developed by Igami and Uetake (2019).
Last but not least, in future work we hope to extend our model to incorporate environmental
externalities arising from oil and natural gas production and consumption, which would then enable
us to simulate and analyze sophisticated counterfactual scenarios regarding global environmental
policy, and subsequently to design environmental policies that maximize net benefits to society,
and that best benefit both firms and consumers with minimal adverse distributional consequences.
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2.8 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for action variables (2000-2005)
Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Oil output (KBD) 300 1214.441 1466.5487 11 11035
Natural gas output (MCFD) 300 3445.546 7242.888 44 53135
Exploration capex (million 2005 US$) 94 595.9822 453.5993 -13.232 1828.14
Development capex (million 2005 US$) 94 2640.832 2268.744 0 9045
Acquisition capex (million 2005 US$) 93 1133.271 2651.709 -142.899 17625
Dummy for M&A at time t
merging with another firm 300 0.0133 0.1149 0 1
acquiring another firm 300 0.0233 0.1512 0 1
being acquired by another firm 300 0.0167 0.1282 0 1
OPEC firms’ production only
Oil output (KBD) 67 2445.269 2324.396 135 11035
Natural gas output (MCFD) 67 3419.313 2687.751 112 8485
Non-OPEC firms’ production only
Oil output (KBD) 233 860.5119 819.4949 11 3754
Natural gas output (MCFD) 233 3453.09 8096.542 44 53135
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for firm level state variables (2000-
2005)
Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
OPEC membership at time t (dummy) 300 0.2233 0.4171 0 1
State ownership (in percentage) 300 48.48641 45.74817 0 100
Oil reserves (million barrels) 300 19820.82 44090.61 50 264200
Natural gas reserves (BCF) 300 85529.82 207369.9 420 1320000
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for prices of oil and natural gas
(2000-2005)
Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crude oil price, Brent (2005 US$/bbl) 6 35.98517 9.791585 28.7883 54.4341
Natural gas price, US (2005 US$/mmbtu) 6 5.756597 1.755797 3.97939 8.91567
Regional natural gas price (2005 US$/mmbtu)
Africa 5 5.643 2.4304 3.3171 9.679
Asia & Oceania 5 9.7815 1.4431 8.2034 11.764
Eurasia 5 0.9509 0.2714 0.7106 1.3715
Europe 5 7.1918 1.8749 5.1571 9.7842
Middle East 5 6.263 1.0773 5.3768 8.1295
America 5 5.8928 1.8119 3.9221 8.5541
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Table 2.5: Estimated parameters in per-period payoff func-
tion
Description Estimated parameters
Coefficient in oil production cost on:
Oil production (KBD*1e-4) δ11 -20.0970 ∗∗∗
(1.1779)
Oil production squared δ12 -0.1591 ∗∗∗
(0.0093)
Oil reserves (bbl) δ13 1.1744 ∗∗∗
(0.0688)
Oil production × Oil reserves δ14 -0.7277 ∗∗∗
(0.0426)
Coefficient in natural gas production cost on:
NG production (MCF*1e-4) δ21 0.0200 ∗∗∗
(0.0012)
NG production squared δ22 -0.0140 ∗∗∗
(0.0008)
NG reserves (KCF) δ23 -0.2700 ∗∗∗
(0.0158)
NG production × NG reserves δ24 -0.0772 ∗∗∗
(0.0045)
Coefficient in oil and natural gas production cost on:
Oil production × NG production δ5 -11.4587 ∗∗∗
(0.6716)
Coefficient in per-period payoff on:
Percentage of state ownership ω1 0.3787 ∗∗∗
(0.0222)
OPEC member (dummy) ω2 2.8945 ∗∗∗
(0.1696)
EV of other firm if acquire (billion $) η1 0.1710 ∗∗∗
(0.0100)
EV of other firm if merge (billion $) η2 0.3976 ∗∗∗
(0.0233)
Percent state ownership × Consumer surplus (billion $) ρCS 0.0000 ∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Constant δ0 0.0000 ∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Notes: Per period payoffs are in billion dollars. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.6: Estimated distribution of fixed payoffs to merger
and acquisition
Mean Standard Deviation
Fixed costs of acquiring another firm ΓBi 0.1037
∗∗∗ 0.1401∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0083)
Fixed benefits from being acquired ΓSi 0.0487
∗∗∗ 0.0724 ∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0048)
Fixed costs of merging Λi 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0045)
Note: Per period payoffs are in billion dollars. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.7: Changes in welfare from base case when all firms
are members of OPEC
All firms
Expected total firm payoff 53.6844 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff 1.0737 ∗∗∗
Min firm payoff 0.0620 ∗∗∗
Max firm payoff 0.1101
Expected total consumer surplus -4.90e+09∗∗∗
Notes: Table reports the difference between the value of the respective welfare statistic under the counterfactual
scenario in which all firms are members of OPEC, and the value of the respective welfare statistic under the
base-case status quo simulation of no counterfactual change. Firm payoffs and consumer surplus are in billion
dollars per year. Significance codes from two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the counterfactual OPEC
membership scenario to the welfare from the base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Table 2.8: Change in action variables from base case when
all firms are members of OPEC
All firms
Oil output (KBD) -317.1271∗∗∗
Natural gas output (MCFD) -1728.641 ∗∗∗
Exploration capex (2005 US$) -138.822 ∗∗∗
Development capex (2005 US$) -392.5024 ∗∗∗
Acquisition capex (2005 US$) -261.2711∗∗∗
Notes: Table reports the difference between the respective action variable under the counterfactual scenario in
which all firms are members of OPEC, and the respective action variable under the base-case status quo simulation
of no counterfactual change. Significance codes from two-sample t-tests comparing the action variables from the
counterfactual OPEC membership scenario to the welfare from the base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.9: Changes in welfare from base case under merger
ban
All firms OPEC firms Non-OPEC firms
Expected total firm payoff -6.9851 ∗∗∗ -1.1974 ∗∗∗ -5.7876 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.1397 ∗∗∗ -0.1092 ∗∗∗ -0.1497∗∗∗
Min firm payoff 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3014 ∗∗∗
Max firm payoff -0.1662 ∗ -0.2494 ∗∗∗ 1.9774 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -3.60e+09 ∗∗∗
Notes: Table reports the difference between the value of the respective welfare statistic under the counterfactual
merger ban, and the value of the respective welfare statistic under the base-case status quo simulation of no coun-
terfactual change. Firm payoffs and consumer surplus are in billion dollars per year. Significance codes from
two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the counterfactual merger ban scenario to the welfare from the
base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 2.10: Change in action variables from base case under
merger ban
All firms OPEC firms Non-OPEC firms
Oil output (KBD) -282.7638∗∗∗ -43.2392 ∗∗ -179.203 ∗∗∗
Natural gas output (MCFD) -706.1913∗∗∗ -38.5162∗ -1001.348 ∗∗∗
Exploration capex (2005 US$) -112.7563∗∗∗ 12.7991 ∗ -72.2011 ∗∗∗
Development capex (2005 US$) -337.2594∗∗∗ 31.7296 ∗ -226.6801∗∗∗
Acquisition capex (2005 US$) -63.2232∗∗∗ 3.404179 ∗∗ -132.3239 ∗∗∗
merging
acquiring another firm 0.0154 ∗∗∗ 0.01997 ∗∗∗
being acquired by another firm 0.0059 ∗∗∗ 0.0076 ∗∗∗
Notes: Table reports the difference between the respective action variable under the counterfactual merger ban
scenario, and the respective action variable under the base-case status quo simulation of no counterfactual change.
Significance codes from two-sample t-tests comparing the action variables from the counterfactual merger ban
scenario to the welfare from the base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.11: Changes in welfare from base case under differ-
ent privatization scenarios
All firms OPEC firms Non-OPEC firms
State ownership=0%
Expected total firm payoff -15.1576 ∗∗∗ -4.8248 ∗∗∗ -10.3328 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.3032 ∗∗∗ -0.3737 ∗∗∗ -0.2700 ∗∗∗
Min firm payoff -0.1173 ∗∗∗ -0.1173 ∗∗∗ -0.4109 ∗∗∗
Max firm payoff 0.0627 0.0627 -2.2536 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus 2.00e+10∗∗∗
State ownership=50%
Expected total firm payoff -7.0886 ∗∗∗ -10.5162 ∗∗∗ 3.4276 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.1418 ∗∗∗ -0.8911 ∗∗∗ 0.0828 ∗∗∗
Min firm payoff -0.1764 ∗∗∗ -0.1764 ∗∗∗ 0.1763 ∗∗∗
Max firm payoff -1.2226 ∗∗∗ -1.2226 ∗∗∗ -1.7623 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus 2.26e+10 ∗∗∗
State ownership=100%
Expected total firm payoff 19.6248 ∗∗∗ -0.2815 19.906 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff 0.3925 ∗∗∗ 0.0393 0.5053 ∗∗∗
Min firm payoff 0.1348 ∗∗∗ 0.1348 ∗∗∗ 0.3734 ∗∗∗
Max firm payoff 0.0798 0.0798 2.4763 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus 3.26e+10 ∗∗∗
Notes: Table reports the difference between the value of the respective welfare statistic under the counterfactual
privatization scenario, and the value of the respective welfare statistic under the base-case status quo simulation of
no counterfactual change. Firm payoffs and consumer surplus are in billion dollars per year. Significance codes
from two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the counterfactual privatization scenario to the welfare from
the base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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2.9 Appendix A
Figure 2.1: World oil supply vs top 50 producers supply in MMBD
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Table 2.12: Summary statistics for action variables
Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Oil output (KBD) 1250 1089.934 1407.45 4 11035
Natural gas output (MCFD) 1250 2951.507 6528.964 0 55901.06
Exploration capex (million 2005 US$) 300 520.385 596.664 -13.232 2760.085
Development capex (million 2005 US$) 300 1743.55 2043.468 0 9045
Acquisition capex (million 2005 US$) 295 531.016 1720.282 -142.899 17625
Dummy for M&A at time t
merging with another firm 1296 0.005 0.067 0 1
acquiring another firm 1296 0.012 0.11 0 1
being acquired by another firm 1296 0.009 0.095 0 1
Table 2.13: Summary statistics for firm level state variables
Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
OPEC membership at time t (dummy) 1316 0.211 0.408 0 1
State ownership (in percentage) 1316 49.858 46.344 0 100
Oil reserves (million barrels) 1250 19473.12 45401.37 22 296501
Natural gas reserves (BCF) 1250 72399.95 177989.3 0 1320000
Table 2.14: Summary statistics for prices of oil and natural gas
Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crude oil price, Brent (2005 US$/bbl) 25 35.6445 23.3058 13.6616 90.5464
Natural gas price, US (2005 US$/mmbtu) 25 3.6833 2.14151 1.5439 8.9157
Regional natural gas price (2005 US$/mmbtu)
Africa 9 6.0782 2.2554 3.3171 9.6790
Asia & Oceania 9 12.1561 3.2825 8.2034 18.1676
Eurasia 9 1.3760 0.5569 0.7106 2.1370
Europe 9 10.2351 4.0633 5.1570 16.6824
Middle East 9 8.8214 3.4490 5.3768 15.1544
America 9 6.8508 2.2628 3.9221 10.7228
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Table 2.23: Oil and natural gas production policy functions
for OPEC firms
Dependent variable is:
Oil output Natural gas output
Avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on transport equipment -4.065 -10.62
(34.87) (42.65)
on other machinery and equipment -0.204 -0.834
(1.402) (1.715)
on total non-residential investment -0.0981 -0.0783
(0.304) (0.372)
on other assets 0.459 1.415
(2.110) (2.581)
Oil reserves (million Barrels) 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.000415
(0.00144) (0.00176)
Natural gas reserves (BCF) 0.000524 0.00186∗∗∗
(0.000266) (0.000326)
Avg weekly earning (2005 US$)
on supporting activities in oil and gas -0.586 -2.412
(7.484) (9.155)
Cumulative oil output (KBD) 0.0386∗∗∗ -0.00133
(0.00537) (0.00657)
Cumulative gas output (MCFD) 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.00346) (0.00423)
Aggregate oil output (KBD) 0.0282 0.0148
(0.122) (0.149)
Aggregate gas output (MCFD) -0.00801 -0.00309
(0.0344) (0.0421)
Aggregate oil reserves (million barrels) 0.000392 0.00662
(0.0149) (0.0182)
Aggregate gas reserves (BCF) -0.0000213 -0.000514
(0.00187) (0.00229)
World GDP per capita (2005 US$) 2.316 1.402
(7.867) (9.624)
World population -8.492 -8.726
(38.08) (46.58)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.23: (continued)
Dependent variable is:
Oil output Natural gas output
Aggregate exploration capex (million 2005 US$) -0.00534 0.00711
(0.226) (0.277)
Aggregate development capex (million 2005 US$) 0.0110 0.0203
(0.101) (0.123)
Aggregate acquisition capex (million 2005 US$) 0.00231 0.0196
(0.0643) (0.0787)
Constant 30697.6 36317.5
(205966.5) (251941.4)
N 173 173
R2 0.900 0.863
Root MSE 725.51 887.45
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.27: Estimated transition density for world population
Dependent variable is:
World population (million people)
Lag world population (million people) 0.994∗∗∗
(0.000149)
Constant 116.8∗∗∗
(0.890)
N 1203
R2 1.000
Root MSE 2.8701
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 2.28: Estimated transition density for GDP per capita
Dependent variable is:
World GDP per capita (2005 US$)
Lag world GDP per capita (2005 US$) 1.003∗∗∗
(0.00411)
Constant 71.11∗∗
(26.59)
N 1203
R2 0.980
Root MSE 95.064
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.31: Estimated transition density for avg industry rate of return
on capital
Dependent variable is:
Avg industry rate of return
on capital for mining and quarry
Lag avg industry rate of return on capital
for mining and quarry -1.005∗∗∗
(0.0295)
Lag aggregate oil reserves (million Barrels) 0.000000987∗∗∗
(2.86e-08)
Lag aggregate natural gas reserves (BCF) -5.80e-08∗∗∗
(2.11e-09)
Lag avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on other machinery and equipment -0.0000540∗∗∗
(0.00000144)
on total non-residential investment 0.00000925∗∗∗
(0.00000105)
Lag world road sector
gasoline fuel consumption (kt of oil equivalent) 0.00000241∗∗∗
(0.000000115)
Lag world population (million people) -0.000926∗∗∗
(0.0000281)
Lag world GDP per capita (2005 US$) -0.0000776∗∗∗
(0.00000757)
Lag world electricity production (kWh)
from natural gas sources 2.98e-13∗∗∗
(9.28e-15)
from oil sources -1.03e-12∗∗∗
(2.45e-14)
Lag aggregate output of all firms
Oil (KBD) 0.000000341
(0.000000325)
Natural gas (MCFD) -0.00000177∗∗∗
(0.000000121)
Constant 4.296∗∗∗
(0.0779)
N 750
R2 0.970
Root MSE 0.00613
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.32: Estimated transition density for avg capital compensation on
other machinery and equipment
Dependent variable is:
Avg capital compensation on
other machinery and equipment
Lag avg industry rate of return on capital
for mining and quarry 1365.0∗∗∗
(348.4)
Lag aggregate oil reserves (million barrels) 0.0196∗∗∗
(0.000348)
Lag aggregate natural gas reserves (BCF) -0.00105∗∗∗
(0.0000287)
Lag avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on other machinery and equipment 0.0439∗
(0.0188)
on total non-residential investment -0.0155
(0.0129)
Lag world road sector
gasoline fuel consumption (kt of oil equivalent) 0.0479∗∗∗
(0.00123)
Lag world population (million people) -12.85∗∗∗
(0.288)
Lag world GDP per capita (2005 US$) -4.037∗∗∗
(0.103)
Lag world electricity production (kWh)
from natural gas sources 5.33e-09∗∗∗
(1.26e-10)
from oil sources -3.48e-09∗∗∗
(2.70e-10)
Lag aggregate output of all firms
Oil (KBD) -0.100∗∗∗
(0.00431)
Natural gas (MCFD) -0.00540∗∗∗
(0.00152)
Constant 48009.7∗∗∗
(1023.5)
N 799
R2 0.984
Root MSE 84.461
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.33: Estimated transition density for avg capital compensation on
total non-residential investment
Dependent variable is:
Avg capital compensation on
total non-residential investment
Lag avg industry rate of return on capital
for mining and quarry -9793.8∗∗∗
(1027.7)
Lag aggregate oil reserves (million barrels) 0.0238∗∗∗
(0.00103)
Lag aggregate natural gas reserves (BCF) -0.00133∗∗∗
(0.0000847)
Lag avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on other machinery and equipment -1.862∗∗∗
(0.0554)
on total non-residential investment 0.288∗∗∗
(0.0382)
Lag world road sector
gasoline fuel consumption (kt of oil equivalent) 0.0913∗∗∗
(0.00363)
Lag world population (million people) -18.10∗∗∗
(0.850)
Lag world GDP per capita (2005 US$) 2.459∗∗∗
(0.303)
Lag world electricity production (kWh)
from natural gas sources 2.57e-09∗∗∗
(3.73e-10)
from oil sources -2.77e-08∗∗∗
(7.96e-10)
Lag aggregate output of all firms
Oil (KBD) -0.221∗∗∗
(0.0127)
Natural gas (MCFD) -0.0479∗∗∗
(0.00447)
Constant 52944.6∗∗∗
(3018.8)
N 799
R2 0.988
Root MSE 249.12
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.34: Estimated transition density for world road sector gasoline
fuel consumption
Dependent variable is:
World road sector gasoline fuel
consumption (kt of oil equivalent)
Lag avg industry rate of return on capital
for mining and quarry -67174.8∗∗∗
(7757.0)
Lag aggregate oil reserves (million barrels) 0.0681∗∗∗
(0.00774)
Lag aggregate natural gas reserves (BCF) -0.00510∗∗∗
(0.000639)
Lag avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on other machinery and equipment -3.795∗∗∗
(0.418)
on total non-residential investment 1.360∗∗∗
(0.288)
Lag world road sector
gasoline fuel consumption (kt of oil equivalent) 0.656∗∗∗
(0.0274)
Lag world population (million people) 125.3∗∗∗
(6.413)
Lag world GDP per capita (2005 US$) -40.56∗∗∗
(2.286)
Lag world electricity production (kWh)
from natural gas sources -5.56e-08∗∗∗
(2.81e-09)
from oil sources -8.99e-08∗∗∗
(6.01e-09)
Lag aggregate output of all firms
Oil (KBD) 2.995∗∗∗
(0.0960)
Natural gas (MCFD) 0.378∗∗∗
(0.0338)
Constant -226225.2∗∗∗
(22785.8)
N 799
R2 0.998
Root MSE 1880.3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.35: Estimated transition density for world motor vehicles
Dependent variable is:
World motor vehicles
(per 1,000 people)
Lag aggregate oil reserves (million barrels) -0.000708∗∗∗
(0.000154)
Lag avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on total non-residential investment 0.0283∗∗
(0.0102)
Lag world road sector
gasoline fuel consumption (kt of oil equivalent) 0.000419∗
(0.000200)
Lag world motor vehicles (per 1,000 people) 1.232∗∗∗
(0.341)
Lag world electricity production (kWh)
from natural gas sources -1.25e-10∗∗∗
(3.35e-11)
from oil sources 7.30e-11
(1.53e-10)
Lag aggregate oil output of all firms (KBD) 0.0144∗∗∗
(0.00355)
Constant -375.4
(384.0)
N 432
R2 0.847
Root MSE 4.2212
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.36: Estimated transition density for world electricity production
from natural gas sources
Dependent variable is:
World electricity production
from natural gas sources (kWh)
Lag avg industry rate of return on capital
for mining and quarry -1.00546e+12∗∗∗
(5.49455e+10)
Lag aggregate oil reserves (million barrels) 667398.1∗∗∗
(54844.7)
Lag aggregate natural gas reserves (BCF) -1946.8
(4529.8)
Lag avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on other machinery and equipment -137198427.2∗∗∗
(2959959.6)
on total non-residential investment -38581285.1∗∗∗
(2040441.5)
Lag world road sector
gasoline fuel consumption (kt of oil equivalent) -958016.6∗∗∗
(193818.5)
Lag world population (million people) 1.23760e+09∗∗∗
(45427800.1)
Lag world GDP per capita (2005 US$) 447240369.9∗∗∗
(16189014.5)
Lag world electricity production (kWh)
from natural gas sources -0.391∗∗∗
(0.0199)
from oil sources -2.678∗∗∗
(0.0425)
Lag aggregate output of all firms
Oil (KBD) 27159110.5∗∗∗
(680113.6)
Natural gas (MCFD) 11117179.1∗∗∗
(239226.4)
Constant -6.26490e+12∗∗∗
(1.61399e+11)
N 799
R2 1.000
Root MSE 1.3e10
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.37: Estimated transition density for world electricity production
from oil sources
Dependent variable is:
World electricity production
from oil sources (kWh)
Lag avg industry rate of return on capital
for mining and quarry -1.29705e+12∗∗∗
(4.12199e+10)
Lag aggregate oil reserves (million barrels) -554911.8∗∗∗
(41144.2)
Lag aggregate natural gas reserves (BCF) 48747.4∗∗∗
(3398.2)
Lag avg capital compensation (million 2005 US$)
on other machinery and equipment 21049440.2∗∗∗
(2220549.6)
on total non-residential investment 22978949.9∗∗∗
(1530730.9)
Lag world road sector
gasoline fuel consumption (kt of oil equivalent) -116019.6
(145401.9)
Lag world population (million people) -70654784.0∗
(34079749.4)
Lag world GDP per capita (2005 US$) 127831765.8∗∗∗
(12144932.3)
Lag world electricity production (kWh)
from natural gas sources -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0150)
from oil sources -0.0661∗
(0.0319)
Lag aggregate output of all firms
Oil (KBD) 10355770.0∗∗∗
(510218.5)
Natural gas (MCFD) -555873.4∗∗
(179466.7)
Constant 1.18372e+12∗∗∗
(1.21081e+11)
Observations 799
R2 0.988
Root MSE 1.0e10
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.38: Welfare
All firms OPEC firms Non-OPEC firms
Variable
Expected total firm payoff 63.0721 ∗∗∗ 37.0672 ∗∗∗ 26.0049 ∗∗∗
(11.2308) (4.4646) (6.7669)
Expected avg. firm payoff 1.2614 ∗∗∗ 3.3048 ∗∗∗ 0.6719 ∗∗∗
(0.2246) (0.3960) (0.1749)
Min firm payoff -3.9834 ∗∗∗ -3.9834 ∗∗∗ -0.6357 ∗
(0.2105) (0.2105) (0.2554)
Max firm payoff 14.3074 ∗∗∗ 14.3074 ∗∗∗ 10.3077 ∗∗∗
(0.9821) (0.9821) (0.9953)
Expected total consumer surplus 3.12e+10 ∗∗∗
(6.48e+09)
Notes: Firm payoffs and consumer surplus are in billion dollars per year.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.40: Probability of an economically significant profitable
deviation by firm
Probability of
Company an economically significant profitable deviation
ADNOC 0.0250 ***
(0.0003)
Anadarko 0.0000
(0.0012)
Apache 0.0000
(0.0000)
BG 0.0000
(0.0000)
BHP 0.0000
(0.0000)
BP 0.0166 ***
(0.0000)
Burlington 0.0000
(0.0000)
Canadian Natural (CNR) 0.0000
(0.0000)
Chevron 0.1166 ***
(0.0031)
CNPC 0.0500 ***
(0.0008)
CPC (Taiwan) 0.0500 ***
(0.0008)
Conoco Phillips 0.0000
(0.0011)
Devon Energy 0.0000
(0.0000)
Ecopetrol 0.0000
(0.0000)
EGPC 0.0000
(0.0000)
El Paso Energy 0.0000
Notes: We define and calculate a firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation as
the fraction of alternative strategies simulated that would yield a payoff, as evaluated using our estimated structural
parameters, more than one billion dollars per year higher than would the optimal strategy as given by our estimated
policy functions. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.40: (continued)
Probability of
Company an economically significant profitable deviation
(0.0000)
Encana 0.0000
(0.0000)
Eni 0.0083 ***
(0.0000)
ExxonMobil 0.2083 ***
(0.0007)
Gazprom 0.2416 ***
(0.0002)
Hess Corporation 0.0500 ***
(0.0011)
INOC 0.1083 ***
(0.0024)
KazMunayGas 0.0000
(0.0000)
KPC 0.1000***
(0.0000)
Libya NOC 0.0000
(0.0000)
Lukoil 0.0166 ***
(0.0001)
Marathon Oil 0.0166 ***
(0.0004)
NIOC 0.0083 ***
(0.0001)
Nippon Mitsubishi 0.0500 ***
(0.0090)
NNPC 0.0416 ***
(0.0000)
Norsk Hydro 0.0333 ***
(0.0011)
Occidental 0.0000
Notes: We define and calculate a firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation as
the fraction of alternative strategies simulated that would yield a payoff, as evaluated using our estimated structural
parameters, more than one billion dollars per year higher than would the optimal strategy as given by our estimated
policy functions. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
93
Table 2.40: (continued)
Probability of
Company an economically significant profitable deviation
(0.0000)
OMV 0.0000
(0.0000)
ONGC 0.0000
(0.0000)
PDO 0.0000
(0.0000)
PDV 0.0666 ***
(0.0001)
Pemex 0.0083 ***
(0.0009)
Pertamina 0.0583 ***
(0.0000)
Petro-Canada 0.0000
(0.0037)
Petrobras 0.0500
(0.0000)
Petroecuador 0.0000
(0.0000)
Petronas 0.0333 ***
(0.0000)
Phillips 0.0000
(0.0000)
QP 0.0750 ***
(0.0010)
Repsol 0.0083 ***
(0.0002)
Rosneft 0.0333 ***
(0.0005)
Royal Dutch Shell 0.0916 ***
(0.0012)
Saudi Aramco 0.04160 ***
Notes: We define and calculate a firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation as
the fraction of alternative strategies simulated that would yield a payoff, as evaluated using our estimated structural
parameters, more than one billion dollars per year higher than would the optimal strategy as given by our estimated
policy functions. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.40: (continued)
Probability of
Company an economically significant profitable deviation
(0.0000)
Sibneft 0.0000
(0.0000)
Sidanco 0.0000
(0.0001)
Sinopec 0.0000
(0.0000)
Slavneft 0.0000
(0.0000)
SOCAR 0.0000
(0.0000)
Sonatrach 0.1166 ***
(0.0013)
SPC 0.0000
(0.0000)
Statoil 0.0000
(0.0000)
Surgutneftegas 0.0000
(0.0000)
Talisman Energy 0.0000
(0.0000)
Tatneft 0.0000
(0.0000)
Texaco 0.0000
(0.0000)
TNK-BP 0.0000
(0.0000)
Total 0.0000
(0.0001)
Tyumen Oil 0.0000
(0.0000)
Unocal Corporation 0.0000
Notes: We define and calculate a firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation as
the fraction of alternative strategies simulated that would yield a payoff, as evaluated using our estimated structural
parameters, more than one billion dollars per year higher than would the optimal strategy as given by our estimated
policy functions. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.40: (continued)
Probability of
Company an economically significant profitable deviation
(0.0000)
Yukos 0.0000
(0.0003)
Notes: We define and calculate a firm’s probability of having an economically significant profitable deviation as
the fraction of alternative strategies simulated that would yield a payoff, as evaluated using our estimated structural
parameters, more than one billion dollars per year higher than would the optimal strategy as given by our estimated
policy functions. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.41: Determinants of a firm’s probability of an economically significant profitable deviation
Dependent variable is:
Statistically significant probability of an economically significant profitable deviation
OPEC membership (dummy) 0.02330
(0.0189)
State ownership (in percentage) -0.0001
(0.0001)
Oil reserves (million barrels) -2.76e-08
(1.53e-07)
Natural gas reserves (BCF) 1.05e-07∗∗∗
(2.75e-08)
Constant 0.0243∗∗
(0.0077)
N 300
R2 0.069
Notes: The value of the dependent variable is zero for firms whose probability of an economically significant
profitable deviation is not significant at a 5% level. We define and calculate a firm’s probability of having an
economically significant profitable deviation as the fraction of alternative strategies simulated that would yield a
payoff, as evaluated using our estimated structural parameters, more than one billion dollars per year higher than
would the optimal strategy as given by our estimated policy functions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
codes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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2.10 Appendix B
Table 2.42: Changes in welfare from base case under differ-
ent demand shocks
All firms OPEC firms Non-OPEC firms
1: Constant in both oil and all regional natural gas demand functions decreases by 10%
Expected total firm payoff -7.8270 ∗∗∗ -8.3398 ∗∗∗ 0.5129
Expected avg firm payoff -0.1565 ∗∗∗ -0.6933 ∗∗∗ 0.0081
Expected total consumer surplus -1.09E+10 ∗∗∗
2: Constant in both oil and all regional natural gas demand functions decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -4.5229 ∗∗∗ -7.2810 ∗∗∗ 2.7582 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.0905 ∗∗∗ -0.5970 ∗∗∗ 0.0656 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -5.78E+09 ∗∗∗
3: Constant in oil demand function decreases by 10%
Expected total firm payoff -4.2786 ∗∗∗ -5.5973 ∗∗∗ 1.3187 ∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.0856 ∗∗∗ -0.4439 ∗∗∗ 0.0287 ∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -1.09E+10 ∗∗∗
4: Constant in oil demand function decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff 3.2723 ∗∗∗ 1.8484 ∗∗∗ 1.4239 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff 0.0654 ∗∗∗ 0.2330 ∗∗∗ 0.0314 ∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -3.77E+08
Notes: Table reports the difference between the value of the respective welfare statistic under the counterfactual
demand shock scenario, and the value of the respective welfare statistic under the base-case status quo simulation
of no counterfactual change. Firm payoffs and consumer surplus are in billion dollars per year. Significance codes
from two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the counterfactual demand shock scenario to the welfare from
the base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.43: Changes in welfare from base case under differ-
ent demand shocks
All firms OPEC firms Non-OPEC firms
5: Constant in natural gas demand function for Africa decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -3.1588 ∗∗∗ -1.6232 ∗∗∗ -1.5356 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.0632 ∗∗∗ -0.1475 ∗∗∗ -0.0395 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -3.08E+09 ∗∗∗
6: Constant in natural gas demand function for Asia & Oceania decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff 8.5882 ∗∗∗ 6.2976 ∗∗∗ 2.2906 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff 0.1718 ∗∗∗ 0.6374 ∗∗∗ 0.0537 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus 1.01E+10 ∗∗∗
7: Constant in natural gas demand function for Eurasia decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff 2.2239 ∗∗ -0.0138 2.2377 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff 0.0445 ∗∗ 0.0637 0.0523 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -9.77E+08
8: Constant in natural gas demand function for Europe decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -3.4513 ∗∗∗ -1.6069 ∗∗∗ -1.8444 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.0690 ∗∗∗ -0.1462 ∗∗∗ -0.0475 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -3.38E+09 ∗∗∗
9: Constant in natural gas demand function for Middle East decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -4.8333 ∗∗∗ -7.1310 ∗∗∗ 2.2977 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.0967 ∗∗∗ -0.5834 ∗∗∗ 0.0538 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -6.08E+09 ∗∗∗
10: Constant in natural gas demand function for America decreases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -6.4455 ∗∗∗ -4.4568 ∗∗∗ -1.9886 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.1289 ∗∗∗ -0.4042 ∗∗∗ -0.0515 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -5.48E+09 ∗∗∗
Notes: Table reports the difference between the value of the respective welfare statistic under the counterfactual
demand shock scenario, and the value of the respective welfare statistic under under the base-case status quo simu-
lation of no counterfactual change. Firm payoffs and consumer surplus are in billion dollars per year. Significance
codes from two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the counterfactual demand shock scenario to the welfare
from the base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.44: Changes in welfare from base case under differ-
ent demand shocks
All firms OPEC firms Non-OPEC firms
11: Constant in natural gas demand function for Africa increases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -10.0762 ∗∗∗ -6.3787 ∗∗∗ -3.6974 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.2015 ∗∗∗ -0.6434 ∗∗∗ -0.0905 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -9.88E+09 ∗∗∗
12: Constant in natural gas demand function for Asia & Oceania increases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff 3.3807 ∗∗∗ 0.2934 3.0873 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff 0.0676 ∗∗∗ 0.0916 ∗∗ 0.0741 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -2.28E+09 ∗∗∗
13: Constant in natural gas demand function for Eurasia increases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -1.1374 -0.1513 -0.9862 ∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.0227 -0.0138 -0.0254 ∗
Expected total consumer surplus -1.77E+08
14: Constant in natural gas demand function for Europe increases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -7.2221 ∗∗∗ -4.8451 ∗∗∗ -2.3770 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.1444 ∗∗∗ -0.4386 ∗∗∗ -0.0615 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -5.48E+09 ∗∗∗
15: Constant in natural gas demand function for Middle East increases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -7.7741 ∗∗∗ -5.8515 ∗∗∗ -1.9226 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.1555 ∗∗∗ -0.5320 ∗∗∗ -0.0496 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -1.56E+10 ∗∗∗
16: Constant in natural gas demand function for America increases by 25%
Expected total firm payoff -1.1550 -3.9475 ∗∗∗ 2.7925 ∗∗∗
Expected avg firm payoff -0.0231 -0.2939 ∗∗∗ 0.0665 ∗∗∗
Expected total consumer surplus -7.58E+09 ∗∗∗
Notes: Table reports the difference between the value of the respective welfare statistic under the counterfactual
demand shock scenario, and the value of the respective welfare statistic under under the base-case status quo simu-
lation of no counterfactual change. Firm payoffs and consumer surplus are in billion dollars per year. Significance
codes from two-sample t-tests comparing the welfare from the counterfactual demand shock scenario to the welfare
from the base-case status quo simulation: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF FUEL SUBSIDIES ON AIR QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE
IRANIAN SUBSIDY REFORM
3.1 Introduction
Gasoline consumption an important source of air pollution and a major environmental concern
in urban areas (Lin and Prince, 2009; Lin Lawell, 2017). Motor vehicles are the primary source
of carbon monoxide (CO), and an important source of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and
nitrogen oxides (NOx, which consist of both nitrogen oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2))
responsible for the formation of photochemical smog and ground-level ozone (O3). Vehicular
emissions also contribute to the ambient air concentrations of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and particulate
matter (PM10) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1994; Zhang et al., 2017; Beaudoin and
Lin Lawell, 2019).
Gasoline taxes have been touted by many economists as an efficient and relatively simple tool to
address environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption. Never-
theless, rather than removing subsidies and increasing gasoline taxes, many countries still subsidize
gasoline (Lin Lawell, 2017), which may have the opposite effect of exacerbating the environmental
concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption.
Coady et al. (2017) estimates such global post-tax fossil fuel subsidies and has found that they
have reached a staggering $4.9 trillion worldwide in 2013 and $5.3 trillion in 2015, representing
6.5% of global GDP. Using detailed measurements of net gasoline taxes and subsidies, Ross et al.
(2017) find that 33 countries subsidized gasoline for at least one 12-month period from 2003 to
2015, and 9 countries subsidized gasoline for the entire period. In general, these subsidizing coun-
tries also kept their gasoline prices fixed and were economically dependent on oil or natural gas
exports. The researchers also find that while two-thirds of the countries in their sample increased
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their net gasoline taxes from 2003 to 2015, the global mean gasoline tax fell by 13.3 percent due to
a shift in consumption towards states that maintain gasoline subsidies or that have low taxes. The
data also reveal variation in net gasoline taxes and subsidies across different regions of the world.
Europe and North America have the highest net taxes, while oil-rich countries in the Middle East
and North Africa have the lowest net taxes. Countries that subsidized gasoline were economically
dependent on oil and gas exports, perhaps due to political pressure to distribute resource revenues
(Ross et al., 2017).
The prevalence of gasoline subsidies worldwide and the fall in the global mean gasoline tax
may exacerbate air pollution owing to the resulting increase in gasoline consumption. Neverthe-
less, whether gasoline subsidies actually increase air pollution, and the effects of gasoline subsidies
on different air pollutants, remain open empirical question not fully addressed in the previous lit-
erature, particularly for oil-rich countries in the Middle East and North Africa that have the lowest
net taxes.
The Iranian government has heavily subsidized petroleum products since the early 1980s. As
a result of these energy subsidies and artificially low national energy price, Iran is one of the most
energy-intensive countries in the world. As seen in Figure 3.1, Iran had the highest pre-tax energy
subsidies (including subsidies on petroleum, electricity, natural gas, and coal) as a percentage of
the GDP amongst the 19 countries in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011.
The Iranian government has recently taken a series of measures to reform and cut back on the
energy subsidies. In this paper, we evaluate the effects of the Iranian subsidy reform on air quality
using a regression discontinuity design.
Our results provide evidence across multiple different empirical specifications that the subsidy
reform in Iran led to improvements in air quality. In particular, the first subsidy reform event,
which increased gasoline prices and implemented a gasoline consumption quota; and the second
subsidy reform event, which increased energy prices and decreased energy subsidies, both led to
declines in concentrations of CO, O3, and NO2. In contrast, the fourth subsidy reform event, which
increased fuel prices but removed the gasoline consumption quota, was less effective in reducing
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air pollution.
The balance of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the previous literature.
Section 3.3 presents an overview of the Iranian Subsidy Reform Plan. We describe our data in
Section 3.4. We present out empirical analysis in Section 3.5. We discuss our results and conclude
in Section 3.6.
3.2 Previous Literature
3.2.1 Fossil Fuel Subsidies
One strand of literature upon which we build is the literature on fossil fuel subsidies.
Fuje (2018) studies the welfare effects of fossil fuel subsidies through their impacts on food
prices. Using a time regression discontinuity design, the author studies the Ethiopian subsidy
reform program and finds that removal of fuel subsidies results in higher grain price dispersion
which could in turn have heterogeneous welfare effects on different districts in Ethiopia depending
on the district’s relative share of income from grains.
Gelan (2018) conducts a simulation experiment to study the economic and emission effects of
removing energy subsidies in Kuwait. Results indicate that a 25% reduction in subsidies for three
energy products could result in significant price hikes and marginally decline the GDP. Under a
different scenario a reduction in subsidies combined with transfers could reduce the negative effects
of removing subsidies on GDP. This paper suggests that subsidy reform should be combined with
demand side stimulus or supply side initiatives to encourage energy conservation.
Aune et al. (2017) look at the oil market impacts and welfare effects of subsidy removal in
OPEC and non-OECD countries. They show that the consumption of oil in transport sector of
OPEC countries significantly decreases due to phasing out subsidies. This in turn reduces the oil
prices and increases consumption in other regions. They also find that total welfare in OPEC is
higher mainly due to increase in oil production profits although consumers are worse off.
Zhao et al. (2019) develop an economic optimization model for oil and gas extraction to analyze
the effects of producer subsidy removal, and use the model to simulate various scenarios of phasing
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out producer subsidies in U.S. federal and state regulation on optimal production using field data
from the Gulf of Mexico.
Ferraresi et al. (2018) study the effect of decentralization (defined as an increase in the number
of government levels) on fuel subsidies using a panel of 108 countries. Their results indicate that
both diesel and gasoline subsidies are decreased as governments become more decentralized. Their
results also indicate that the decrease in subsidies due to decentralization is more significant when
political accountability is lower.
Ghoddusi and Rafizadeh (2018) study the effect of fuel subsidy reform on the behavior of
gasoline consumers using three major fuel subsidy reform events in Iran. Their results indicate
consistent decline in the gasoline price elasticity following each subsidy reform event.
3.2.2 Fossil Fuels and Iran
In addition to the literature on fossil fuel subsidies, we also build upon the literature on fossil fuels
in Iran.
Ghandi and Lin (2012) examine the National Iranian Oil Company’s (NIOC) actual and con-
tractual oil production behavior on Iran’s offshore Soroosh and Nowrooz fields, which have been
developed by Shell Exploration through a buy-back service contract.
Ghoddusi et al. (2018) apply difference-in-differences and panel estimation methods to esti-
mate the price elasticity of gasoline smuggling in Iran. Their results indicate that the foreign-to-
home gasoline price ratios have a significant effect on the elasticity of demand.
Farzanegan and Krieger (2018) study the short and long run responses of income inequality to
positive per capita oil and gas rent shocks in Iran, and find a positive and statistically significant
response of income inequality to oil rent booms within 4 years of the shock.
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3.3 Background
3.3.1 Air Pollution in Iran
The air in Tehran, the capital of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), is amongst the most polluted
in the world (Heger and Sarraf, 2018). There are more than 17 million vehicular trips per day
in Tehran (Hosseini and Shahbazi, 2016), and many of the vehicles have outdated technology
(Heger and Sarraf, 2018). Topography and climate add to the pollution problem: Tehran is at
a high altitude and is surrounded by the Alborz Mountain Range, which traps polluted air; and
temperature inversion, a phenomenon particularly occurring during the winter months, prevents
the pollutants from being diluted. Rapid population growth, industrial development, urbanization,
and increasing fuel consumption make reducing air pollution in Tehran difficult (Heger and Sarraf,
2018).
Iran’s Department of the Environment estimates that 85 percent of nitrogen oxides emissions
(which include NO2 emissions) and over 90 percent of hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon monoxide
(CO) emissions in Tehran are caused by motor vehicles (Zerbonia and Soraya, 1978). Other studies
estimate that approximately 80 percent nitrogen oxides (which include NO2), PM10, and CO in
Tehran are produced by mobile sources (Azarmi and Arhami, 2017).
In Tehran, 70 percent of particular matter emissions come from mobile sources (vehicles).
Power plants and refineries are responsible for about 20 percent of particular matter emissions;
industrial sources and gas terminals emit 8 percent; and households and commercial sources are
responsible for the remaining 2 percent (Heger and Sarraf, 2018).
3.3.2 Iranian Subsidy Reform
In Iran, domestic energy prices, including gasoline prices, are set administratively rather than by
the market. The Iranian government has heavily subsidized petroleum products, utilities, as well as
a few food products for over three decades since the early 1980s. These subsidies were originally
introduced to manage the economic challenges during the war against Iraq. As seen in Figure 3.1,
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Iran had the highest pre-tax energy subsidies (including subsidies on petroleum, electricity, natural
gas, and coal) as a percentage of the GDP amongst the 19 countries in the Middle East and North
Africa in 2011. The World Bank (2016) estimated the overall indirect subsidies in 2007-2008
to be $77.2 billion, about 27 percent of the country’s GDP. Prior to the recent subsidy reforms,
an average Iranian household of four received about $4,000 annually in various subsidies on oil
and natural gas alone (Guillaume et al., 2011). Over the last four decades, energy prices in Iran
have changed only a handful of times, each time after remaining constant for long period. As a
result of these energy subsidies and artificially low national energy price, Iran is one of the most
energy-intensive countries in the world.
Redistribution of wealth and helping the poor is the primary reason for energy subsidies. Many
countries in this region have started subsidy reform programs as they realized that there are huge
economic costs hidden in their subsidy programs and the wealth redistribution was inefficient since
the benefits go mainly to the wealthy. Pricing energy below cost is inefficient as it leads to over-
consumption and causes deadweight loss. Under certain assumptions about supply and demand
elasticities, Davis (2014) estimates the annual deadweight loss caused by fuel subsidies worldwide
to be over $44 billion in year 2012.
In addition to deadweight loss, there are other distortions caused by pricing energy below cost
which increases the economic cost of energy subsidies. These include, for instance, environmental
damages caused by overconsumption among the major external costs of subsidies.
The Iranian government has recently taken a series of measures to reform and cut back on the
energy subsidies. The first subsidy reform event took place on June 27, 2007. As part of the first
subsidy reform event, in order to control fuel smuggling activities the government announced a
price hike for gasoline and issued a fuel card for each vehicle owner introducing a 60 liter monthly
quota for each vehicle. The 60 liter monthly quota (with roll over) was for gasoline and premium
gasoline only. After the introduction of fuel card (gasoline card) each vehicle could buy 60 liters
of gasoline or premium gasoline per month at the ”subsidized” price, after which they have to pay
the higher price. For example, after the first reform event on June 27, 2007, a fuel card holder
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could buy 60 liters of gasoline at 1000 IRR (100 Iranian Toman 1) per liter, and once the 60 liter
quota is used they had to pay 4000 IRR (400 Toman) per liter. To buy gasoline exceeding the 60
liter quota one had to pay a significantly higher price. This price hike was another component of
the first subsidy reform event.
The second subsidy reform event took place on December 18, 2010, when the Iranian gov-
ernment implemented the first phase of the Iranian subsidy reform plan, announcing a significant
increase in energy prices as well as the prices of subsidized agricultural products (by up to 20
times). Under this plan, the government removed an estimated US$50-US$60 billion dollars in
subsidies on key staples such as petroleum products and utilities. The government used the sav-
ings to provide universal direct monthly cash transfers to each household, direct assistance to
enterprises adjusting to the new price structure, and direct assistance to the government agencies
to help pay for higher energy bills.
The third subsidy reform event took place on April 24, 2014, when the Iranian government
implemented the second phase of the Iranian subsidy reform plan, decreasing subsidies further and
causing fuel prices to experience another significant increase.
The fourth subsidy reform event took place on May 27, 2015, when the Iranian government
announced even higher fuel prices and abandoned the gasoline consumption quota restriction and
the fuel card program altogether.
Table 3.1 lists the 4 major Iranian subsidy reform events. Table 3.2 summarizes the energy and
utility prices during the subsidy reform.
Before event 2, the first phase of subsidy reform which took place on December 18, 2010, the
daily gasoline consumption on average was between 54-55 million liters. Just over 3 weeks later,
the daily average gasoline consumption reported to be 44 million liters on Jan 10, 2011. This is
a decline of 10 million liters, or 18.5%, in gasoline consumption in the national level. There was
also a 11 million liter reduction in daily diesel fuel consumption in transportation sector, and a 20
million cubic meter reduction in daily natural gas consumption (Khajehpour, 2018)
1Each Iranian Toman is equivalent to 10 IRR
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Nevertheless, as seen in Figures 3.2.A-3.2.B, gasoline consumption continued to have an up-
ward trend following events 2, 3, and 4. In contrast, as seen in Figures 3.3.A-3.3.B, diesel con-
sumption had a downward trend following events 3 and 4.
As seen in Figure 3.4, even despite the Iranian subsidy reform, gasoline prices in Iran continue
to be among the lowest in the world in 2017.
3.4 Data
For our air quality data, we use data from the Tehran Air Quality Control Company2 on the daily
average concentrations and hourly mean concentrations of five air pollutants (CO, O3, NO2, SO2,
and PM10) from 24 monitoring stations in Tehran over the period March 21, 2007 to March 19,
2017 (corresponding to the dates 1386/1/1 to 1395/29/12 in the Iranian Calendar).
From the hourly mean air quality data, we create variables for the daily maximum pollution
concentration for each of the five air pollutants. For each pollutant, each day, and each monitoring
station, this is the maximum value of all hourly values of that pollutant for that day and monitoring
station. For each pollutant, there is a separate observation of the daily maximum pollution level
for that pollutant for each day for each monitoring station.
The weather data are from the Mehrabad Airport and IKI Airport weather monitoring stations.
This is daily data on two weather stations near Tehran. Mehrabad Airport and IKI Airport are
the two airports serving Tehran and there is daily weather data available for these two stations.
The source of the weather data is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
(2018).
Figure 3.5 shows the local air quality monitoring stations across Tehran. Figure 3.6 shows both
the local air quality monitoring stations across Tehran and the weather monitoring stations near
Tehran.
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics for the daily average pollution concentration and the
daily maximum pollution concentration for each of the five air pollutants (CO, O3, NO2, SO2, and
2http://air.tehran.ir/
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PM10).
Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics for the weather data, averaged over both weather
stations near Tehran. Table 3.5 presents the summary statistics for the weather data using data from
the Mehrabad Airport weather monitoring station, which is closer to our air quality monitoring
stations, only. The weather data are very similar whether or not we average over both stations
or use just the data from the closer station. The correlation coefficient between daily average
temperature averaged across both airports and daily average temperature at Mehrabad airport is
0.9989. The correlation coefficient between daily maximum sustained wind speed averaged across
both airports and daily maximum sustained wind speed at Mehrabad airport is 0.8723. As shown
below, our empirical results are robust to whether or not we average the weather data over both
stations or use just the weather data from the closer station.
Figure 3.7 plots mean daily pollution levels for each of the five pollutants for the time period
1997 to 2009. Mean daily pollution levels are constructed by averaging the hourly mean concen-
tration over all hours in a day and over all monitoring stations. The vertical lines indicate the dates
when each of the four subsidy reform events: June 27, 2007; December 18, 2010; April 24, 2014;
and May 27, 2015.
3.5 Empirical analysis
To analyze the impact of the energy subsidy reform on air quality, we use a regression discontinuity
design. A regression discontinuity design can be used when observations can be ordered according
to a forcing (or running) variable and then the treatment is assigned above a given threshold. In our
case, the forcing variable is time and the threshold is the date a phase of the Iranian subsidy reform
plan was implemented (Percoco, 2014). Previous studies that have used a regression discontinuity
design with time as the forcing variable to evaluate environmental and energy policy include Davis
(2008); Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011); Salvo and Wang (2017); Zhang et al. (2017); Hausman
and Rapson (2018) provide an excellent review of these studies and a guide for practitioners. In a
regression discontinuity design, there is no value of the forcing variable at which we observe both
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treatment and control observations; instead, we extrapolate across covariate values, at least in a
neighborhood of the discontinuity (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
We augment our polynomial regression discontinuity estimator with covariates entering in an
additively separable, linear-in-parameters way; Calonico et al. (2019) shows that the resulting
covariate-adjusted regression discontinuity estimator remains consistent for the standard regression
discontinuity treatment effect and can achieve substantial efficiency gains relative to the unadjusted
regression discontinuity estimator.
In particular, we use the following regression discontinuity design for each pollutant j:
ln yijt = β1D1t + β2D2t + β3D3t + β4D4t + x
′
tγ + τt + αi + ijt, (3.1)
where yijt is the amount of pollutant j measured at station i on day t, Dnt is a subsidy reform
indicator variable which equals one for all the days covered by subsidy reform event n and zero
otherwise, xt is a vector of covariates, τt are year effects, and αi is a station fixed effect. We
include four subsidy reform indicators Dnt in the specification, one for each of the four events of
the subsidy reform listed in Table 3.1, where Dnt is equal to 1 if day t is after event n and before
event n+ 1, and 0 otherwise. The vector of covariates xt includes indicator variables for month of
the year and day of the week; fourth-order polynomials in log daily average temperature and log
daily maximum sustained wind speed; and a ninth-order polynomial time trend.3 The coefficients
of interest are the coefficients βn on the four events n of the subsidy reform, as they capture the
effect of the different events of the subsidy reform on air quality.
Our regression discontinuity design addresses the potential bias caused by time-varying omitted
variables. Within a narrow time window, the unobserved factors influencing air quality are likely
to be similar so that observations when the subsidy reform was not in effect provide a comparison
3The validity of regression discontinuity estimates of causal effects depends on whether the polynomial models
provide an adequate description of the counterfactual conditional mean of the dependent variable, conditional on time.
If not, then what may look like a jump due to treatment might simply be an unaccounted-for nonlinearity in the
counterfactual conditional mean function (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We therefore use a higher order polynomial to
account for any nonlinearities in the counterfactual conditional mean function. We use a ninth-order polynomial time
trend because the ninth-order time trend term is often significant, and because our results are robust to whether we also
include a tenth-order time trend term.
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group for observations when the subsidy reform was in effect.
The station fixed effects αi control for time-invariant station heterogeneity. The indicator vari-
ables for month of the year control for monthly variation in driving patterns and other factors that
affect air quality. Similarly, the indicator variables for day of the week control for intra-week
variation in driving patterns and other factors that affect air quality.
For the year effects τt, we define each year to be from July 1st to June 30th so that events 2 and
3, which are the events during which there were the largest changes in prices, occur almost in the
middle of each corresponding year.
Figure 3.8 plots residuals from a regression of log daily average pollution concentration levels
on weather and seasonality covariates and station fixed effects for each of the five air pollutants
(CO, O3, NO2, SO2, and PM10). The fitted lines are the predicted values of a regression of these
residuals on subsidy reform dummies and a ninth-order polynomial time trend. Again, the vertical
lines indicate the dates of each subsidy reform event. For all pollutants, the ninth-order polynomial
seems to describe the underlying time trend adequately while maintaining some degree of smooth-
ness. According to Figure 3.8, events 1 and 2 seem to led to a drop in daily average pollution
concentrations for all five air pollutants; and daily average pollution concentrations for O3 and
NO2 appear to have declined at each of the 4 events. The effects of events 3 and 4 on daily average
concentrations of CO, SO2, and PM10 appear more mixed, however.
The results from the regression discontinuity using daily average pollution concentration levels
and a ninth-order polynomial time trend are shown in Table 3.6.A. For each pollutant, each row
reports coefficients corresponding to different driving subsidy reform event indicator variables.
Following Davis (2008), we report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary
correlation within 5-week clusters. Since we analyze the effects of the driving restrictions on 5
different pollutants, we apply the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing
(Bland and Altman, 1995; Napierala, 2012). According to the results, each of the four subsidy
reform events has a significant negative effect on the daily average concentrations of each of the
five air pollutants (CO, O3, NO2, SO2, and PM10). The results are robust to whether we use
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an eighth-order polynomial time trend (Table 3.6.B) or tenth-order polynomial time trend (Table
3.6.C) instead.4 The results are also robust to whether we average the weather data over both
weather stations near Tehran, or if we instead use just the weather data from the Mehrabad Airport
weather monitoring station, which is closer to our air quality monitoring stations 3.7.A-3.7.B.
The magnitudes of our significant coefficients in Tables 3.6.A-3.7.B range from 0.2150 to
0.8397, meaning that the respective event of the subsidy reform can decrease the daily average
concentration of the respective pollutant by 21.50 to 83.97 percentage points. As seen in the sum-
mary statistics in Table 3.3, the standard deviations of the daily average pollution concentrations
are quite large, and the maximum values of the daily average pollution concentrations can be up to
179.67 times the minimum value of the the daily average pollution concentrations of the respective
pollutant. Thus, increases in daily average or daily maximum pollution concentrations of 21.50 to
83.97 percentage points as a result of the subsidy reform events are reasonable, since the range in
daily average pollution concentrations can be even higher.
Figure 3.9 plots residuals from a regression of log daily maximum pollution concentrations
levels on weather and seasonality covariates and station fixed effects for each of the 5 pollutants.
The weather covariates are a fourth-order polynomial in log daily average temperature and log daily
max sustained wind speed. The seasonality covariates include dummies for each month of the year
and dummies for each day of the week. The fitted lines are the predicted values of a regression of
these residuals on subsidy reform dummies and a ninth-order polynomial time trend. Again, the
vertical lines indicate the dates of each subsidy reform event. For all pollutants, the ninth-order
polynomial seems to describe the underlying time trend adequately while maintaining some degree
of smoothness. According to Figure 3.9, events 1 and 2 seem to led to a drop in daily maximum
pollution concentrations for all five air pollutants; and daily maximum pollution concentrations for
O3 and NO2 appear to have declined at each of the 4 events. The effects of events 3 and 4 on daily
maximum concentrations of CO, SO2, and PM10 appear more mixed, however.
4For all our regression discontinuity models with higher-order polynomial time trends, the results are identical
whether we use a ninth-order polynomial or a tenth-order polynomial. We therefore do not present the results using a
tenth-order polynomial time trend in the subsequent variants of our model.
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The results from the regression discontinuity using daily maximum pollution concentration
levels are shown in Table 3.8.A. According to the results, each of the four subsidy reform events
has a significant negative effect on the daily maximum concentrations of each of the five air pol-
lutants (CO, O3, NO2, SO2, and PM10). The results are robust to whether we use an eighth-order
polynomial time trend (Table 3.8.B) or tenth-order polynomial time trend instead. The results are
also robust to whether we average the weather data over both weather stations near Tehran, or if
we instead use just the weather data from the Mehrabad Airport weather monitoring station, which
is closer to our air quality monitoring stations 3.9.A-3.9.B
The magnitudes of our significant coefficients in Tables 3.8.A-3.9.B range from 0.2870 to
1.0972, meaning that the respective event of the subsidy reform can decrease the d daily maximum
concentration of the respective pollutant by 28.70 to 109.72 percentage points. As seen in the sum-
mary statistics in Table 3.3, the standard deviations of the daily maximum pollution concentrations
are quite large, and the maximum values of the daily maximum pollution concentrations can be
up to 191.33 times the minimum value of the daily maximum pollution concentrations of the re-
spective pollutant. Thus, increases in daily average or daily maximum pollution concentrations of
28.70 to 108.72 percentage points as a result of the subsidy reform events are reasonable, since the
range in daily average and daily maximum pollution pollutant concentrations can be even higher.
An underlying assumption for regression discontinuity designs is that the forcing variable,
which in our case is time, should be balanced around the cutoff, which in the case of our regression
discontinuity model of the effect of the first event of the subsidy reform is the implementation
of the first event of the subsidy reform on June 27, 2007 (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and
Lemieux, 2010; Beach and Jones, 2017). To examine the distribution of the forcing variable (time)
at the threshold (the implementation of the first event of the subsidy reform on June 27, 2007),
we plot the number of observations per week against the week away from June 27, 2007 for each
pollutant. The results for each pollutant are in Figure 3.10. As these graphs show, the distribution
is continuous around the threshold, so the forcing variable is balanced around the cutoff. This
continuity of the distribution around the threshold is evidence against any manipulation of whether
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air quality measurements were taken before or after the subsidy reform.
The cutoff for our regression discontinuity model of the effect of the second event of the subsidy
reform is the implementation of the second event of the subsidy reform on December 18, 2010. To
examine the distribution of the forcing variable (time) at the threshold (the implementation of the
second event of the subsidy reform on December 18, 2010), we plot the number of observations
per week against the week away from December 18, 2010 for each pollutant. The results for
each pollutant are in Figure 3.11. As these graphs show, the distribution is continuous around the
threshold, so the forcing variable is balanced around the cutoff. This continuity of the distribution
around the threshold is evidence against any manipulation of whether air quality measurements
were taken before or after the subsidy reform.
The cutoff for our regression discontinuity model of the effect of the third event of the subsidy
reform is the implementation of the third event of the subsidy reform on April 24, 2014. To
examine the distribution of the forcing variable (time) at the threshold (the implementation of the
third event of the subsidy reform on April 24, 2014), we plot the number of observations per week
against the week away from April 24, 2014 for each pollutant. The results for each pollutant
are in Figure 3.12. As these graphs show, the distribution is continuous around the threshold, so
the forcing variable is balanced around the cutoff. This continuity of the distribution around the
threshold is evidence against any manipulation of whether air quality measurements were taken
before or after the subsidy reform.
The cutoff for our regression discontinuity model of the effect of the fourth event of the subsidy
reform is the implementation of the fourth event of the subsidy reform on May 27, 2015. To
examine the distribution of the forcing variable (time) at the threshold (the implementation of the
fourth event of the subsidy reform on May 27, 2015), we plot the number of observations per
week against the week away from May 27, 2015 for each pollutant. The results for each pollutant
are in Figure 3.13. As these graphs show, the distribution is continuous around the threshold, so
the forcing variable is balanced around the cutoff. This continuity of the distribution around the
threshold is evidence against any manipulation of whether air quality measurements were taken
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before or after the subsidy reform.
Another underlying assumption for regression discontinuity designs is that there are no dis-
continuous changes in the control variables at the time of the various subsidy reform events. To
examine if there were any discontinuous changes in the control variables at the time of the various
subsidy reform events, Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present results of regression discontinuity analyses of
our daily weather variables: log daily average temperature and log daily maximum sustained wind
speed, respectively. None of the subsidy reforms had any significant effect on any of the weather
variables.
To further examine differences in the effects of the different events of the subsidy reform, we
also run a ’post-reform’ set of regressions in which we redefine the four subsidy reform indicators
Dnt in the specification to equal to 1 if day t is after event n, even if a subsequent event has begun,
and 0 otherwise.
As seen in Tables 3.12.A-3.12.B, for the ’post-reform’ regressions, the subsidy reform events
generally have a significant negative effect on daily average pollution concentrations, though the
effect is no longer negative and significant for all pollutants for all events. In addition, event 3 now
has a significant positive effect on daily average concentrations of CO and SO2, and event 4 now
has a significant positive effect on daily average concentrations of SO2 and PM10.
Similarly, as seen in Tables 3.13.A-3.13.B, for the ’post-reform’ regressions, the subsidy reform
events generally have a significant negative effect on daily maximum pollution concentrations,
though the effect is no longer negative and significant for all pollutants for all events. In addition,
event 3 now has a significant positive effect on daily maximum concentrations of CO, and event 4
now has a significant positive effect on daily maximum concentrations of SO2 and PM10.
To examine the robustness of our results, we run placebo tests for each of our regression discon-
tinuity regression models using placebo subsidy reform dates instead of the actual subsidy reform
dates as the treatment. If we do not find significant treatment effects where there has been no
treatment, then this means that our results are robust to our tests.
Since the implementation of the first event of the subsidy reform on June 27, 2007 took place
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on the fourth Wednesday of the month, we choose as our placebo date for the first subsidy reform
event a fourth Wednesday prior to the first event of the subsidy reform: Wednesday, March 28,
2007. For the placebo test of the first event of the subsidy reform, we use data from before the first
subsidy reform event only (i.e., before June 27, 2007).
Since the implementation of the second event of the subsidy reform on December 18, 2010
took place on the third Saturday of the month, we choose as our placebo dates for the second
subsidy reform event a third Saturdays of the month, and, following Imbens and Lemieux (2008),
one that was roughly in the middle of the relevant sample period between the first and second
subsidy events: Saturday, June 21, 2008. For the placebo test of the second event of the subsidy
reform, we use data from after the first subsidy reform event but before the second subsidy reform
event only (i.e., after June 27, 2007 but before December 18, 2010).
Since the implementation of the third event of the subsidy reform on April 24, 2014 took place
on the fourth Thursday of the month, we choose as our placebo date for the third subsidy reform
event a fourth Thursday, and, following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), one that was roughly in the
middle of the relevant sample period between the second and third subsidy events: Thursday, June
27, 2013. For the placebo test of the third event of the subsidy reform, we use data from after the
second subsidy reform event but before the third subsidy reform event only (i.e., after December
18, 2010 but before April 24, 2014).
Since the implementation of the fourth event of the subsidy reform on May 27, 2015 took place
on the fourth Wednesday of the month, we choose as our placebo date for the fourth subsidy reform
event a fourth Wednesday of the month, and, following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), one that was
roughly in the middle of the relevant sample period between the third and fourth subsidy events:
Wednesday, November 19, 2014. For the placebo test of the fourth event of the subsidy reform, we
use data from after the third subsidy reform event but before the fourth subsidy reform event only
(i.e., after April 24, 2014 but before May 27, 2015).
The results of the placebo tests of the regression discontinuity models using daily average pol-
lution concentration levels and a ninth-order polynomial time trend in Table 3.12.A) are presented
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in Table 3.14. As seen in Table 3.14, none of the placebo treatment effects are significant and neg-
ative for any of the pollutants, and the one placebo treatment effects that is statistically significant
at a 5% level is positive, not negative. Thus, since we do not find any significant negative treatment
effects where there has been no treatment, and since we find very few significant treatment effects
where there has been no treatment, this means that our results are robust to our tests.
The results of the placebo tests of the regression discontinuity models using daily maximum
pollution concentration levels are shown in Table 3.13.A are presented in Table 3.15. As seen
in Table 3.15, none of the placebo treatment effects are significant and negative for any of the
pollutants, and the one placebo treatment effect that is statistically significant at a 5% level is
positive, not negative. Thus, since we do not find any significant negative treatment effects where
there has been no treatment, and since we find very few significant treatment effects where there
has been no treatment, this means that our results are robust to our tests.
Automobile emissions are not a primary source of emissions of SO2, which may be more re-
lated to industrial activity than to driving behavior (Zhang et al., 2017). In Tehran, industrial
sources, domestic and commercial heating are responsible for nearly all the SO2 emissions (Mas-
soudi, 1977). Thus, following Gallego et al. (2013), we include SO2 as a control variable rather
than as a dependent variable, in order to control for any changes in industrial activity that may have
been correlated with the energy subsidy reform events.
As seen in Tables 3.16.A-3.16.B, when controlling for SO2, event 1 no longer has a statistically
significant effect on the daily average concentrations of any of the remaining pollutants (O3, CO,
NO2, PM10); event 2 has a significant negative effect on daily average concentrations of O3 and
CO; event 3 has a significant negative effect on daily average concentrations of NO2 and PM10;
and event 4 has a significant positive effect on the daily average concentration of PM10.
Similarly as seen in Tables 3.17.A-3.17.B, when controlling for SO2, event 1 has a significant
positive effect on the daily maximum concentration of PM10; event 2 has a significant negative
effect on daily maximum concentrations of O3 and CO; event 3 has a significant negative effect on
daily maximum concentrations of NO2 and PM10; and event 4 has a significant positive effect on
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the daily maximum concentration of PM10.
We also run regression discontinuity regressions for each event that use only data from a time
window before and after each respective event, where the window range from a window spanning
8 weeks before to 8 weeks after the event; to a window spanning 50 weeks before to 50 weeks after
the event. As seen in the results for events 1-4 are in Tables 3.18.A-3.18.D, respectively, events
1 and 2 tend to have effects on pollutants, when significant, that are negative; while events 3 and
4 have effects on pollution, when significant, that can be positive or negative. As seen in Tables
3.19.A-3.19.D, results are similar when we use SO2 as a control rather than a dependent variable.
Gelman and Imbens (2018) recommend using local polynomial regressions instead of high-
order global polynomials in regression discontinuity design. We therefore run a set of specifica-
tions using the local polynomial regression discontinuity robust bias-corrected confidence intervals
and inference procedures developed in Calonico et al. (2014), Calonico et al. (2018), and Calonico
et al. (2019). The confidence intervals are constructed using a bias-corrected regression discontinu-
ity estimator together with a novel standard error estimator proposed in Calonico et al. (2014). In
particular, the confidence intervals are constructed using an alternative asymptotic theory for bias-
corrected local polynomial estimators in the context of regression discontinuity designs, which
leads to a different asymptotic variance in general and thus justifies a new standard error estima-
tor. Bandwidth choices that minimize asymptotic mean squared error (MSE) are derived following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Calonico et al. (2014) find that the resulting data-driven con-
fidence intervals performed very well in simulations, suggesting in particular that they provide a
robust (to the choice of bandwidths) alternative when compared to the conventional confidence
intervals routinely employed in empirical work. Hyytinen et al. (2018) similarly find that bias-
corrected regression discontinuity design estimates that apply robust inference are in line with the
experimental estimate from an experiment that takes place exactly at the cutoff.
In particular, we run the local linear regression discontinuity regressions with robust confidence
intervals proposed in Calonico et al. (2014) of residuals from a regression of log daily average
pollution concentration levels on weather and seasonality covariates, station fixed effects, and year
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effects for each of the five air pollutants (CO, O3, NO2, SO2, and PM10). We similarly run the local
linear regression discontinuity regressions with robust confidence intervals proposed in Calonico
et al. (2014) of residuals from a regression of log daily maximum pollution concentration levels
on weather and seasonality covariates and station fixed effects for each of the five air pollutants
(CO, O3, NO2, SO2, and PM10). The weather covariates are a fourth-order polynomial in log daily
average temperature and log daily max sustained wind speed. The seasonality covariates include
dummies for each month of the year and dummies for each day of the week.
Residual plots that plot residuals from a regression of log daily average pollution concentration
levels on weather and seasonality covariates, station fixed effects, and year effects on a local linear
regression discontinuity regression on day, using data within a window of 20 weeks before to 20
weeks after each respective event, are presented in Figures 3.14.A-3.14.D for the daily average
pollution concentrations and Figures 3.15.A-3.15.D for the daily maximum pollution concentra-
tions. The residual plots suggest that events 1, 2, and 3 each caused declines in the daily average
and daily maximum concentrations of each pollutant, but the effects of event 4 are more mixed.
The regression results of the local linear regression discontinuity regressions with robust con-
fidence intervals for windows ranging from 8 to 50 weeks before and after each respective event
are presented in Tables 3.20.A-3.20.D. Event 1 has a significant negative effect on daily maximum
and daily average O3 and PM10, and a significant negative effect on daily average NO2 in the short
run. Event 2 has a significant negative effect on daily maximum and daily average CO, O3, and
NO2. Event 3 has a significant negative effect on daily maximum and daily average SO2. Event 4
has a significant negative effect on daily maximum and daily average O3 and NO2, but a significant
positive effect on daily average PM10.
We run placebo tests of the local linear regression discontinuity regressions with robust confi-
dence intervals for windows ranging from 8 to 50 weeks before and after each respective event in
Tables 3.21.A-3.21.D. Results of the placebo tests show that none of the placebo treatment effects
are significant and negative for any of the pollutants, and that the few placebo treatment effects that
are statistically significant at a 5% level are positive, not negative. Thus, since we do not find any
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significant negative treatment effects where there has been no treatment, and since we find very
few significant treatment effects where there has been no treatment, this means that our results are
robust to our tests.
When we control for SO2, the results of the local linear regression discontinuity regressions
with robust confidence intervals for windows ranging from 8 to 50 weeks before and after each
respective event are presented in Tables 3.22.A-3.22.D. Event 1 has a significant negative effect on
daily maximum and daily average PM10, and a significant negative effect on daily maximum O3.
Event 2 has a significant negative effect on daily maximum and daily average CO, O3, and NO2;
but a significant positive effect on daily average and daily maximum PM10 in the short run. Event 3
has a significant positive effect on daily maximum and daily average NO2 in the long run. Event 4
has a significant negative effect on daily maximum and daily average O3, but a significant positive
effect on daily average and daily maximum PM10.
We also run a set of local linear regression discontinuity regressions with robust confidence
intervals where we bootstrap the standard errors over both stages of the estimation, where the first-
stage regression of log daily average pollution concentration levels on weather and seasonality
covariates, station fixed effects, and year effects from which we derive residuals; and the second
stage is the local linear regression of residuals. In particular, monitoring stations are randomly
drawn from the data set with replacement to generate multiple independent panels each with the
sample number of stations in the original data set. We then run both stages on each of the new
panels. The standard errors are then formed by taking the standard deviation of the bias-corrected
local-polynomial regression discontinuity estimates from each of the panels. Only CO and O3 had
enough observations to run this bootstrap, and only for windows ranging from 10 to 50 weeks
before and after each respective event. The results are presented in Tables 3.23.A-3.23.D. Event 1
has a significant negative effect on daily average and daily maximum O3. Event 2 has a significant
negative effect on daily average and daily maximum O3, and a significant negative effect on daily
average CO. Event 3 has a significant positive effect on daily average and daily maximum O3 in the
longer run, and a significant positive effect on daily average CO. Event 4 has a significant negative
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effect on daily average and daily maximum O3.
We also run a set of local linear regression discontinuity regressions with robust confidence
intervals where we bootstrap the standard errors over both stages of the estimation, this time using
SO2 as a control. Only CO and O3 had enough observations to run this bootstrap, and only for
windows ranging from 30 to 50 weeks before and after each respective event. The results are
presented in Tables 3.24.A-3.24.D. Event 1 has a significant negative effect on daily average and
daily maximum O3. Event 2 has a significant negative effect on daily average and daily maximum
O3, and on daily average and daily maximum CO. Event 3 has a significant positive effect on daily
average O3 in the longer run. Event 4 has a significant negative effect on daily maximum O3.
We also run a set of regressions allowing for adjustment over time, adapting a model developed
by Gallego et al. (2013). As these adjustment models do not pass the placebo tests, however, this
evidence is weak at best and we therefore do not present these results.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In Tehran, motor vehicle emissions are major sources of CO, O3, NO2, and PM10 (Zerbonia and
Soraya, 1978; Azarmi and Arhami, 2017; Heger and Sarraf, 2018), but not a primary source of
SO2 (Massoudi, 1977; Zhang et al., 2017).
Our results provide evidence across multiple different empirical specifications that the subsidy
reform in Iran, especially first two subsidy reform events, led to improvements in air quality and
declines in concentrations of CO, O3, and NO2.
The possible effects of changes in driving on ozone (O3) are more complicated. A secondary
pollutant, ozone is not emitted directly but is formed in ambient air in the presence of sunlight
by chemical reactions involving nitrogen oxides (NOx), which consist of nitrogen oxide (NO) and
nitrogen dioxide (NO2); and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) (Lin, 2000; Lin et al., 2000, 2001;
Lin, 2010). Higher emissions of NOx do not always result in higher levels of ozone pollution; in
some cases, higher NOx emissions may actually decrease ozone, a phenomenon known as NOx
titration (Lin, 2010). Nevertheless, we find evidence that subsidy reform can decrease O3.
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Vehicles fueled by gasoline have different effects on air pollution than do vehicles fueled by
diesel, and these effects vary by air pollutant. In the absence of particle traps, diesel CO emissions
are similar to those from gasoline. However, “modern” diesel vehicles with particle traps have
lower CO emissions and lower hydrocarbon emissions than gasoline vehicles (Jacobson et al.,
2004). Diesel vehicles with or without a particle trap and without a NOx control device emit 4-30
times more NOx than do gasoline vehicles (Jacobson et al., 2004). In addition, diesel vehicles have
higher particulate matter emission rates than gasoline vehicles (Onursal and Gautam, 1997; Zhang
et al., 2017). Diesel vehicles with or without a particle trap and without a NOx control device also
emit a higher ratio of NO2 to NO than do gasoline vehicles, and as a consequence, may increase
O3 particularly under certain circumstances (Jacobson et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2017).
As seen in Figures 3.2.A-3.2.B, gasoline consumption continued to have an upward trend fol-
lowing events 2, 3, and 4. Moreover, Ghoddusi and Rafizadeh (2018) find that the gasoline price
elasticity declined following each subsidy reform event. In contrast, as seen in Figures 3.3.A-3.3.B,
diesel consumption had a downward trend following events 3 and 4.
There are several possible explanations for why the first subsidy reform event, which increased
gasoline prices and implemented a gasoline consumption quota; and the second subsidy reform,
which increased energy prices and decreased energy subsidies, both led to declines in concentra-
tions of CO, O3, and NO2; but event 3, which further increased fuel prices; and event 4, which
increased fuel prices even more but removed the gasoline consumption quota, had more mixed
results.
First, our result that the later subsidy reform events were less effective in reducing air pollution
is consistent with the result of Ghoddusi and Rafizadeh (2018) that consumers were becoming less
responsive to increases in fuel prices at each subsequent subsidy reform event, since this would
mean that energy consumption, and hence air pollution, would not decline as much in the later
subsidy reform events.
Second, event 4 may have been less effective in reducing air pollution because it removed the
gasoline consumption quota. As seen in Figures 3.2.A-3.2.B, gasoline consumption continued to
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have an upward trend following events 2, 3, and 4.
Third, there are news reports indicating that around the time of event 4, Tehran experienced
about a week of very dry weather with high winds, which may explain the significant increase
in PM10 concentrations at the time of event 4. This news article about the air quality of Tehran
during last week of May 2015 also mentions that particulate matters are reported to be migrating
from western Iran towards Tehran (Khabaronline.ir, 2015).
Our results provide evidence across multiple different empirical specifications that the subsidy
reform in Iran led to improvements in air quality. In particular, the first subsidy reform event,
which increased gasoline prices and implemented a gasoline consumption quota; and the second
subsidy reform event , which increased energy prices and decreased energy subsidies, both led to
declines in concentrations of CO, O3, and NO2. In contrast, the fourth subsidy reform event, which
increased fuel prices but removed the gasoline consumption quota, was less effective in reducing
air pollution.
In future work, we hope to obtain sufficiently detailed data to enable us to better understand
and tease out the mechanisms that led the later subsidy reform events to be less effective than the
earlier subsidy reform events in reducing air pollution. In addition, in future work we hope to
analyze the health impacts of the changes in air quality resulting from the subsidy reform.
Gasoline taxes have been touted by many economists as an efficient and relatively simple tool
to address environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption. Nev-
ertheless, rather than removing subsidies and increasing gasoline taxes, many countries still subsi-
dize gasoline, which may have the opposite effect of exacerbating air pollution and other problems
associated with gasoline consumption. Our research shows that energy subsidy reform and the
removal of fuel subsidies can have the beneficial effect of reducing air pollution.
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3.7 Tables and figures
Figure 3.1: Pre-tax energy subsidies (as percent of GDP) in countries across the Middle East and
North Africa, 2011.
Data source: Sdralevich et al. (2014).
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Table 3.1: Description of the important events during the study period
Event Date: Description:
1: June 27, 2007 25% price hike for gasoline and similar price increases for other trans-
portation fuels. This price hike accompanied the introduction of the ve-
hicle fuel card program that introduced a 60 liter/vehicle monthly quota
on gasoline consumption after which gasoline can be purchased with an
additional premium.
2: December 18, 2010 First phase of the Iranian subsidy reform plan implemented, involving
higher energy prices and the decrease in energy subsidies.
3: Apr 24, 2014 Second phase of the Iranian subsidy reform plan began, involving even
higher fuel prices.
4: May 27, 2015 Government announced even higher fuel prices and abandoned the
quota on gasoline consumption and fuel card program.
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Table 3.2: Energy and utility prices in Iran after each event during the study period (10 IRR)
unit Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4
Subsidized fuel/utility: 10 IRR per 6/27/07 12/18/10 4/24/14 5/27/15
Gasoline ` 100(400) 400(700) 700(1000) 1000
Premium gas ` 150 500(800) 800(1100) 1200
Diesel fuel ` 16.5 150(350) 250(500) 300
Kerosene ` 16.5 100 150 150
Mazut (Fuel oil) ` 9.5 200 250 300
Aviation fuel ` 100 400 500 600
LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) kg 5.7 180 210 230
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) kg 40 540 650
CNG (Compressed natural gas) m3 40 300 450
Natural gas (residential) Winter m3 13.2 70 20% ↑
Natural gas (residential) Summer m3 13.2 120 20% ↑
Electricity (residential) kWh 12.9 45-75 24% ↑
Water (residential) m3 127 262.3 20% ↑
Note: Values inside parentheses are prices for volumes exceeding the 60 liter (`) quota.
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Figure 3.2.A: Annual gasoline consumption in Iran, 1978-2017
Data source: National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (2018)
Figure 3.2.B: Monthly gasoline consumption in Iran
Data source: National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (2018)
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Figure 3.3.A: Annual diesel consumption in Iran, 1978-2017
Data source: National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (2018)
Figure 3.3.B: Monthly diesel consumption in Iran
Data source: National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (2018)
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Figure 3.4: Gasoline prices in selected countries worldwide (in U.S. dollars per gallon)
Data source: Statista (2018)
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Figure 3.5: Local air quality monitoring stations across Tehran
Data source: Tehran Air Quality Control Company (http://air.tehran.ir/).
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Figure 3.6: Local air quality monitoring and weather stations across Tehran
indicate air quality monitoring stations
indicate weather stations
Data sources: Tehran Air Quality Control Company (http://air.tehran.ir/);
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2018).
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for air pollution concentration in Tehran, 2007-2017
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Daily average pollution concentration averaged over all stations in Tehran
O3 (ppb) 22.998 11.393 1 100 3600
CO (ppm) 2.948 0.896 0.8 9 3606
NO2 (ppb) 50.952 18.708 17.5 184 3606
SO2 (ppb) 24.179 17.874 1 179.667 3600
PM10 (µg/m3) 84.321 36.516 8 696.5 3606
Daily maximum pollution concentration averaged over all stations in Tehran
O3 (ppb) 48.452 25.416 1 191.333 3600
CO (ppm) 5.683 1.962 1.2 17.067 3606
NO2 (ppb) 77.768 31.293 24 314.75 3606
SO2 (ppb) 43.153 36.445 2 376 3600
PM10 (µg/m3) 144.36 85.671 14.4 2136.923 3606
Data source: Tehran Air Quality Control Company (http://air.tehran.ir/).
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics for daily weather data (averaged over two stations in Tehran), 2007-
2017
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Daily average temperature (◦F) 64.593 18.308 3651
Maximum sustained wind speed (knots) 15.436 5.924 3651
Data source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2018)
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for daily weather data (Mehrabad Airport station), 2007-2017
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Daily average temperature (◦F) 65.145 18.132 3651
Maximum sustained wind speed (knots)( 13.95 6.511 3642
Data source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2018)
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Figure 3.7: Mean Daily Air Pollution Levels in Tehran, 2007-2017
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Figure 3.8: Air Pollution Levels in Tehran, Ninth-Order Polynomial Time Trend, 2007-2017 (Us-
ing daily average pollution levels)
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Table 3.6.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 9th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.2150∗ -0.4669∗ -0.6059∗ -0.5479∗ -0.7191∗
(0.0738) (0.0473) (0.0710) (0.0740) (0.0683)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.3957∗ -0.6935∗ -0.5852∗ -0.8471∗ -0.7279∗
(0.0783) (0.0506) (0.0748) (0.0785) (0.0723)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.5254∗ -0.5319∗ -0.5959∗ -0.5715∗ -0.8281∗
(0.0823) (0.0528) (0.0784) (0.0851) (0.0748)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.5613∗ -0.5372∗ -0.7369∗ -0.3748∗ -0.7256∗
(0.0870) (0.0562) (0.0819) (0.0918) (0.0782)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
Table 3.6.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 8th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3104∗ -0.1841∗ -0.4709∗ -0.3362∗ -0.3577∗
(0.0670) (0.0433) (0.0645) (0.0681) (0.0622)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.4802∗ -0.4410∗ -0.4601∗ -0.6556∗ -0.3961∗
(0.0734) (0.0477) (0.0695) (0.0741) (0.0676)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.5933∗ -0.3472∗ -0.4915∗ -0.4741∗ -0.5621∗
(0.0793) (0.0514) (0.0750) (0.0841) (0.0719)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.6032∗ -0.4421∗ -0.6671∗ -0.3571∗ -0.5520∗
(0.0860) (0.0560) (0.0805) (0.0918) (0.0771)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.6.C: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 10th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.2150∗ -0.4669∗ -0.6059∗ -0.5479∗ -0.7191∗
(0.0738) (0.0473) (0.0710) (0.0740) (0.0683)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.3957∗ -0.6935∗ -0.5852∗ -0.8471∗ -0.7279∗
(0.0783) (0.0506) (0.0748) (0.0785) (0.0723)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.5254∗ -0.5319∗ -0.5959∗ -0.5715∗ -0.8281∗
(0.0823) (0.0528) (0.0784) (0.0851) (0.0748)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.5613∗ -0.5372∗ -0.7369∗ -0.3748∗ -0.7256∗
(0.0870) (0.0562) (0.0819) (0.0918) (0.0782)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 10th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.7.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 9th-order polynomial time trend and Mehrabad only weather data)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.2274∗ -0.4510∗ -0.5997∗ -0.5521∗ -0.7287∗
(0.0740) (0.0473) (0.0712) (0.0741) (0.0685)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.4097∗ -0.6795∗ -0.5788∗ -0.8483∗ -0.7348∗
(0.0785) (0.0506) (0.0749) (0.0787) (0.0726)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.5395∗ -0.5199∗ -0.5882∗ -0.5750∗ -0.8397∗
(0.0825) (0.0528) (0.0786) (0.0853) (0.0750)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.5699∗ -0.5299∗ -0.7324∗ -0.3747∗ -0.7328∗
(0.0873) (0.0562) (0.0821) (0.0920) (0.0784)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
Table 3.7.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 8th-order polynomial time trend and Mehrabad only weather data)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3155∗ -0.1757∗ -0.4731∗ -0.3357∗ -0.3690∗
(0.0673) (0.0434) (0.0647) (0.0684) (0.0625)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.4877∗ -0.4335∗ -0.4613∗ -0.6524∗ -0.4041∗
(0.0736) (0.0477) (0.0697) (0.0743) (0.0678)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.6022∗ -0.3402∗ -0.4901∗ -0.4764∗ -0.5748∗
(0.0796) (0.0515) (0.0752) (0.0844) (0.0722)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.6085∗ -0.4378∗ -0.6670∗ -0.3583∗ -0.5600∗
(0.0862) (0.0560) (0.0807) (0.0921) (0.0774)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Figure 3.9: Air Pollution Levels in Tehran, Ninth-Order Polynomial Time Trend, 2007-2017 (Us-
ing daily maximum pollution levels)
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Table 3.8.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Maximum Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 9th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily max pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3239∗ -0.5325∗ -0.8041∗ -0.7583∗ -0.6963∗
(0.0837) (0.0532) (0.0724) (0.0847) (0.0752)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.4965∗ -0.7377∗ -0.7706∗ -1.0849∗ -0.7354∗
(0.0888) (0.0569) (0.0763) (0.0899) (0.0796)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.4697∗ -0.5855∗ -0.8076∗ -0.7445∗ -0.7712∗
(0.0934) (0.0594) (0.0800) (0.0975) (0.0823)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.4421∗ -0.5957∗ -1.0328∗ -0.6295∗ -0.6263∗
(0.0988) (0.0632) (0.0835) (0.1051) (0.0860)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
Table 3.8.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Maximum Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 8th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily max pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.4489∗ -0.2968∗ -0.6751∗ -0.6378∗ -0.3772∗
(0.0761) (0.0486) (0.0658) (0.0780) (0.0684)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.6071∗ -0.5272∗ -0.6511∗ -0.9759∗ -0.4425∗
(0.0833) (0.0536) (0.0709) (0.0848) (0.0743)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.5586∗ -0.4315∗ -0.7078∗ -0.6890∗ -0.5363∗
(0.0900) (0.0578) (0.0765) (0.0963) (0.0791)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.4971∗ -0.5164∗ -0.9662∗ -0.6195∗ -0.4730∗
(0.0976) (0.0629) (0.0821) (0.1051) (0.0848)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.9.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Maximum Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 9th-order polynomial time trend and Mehrabad only weather data)
Dependent variable is log daily max pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3246∗ -0.5129∗ -0.8013∗ -0.7723∗ -0.7255∗
(0.0840) (0.0531) (0.0725) (0.0850) (0.0757)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.4975∗ -0.7192∗ -0.7652∗ -1.0972∗ -0.7598∗
(0.0891) (0.0567) (0.0764) (0.0902) (0.0801)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.4738∗ -0.5698∗ -0.8019∗ -0.7576∗ -0.7997∗
(0.0936) (0.0593) (0.0801) (0.0978) (0.0828)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.4435∗ -0.5852∗ -1.0281∗ -0.6385∗ -0.6443∗
(0.0990) (0.0631) (0.0837) (0.1055) (0.0866)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
Table 3.9.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Maximum Pollution Levels in Tehran
(using 8th-order polynomial time trend and Mehrabad only weather data)
Dependent variable is log daily max pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.4443∗ -0.2870∗ -0.6771∗ -0.6471∗ -0.3937∗
(0.0764) (0.0486) (0.0660) (0.0784) (0.0689)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.6035∗ -0.5173∗ -0.6499∗ -0.9838∗ -0.4549∗
(0.0836) (0.0535) (0.0711) (0.0852) (0.0748)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.5590∗ -0.4224∗ -0.7057∗ -0.7005∗ -0.5554∗
(0.0903) (0.0577) (0.0766) (0.0967) (0.0796)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.4960∗ -0.5097∗ -0.9640∗ -0.6291∗ -0.4850∗
(0.0979) (0.0628) (0.0823) (0.1055) (0.0854)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects. The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly
pollution levels for were averaged over all hours of the day for that station. The reported coefficients correspond to
indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5%
level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Figure 3.10: Number of observations per week for each pollutant around event 1
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Figure 3.11: Number of observations per week for each pollutant around event 2
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Figure 3.12: Number of observations per week for each pollutant around event 3
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Figure 3.13: Number of observations per week for each pollutant around event 4
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Table 3.10: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Mean Temperature in Tehran
Dependent variable is log daily average temperature
N th order time trend 10th order 9th order 8th order 7th order 6th order
Event 1: June 27, 2007 0.0077 0.0077 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0034
(0.0742) (0.0742) (0.0738) (0.0738) (0.0734)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.0666 -0.0666 -0.0692 -0.0692 -0.0712
(0.0762) (0.0762) (0.0762) (0.0762) (0.0756)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.0303 -0.0303 -0.0321 -0.0321 -0.0353
(0.0789) (0.0789) (0.0789) (0.0789) (0.0774)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0056
(0.0851) (0.0851) (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.0826)
Notes: This table reports estimates from a regression discontinuity model with a N th-order time trend. All models
include day of the week, month of the year, and year dummies. The unit of observation is a station-day. The
reported coefficients correspond to indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of
the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level.
Table 3.11: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Maximum Wind Speed in Tehran
Dependent variable is log daily maximum sustained wind speed
N th order time trend 10th order 9th order 8th order 7th order 6th order
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.1304 -0.1304 -0.1052 -0.1052 -0.1180
(0.1986) (0.1986) (0.1976) (0.1976) (0.1964)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.0225 -0.0225 -0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0310
(0.2040) (0.2040) (0.2040) (0.2040) (0.2023)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 0.0201 0.0201 0.0250 0.0250 0.0008
(0.2112) (0.2112) (0.2112) (0.2112) (0.2072)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 0.1011 0.1011 0.0808 0.0808 0.0500
(0.2277) (0.2277) (0.2271) (0.2271) (0.2210)
Notes: This table reports estimates from a regression discontinuity model with a N th-order time trend. All models
include day of the week, month of the year, and year dummies. The unit of observation is a station-day. The
reported coefficients correspond to indicator variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of
the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level.
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Table 3.12.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(Post reform regression using 9th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.2846 -0.3604∗ -0.5606∗ -1.8997∗ -0.7039∗
(0.1964) (0.1160) (0.1741) (0.1888) (0.1711)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.2216∗ -0.1923∗ -0.0250 -0.3081∗ -0.0657∗
(0.0234) (0.0157) (0.0196) (0.0230) (0.0199)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.1823∗ 0.1113∗ -0.0133 0.1308∗ -0.1537∗
(0.0282) (0.0180) (0.0256) (0.0446) (0.0219)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.0818 0.0549 -0.0591 0.1380∗ 0.2909∗
(0.0323) (0.0218) (0.0271) (0.0321) (0.0274)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.12.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(Post reform regression using 8th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3854 -0.2890 -0.5471∗ -1.7911∗ -0.6770∗
(0.1954) (0.1153) (0.1730) (0.1877) (0.1701)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.1967∗ -0.2096∗ -0.0273 -0.3314∗ -0.0709∗
(0.0228) (0.0154) (0.0193) (0.0226) (0.0196)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.1903∗ 0.1155∗ -0.0121 0.1347∗ -0.1522∗
(0.0281) (0.0180) (0.0255) (0.0447) (0.0219)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.0409 0.0220 -0.0638 0.0925∗ 0.2809∗
(0.0312) (0.0210) (0.0262) (0.0309) (0.0265)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.13.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Max Pollution Levels in Tehran (Post
reform regression using 9th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily max pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3088 -0.4351∗ -0.6027∗ -1.9903∗ -0.7772∗
(0.2227) (0.1306) (0.1773) (0.2166) (0.1884)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.2217∗ -0.1774∗ -0.0438 -0.3461∗ -0.1123∗
(0.0265) (0.0177) (0.0199) (0.0264) (0.0220)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.0535 0.1027∗ -0.0323 0.0215 -0.0741∗
(0.0319) (0.0202) (0.0261) (0.0512) (0.0242)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 0.0022 0.0428 -0.1000∗ 0.1202∗ 0.3337∗
(0.0367) (0.0246) (0.0276) (0.0368) (0.0302)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.13.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Max Pollution Levels in Tehran (Post
reform regression using 8th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily max pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.4177 -0.3630∗ -0.6043∗ -1.8837∗ -0.7908∗
(0.2216) (0.1299) (0.1762) (0.2153) (0.1873)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.1947∗ -0.1949∗ -0.0435 -0.3689∗ -0.1096∗
(0.0258) (0.0173) (0.0196) (0.0259) (0.0216)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 -0.0621 0.1070∗ -0.0325 0.0254 -0.0749∗
(0.0319) (0.0202) (0.0260) (0.0512) (0.0241)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 0.0464 0.0096 -0.0995∗ 0.0756 0.3388∗
(0.0354) (0.0237) (0.0267) (0.0354) (0.0292)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.14: Placebo tests for four subsidy reform events (Post reform regression using 9th-order
polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Before event 1: March 28, 2007 0.2032 -0.0436 -0.1935 -0.1896 0.3052
(0.1464) (0.0872) (0.1301) (0.1419) (0.1279)
Before event 2: June 21, 2008 -0.0099 0.0085 0.0389 -0.0220 -0.0784
(0.0790) (0.0581) (0.0988) (0.0845) (0.0751)
Before event 3: June 27, 2013 -0.1582 -0.1323 0.2144 -0.1037 -0.1479
(0.1001) (0.0677) (0.0840) (0.0981) (0.0721)
Before event 4: November 19, 2014 0.1188∗ -0.0116 0.0475 0.0173 0.0493
(0.0281) (0.0167) (0.0215) (0.0297) (0.0206)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.15: Placebo tests for four subsidy reform events (Post reform regression using 9th-order
polynomial time trend using max pollution levels)
Dependent variable is log daily maximum pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
Before event 1: March 28, 2007 0.3067 0.0222 -0.3384 -0.1745 0.2060
(0.1658) (0.0981) (0.1324) (0.1626) (0.1408)
Before event 2: June 21, 2008 -0.0412 -0.0420 0.0367 -0.0411 -0.1203
(0.0895) (0.0654) (0.1006) (0.0969) (0.0826)
Before event 3: June 27, 2013 -0.1060 -0.1754 0.2056 -0.1566 -0.1916
(0.1134) (0.0762) (0.0856) (0.1124) (0.0793)
Before event 4: November 19, 2014 0.0879∗ -0.0448 0.0113 0.0247 0.0334
(0.0319) (0.0188) (0.0219) (0.0340) (0.0227)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.16.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(Post reform regression controlling for SO2 and using 9th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3890 -0.1873 -0.2846 -0.4297
(0.1900) (0.1371) (0.1671) (0.1725)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.2981∗ -0.1154∗ -0.0438 0.0221
(0.0258) (0.0172) (0.0213) (0.0233)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 0.1383 0.0529 -0.2844∗ -0.2864∗
(0.0560) (0.0332) (0.0435) (0.0417)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 -0.0070 0.0031 -0.0355 0.3405∗
(0.0351) (0.0240) (0.0294) (0.0317)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.16.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Average Pollution Levels in Tehran
(Post reform regression controlling for SO2 and using 8th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily average pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.4265 -0.1476 -0.3097 -0.3973
(0.1889) (0.1363) (0.1660) (0.1712)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.2871∗ -0.1244∗ -0.0385 0.0142
(0.0250) (0.0169) (0.0209) (0.0228)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 0.1374 0.0530 -0.2850∗ -0.2866∗
(0.0560) (0.0332) (0.0435) (0.0417)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 0.0101 -0.0147 -0.0252 0.3268∗
(0.0338) (0.0230) (0.0283) (0.0305)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.17.A: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Max Pollution Levels in Tehran (Post
reform regression controlling for SO2 and using 9th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily maximum pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.2727 -0.1559 -0.3396 -0.5193∗
(0.2176) (0.1527) (0.1712) (0.1857)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.2643∗ -0.0862∗ -0.0351 0.0517
(0.0295) (0.0192) (0.0218) (0.0251)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 0.1353 0.0590 -0.2810∗ -0.2122∗
(0.0641) (0.0369) (0.0445) (0.0449)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 0.0622 0.0127 -0.0877∗ 0.3770∗
(0.0402) (0.0267) (0.0301) (0.0342)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 9th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.17.B: The Effects of Removing Subsidies on Daily Max Pollution Levels in Tehran (Post
reform regression controlling for SO2 and using 8th-order polynomial time trend)
Dependent variable is log daily maximum pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
Event 1: June 27, 2007 -0.3220 -0.0631 -0.3829 -0.4993∗
(0.2163) (0.1519) (0.1700) (0.1844)
Event 2: December 18, 2010 -0.2499∗ -0.1071∗ -0.0260 0.0468
(0.0287) (0.0188) (0.0214) (0.0246)
Event 3: April 24, 2014 0.1341 0.0593 -0.2819∗ -0.2123∗
(0.0641) (0.0370) (0.0446) (0.0449)
Event 4: May 27, 2015 0.0848 -0.0286 -0.0701 0.3686∗
(0.0387) (0.0256) (0.0290) (0.0329)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression discontinuity specifications, one for each pollu-
tant, each with a 8th-order time trend, 4th order polynomial on log daily average temperature and log daily max
sustained wind speed, and station fixed effects, as well as month of the year, day of the week, and year fixed effects.
The unit of observation is a station-day; for each station, hourly pollution levels for were averaged over all hours
of the day for that station. The reported coefficients on ”Post reform” correspond to indicator variable that equals
to one after the first reform event on June 2007. The reported coefficients on other events correspond to indicator
variables that equal to one for every day during the time periods of the respective subsidy reform phase. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after
applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.18.A: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 1)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.5173∗ -0.1863 -0.2026 -0.2134 -0.6677∗
(0.1533) (0.1337) (0.1456) (0.2734) (0.1271)
10 weeks before and after event -0.4461∗ -0.1449 -0.1487 -0.1407 -0.5399∗
(0.1432) (0.1321) (0.1346) (0.2500) (0.1274)
20 weeks before and after event -0.4236∗ -0.2045 -0.0507 -0.4131 -0.4059∗
(0.1381) (0.1199) (0.1409) (0.2431) (0.1164)
26 weeks before and after event -0.3296 -0.1930 -0.1344 -0.4632 -0.4099∗
(0.1549) (0.1165) (0.1425) (0.2386) (0.1253)
30 weeks before and after event -0.3231 -0.2259 -0.1348 -0.4624 -0.4179∗
(0.1883) (0.1183) (0.1485) (0.2395) (0.1332)
40 weeks before and after event -0.3006 -0.2072 -0.1475 -0.4752 -0.3611
(0.2007) (0.1203) (0.1566) (0.2624) (0.1477)
50 weeks before and after event -0.3551 -0.2615 -0.1745 -0.7661∗ -0.3659
(0.2161) (0.1211) (0.1538) (0.2653) (0.1639)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.8709∗ -0.5687∗ -0.2441 -0.3142 -0.7912∗
(0.2001) (0.1593) (0.1581) (0.2958) (0.1848)
10 weeks before and after event -0.4236∗ -0.2045 -0.0507 -0.4131 -0.4059∗
(0.1381) (0.1199) (0.1409) (0.2431) (0.1164)
20 weeks before and after event -0.6404∗ -0.3899∗ -0.0869 -0.4207 -0.4857∗
(0.1786) (0.1370) (0.1662) (0.2671) (0.1429)
26 weeks before and after event -0.5370∗ -0.3371 -0.1396 -0.4479 -0.5020∗
(0.1834) (0.1323) (0.1649) (0.2610) (0.1456)
30 weeks before and after event -0.5309 -0.3877∗ -0.1435 -0.4330 -0.5248∗
(0.2088) (0.1339) (0.1740) (0.2590) (0.1530)
40 weeks before and after event -0.5055 -0.3627∗ -0.1470 -0.4630 -0.4518∗
(0.2257) (0.1354) (0.1852) (0.2767) (0.1644)
50 weeks before and after event -0.5436 -0.4424∗ -0.1917 -0.8279∗ -0.4292
(0.2382) (0.1347) (0.1814) (0.2829) (0.1779)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.18.B: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 2)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.1571 0.0743 0.0958 0.5508∗ 0.1548
(0.0925) (0.0613) (0.0596) (0.0940) (0.0877)
10 weeks before and after event -0.0229 -0.2432∗ -0.1413∗ 0.0762 -0.0526
(0.0629) (0.0434) (0.0386) (0.0614) (0.0571)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0817 -0.2526∗ -0.1655∗ -0.0190 -0.1669∗
(0.0550) (0.0360) (0.0351) (0.0577) (0.0561)
26 weeks before and after event -0.0786 -0.2279∗ -0.0934∗ 0.0427 -0.0945
(0.0586) (0.0365) (0.0358) (0.0596) (0.0555)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0551 -0.2389∗ -0.1224∗ 0.0162 -0.1114
(0.0614) (0.0371) (0.0364) (0.0605) (0.0573)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1139 -0.2085∗ -0.0851 0.0350 -0.0629
(0.0618) (0.0363) (0.0362) (0.0579) (0.0571)
50 weeks before and after event -0.2205∗ -0.1180∗ 0.0131 0.0839 0.0526
(0.0577) (0.0342) (0.0375) (0.0534) (0.0534)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.0389 0.0523 0.0230 0.6565∗ 0.0049
(0.1191) (0.0667) (0.0621) (0.1109) (0.1007)
10 weeks before and after event -0.1063 -0.2983∗ -0.1754∗ 0.0996 -0.0900
(0.0788) (0.0466) (0.0403) (0.0713) (0.0658)
20 weeks before and after event -0.1597 -0.2507∗ -0.1680∗ 0.0042 -0.1753∗
(0.0650) (0.0404) (0.0382) (0.0610) (0.0624)
26 weeks before and after event -0.1466 -0.2092∗ -0.0825 0.0917 -0.1067
(0.0681) (0.0415) (0.0388) (0.0630) (0.0628)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1285 -0.2279∗ -0.1176∗ 0.0533 -0.1206
(0.0715) (0.0426) (0.0395) (0.0642) (0.0639)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1952∗ -0.1933∗ -0.0745 0.0836 -0.0676
(0.0733) (0.0415) (0.0391) (0.0612) (0.0626)
50 weeks before and after event -0.3195∗ -0.1152∗ 0.0009 0.1229 0.0363
(0.0693) (0.0389) (0.0395) (0.0566) (0.0577)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.18.C: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 3)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.0558 0.0904 0.0758 -0.0709 0.1295∗
(0.0473) (0.0374) (0.0495) (0.0483) (0.0452)
10 weeks before and after event -0.0092 0.1108∗ 0.0340 -0.0269 0.1815∗
(0.0433) (0.0354) (0.0482) (0.0499) (0.0411)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0691 0.1387∗ -0.0540 -0.1306 0.0481
(0.0560) (0.0516) (0.0686) (0.0983) (0.0551)
26 weeks before and after event -0.0644 0.1081 0.0227 -0.0831 0.0524
(0.0505) (0.0431) (0.0634) (0.0746) (0.0453)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1148 0.0876 -0.0023 -0.0605 0.0541
(0.0491) (0.0438) (0.0620) (0.0766) (0.0450)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0933 0.0528 -0.0689 -0.1220 -0.0329
(0.0479) (0.0422) (0.0619) (0.0792) (0.0439)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1308∗ 0.0486 -0.0698 -0.0488 0.0413
(0.0475) (0.0407) (0.0639) (0.0781) (0.0444)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.1098 0.1474∗ 0.1075 -0.1290 0.1175
(0.0527) (0.0509) (0.0553) (0.0649) (0.0601)
10 weeks before and after event 0.0506 0.1577∗ 0.0253 -0.0203 0.1968∗
(0.0483) (0.0464) (0.0523) (0.0684) (0.0546)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0315 0.2169∗ 0.0168 -0.0190 0.1085
(0.0563) (0.0491) (0.0637) (0.0906) (0.0556)
26 weeks before and after event -0.0691 0.1387∗ -0.0540 -0.1306 0.0481
(0.0560) (0.0516) (0.0686) (0.0983) (0.0551)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0988 0.1004 -0.0908 -0.0967 0.0438
(0.0551) (0.0520) (0.0675) (0.1034) (0.0547)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0635 0.0350 -0.1483 -0.1909 -0.0124
(0.0563) (0.0509) (0.0675) (0.1102) (0.0522)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0869 0.0236 -0.1532 -0.0940 0.0703
(0.0552) (0.0488) (0.0684) (0.1105) (0.0527)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.18.D: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 4)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2470∗ -0.0714 -0.1726∗ -0.0657 0.1900∗
(0.0496) (0.0415) (0.0396) (0.0420) (0.0635)
10 weeks before and after event -0.1803∗ -0.0734 -0.1597∗ -0.0777 0.0792
(0.0480) (0.0392) (0.0382) (0.0404) (0.0584)
20 weeks before and after event -0.1870∗ -0.0709 -0.1461∗ -0.0142 0.3218∗
(0.0449) (0.0374) (0.0396) (0.0467) (0.0608)
26 weeks before and after event -0.1693∗ -0.0477 -0.0939 0.0087 0.4034∗
(0.0448) (0.0380) (0.0441) (0.0483) (0.0594)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1501∗ -0.0572 -0.0999 0.0281 0.4313∗
(0.0455) (0.0391) (0.0461) (0.0500) (0.0601)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0706 -0.1073∗ -0.1122 -0.0057 0.3476∗
(0.0455) (0.0401) (0.0487) (0.0514) (0.0585)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0800 -0.0605 -0.0386 -0.0190 0.3531∗
(0.0478) (0.0412) (0.0506) (0.0531) (0.0572)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.3496∗ -0.1509∗ -0.2094∗ -0.1638∗ 0.1770
(0.0549) (0.0541) (0.0411) (0.0609) (0.0806)
10 weeks before and after event -0.2997∗ -0.1374∗ -0.1635∗ -0.1556∗ 0.0956
(0.0529) (0.0510) (0.0392) (0.0589) (0.0743)
20 weeks before and after event -0.2337∗ -0.1337∗ -0.1782∗ -0.0741 0.3300∗
(0.0509) (0.0470) (0.0414) (0.0650) (0.0762)
26 weeks before and after event -0.2151∗ -0.1103 -0.1224∗ -0.0513 0.4231∗
(0.0520) (0.0471) (0.0461) (0.0671) (0.0724)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1884∗ -0.1264∗ -0.1267∗ -0.0386 0.4520∗
(0.0526) (0.0476) (0.0487) (0.0685) (0.0720)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0942 -0.1977∗ -0.1435∗ -0.0897 0.3896∗
(0.0523) (0.0477) (0.0509) (0.0685) (0.0694)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0938 -0.1536∗ -0.0782 -0.1041 0.3941∗
(0.0543) (0.0486) (0.0528) (0.0699) (0.0688)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.19.A: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 1, using
SO2 as control)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.5674∗ -0.1681 -0.1727 -0.6569∗
(0.1539) (0.1786) (0.1255) (0.1284)
10 weeks before and after event -0.5125∗ -0.0949 -0.1369 -0.5192∗
(0.1394) (0.1724) (0.1177) (0.1290)
20 weeks before and after event -0.5407∗ 0.0011 -0.0142 -0.3465∗
(0.1344) (0.1555) (0.1332) (0.1152)
26 weeks before and after event -0.4705∗ 0.0247 -0.0988 -0.3148∗
(0.1539) (0.1503) (0.1343) (0.1225)
30 weeks before and after event -0.4540∗ -0.0377 -0.0883 -0.3456∗
(0.1787) (0.1530) (0.1393) (0.1301)
40 weeks before and after event -0.4212 -0.0040 -0.1009 -0.2958
(0.1893) (0.1536) (0.1494) (0.1397)
50 weeks before and after event -0.5237∗ -0.0435 -0.0901 -0.3180
(0.2061) (0.1549) (0.1485) (0.1525)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.9480∗ -0.4928 -0.1847 -0.7603∗
(0.2013) (0.1997) (0.1414) (0.1890)
10 weeks before and after event -0.8876∗ -0.3695 -0.1591 -0.6160∗
(0.1848) (0.1906) (0.1384) (0.1737)
20 weeks before and after event -0.7727∗ -0.1531 -0.0699 -0.4195∗
(0.1778) (0.1718) (0.1646) (0.1433)
26 weeks before and after event -0.6727∗ -0.0722 -0.1273 -0.4045∗
(0.1844) (0.1635) (0.1618) (0.1443)
30 weeks before and after event -0.6367∗ -0.1594 -0.1130 -0.4462∗
(0.2069) (0.1678) (0.1697) (0.1520)
40 weeks before and after event -0.6247∗ -0.1179 -0.1071 -0.3786
(0.2171) (0.1707) (0.1811) (0.1594)
50 weeks before and after event -0.6859∗ -0.1418 -0.0975 -0.3735
(0.2292) (0.1696) (0.1794) (0.1681)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.19.B: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 2, using
SO2 as control)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2602∗ -0.0021 -0.0444 -0.0411
(0.0936) (0.0628) (0.0592) (0.0841)
10 weeks before and after event -0.1140 -0.2327∗ -0.2028∗ -0.0548
(0.0649) (0.0423) (0.0384) (0.0536)
20 weeks before and after event -0.1553∗ -0.2741∗ -0.2085∗ -0.1549∗
(0.0570) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0573)
26 weeks before and after event -0.1608∗ -0.2545∗ -0.1479∗ -0.0865
(0.0587) (0.0377) (0.0365) (0.0583)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1504 -0.2600∗ -0.1744∗ -0.1015
(0.0627) (0.0385) (0.0372) (0.0599)
40 weeks before and after event -0.2102∗ -0.2357∗ -0.1459∗ -0.0754
(0.0647) (0.0382) (0.0373) (0.0607)
50 weeks before and after event -0.2877∗ -0.1261∗ -0.0318 0.0100
(0.0595) (0.0363) (0.0383) (0.0569)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2078 -0.0565 -0.1535∗ -0.1421
(0.1180) (0.0697) (0.0604) (0.0994)
10 weeks before and after event -0.2575∗ -0.2966∗ -0.2427∗ -0.0661
(0.0792) (0.0475) (0.0397) (0.0625)
20 weeks before and after event -0.2743∗ -0.2790∗ -0.2030∗ -0.1511
(0.0670) (0.0421) (0.0398) (0.0612)
26 weeks before and after event -0.2718∗ -0.2519∗ -0.1384∗ -0.0842
(0.0704) (0.0442) (0.0397) (0.0639)
30 weeks before and after event -0.2655∗ -0.2667∗ -0.1677∗ -0.0987
(0.0749) (0.0453) (0.0406) (0.0652)
40 weeks before and after event -0.3348∗ -0.2410∗ -0.1357∗ -0.0609
(0.0785) (0.0447) (0.0403) (0.0655)
50 weeks before and after event -0.4352∗ -0.1405∗ -0.0511 0.0224
(0.0731) (0.0419) (0.0402) (0.0605)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.19.C: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 3, using
SO2 as control)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.1820 0.1330 0.1401 0.2521
(0.0929) (0.0815) (0.1045) (0.1023)
10 weeks before and after event 0.1704 0.1147 0.0569 0.2637∗
(0.0777) (0.0769) (0.0912) (0.0880)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0323 0.1102 0.1104 0.2286∗
(0.0970) (0.0779) (0.1060) (0.0906)
26 weeks before and after event -0.0611 0.0376 0.0528 0.1195
(0.0940) (0.0804) (0.1061) (0.0944)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1166 0.0223 0.0163 0.1376
(0.0904) (0.0808) (0.0999) (0.0933)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1200 0.0059 -0.0908 0.0146
(0.0865) (0.0778) (0.0953) (0.0901)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1179 -0.0199 -0.2105 0.0405
(0.0864) (0.0733) (0.1012) (0.0913)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.1920 0.1972 0.1687 0.2838
(0.0913) (0.0989) (0.1207) (0.1174)
10 weeks before and after event 0.1831 0.1921 -0.0149 0.3008∗
(0.0797) (0.0878) (0.1058) (0.0990)
20 weeks before and after event -0.1027 0.2609∗ -0.0147 0.3202∗
(0.1132) (0.0947) (0.1204) (0.1064)
26 weeks before and after event -0.1711 0.1709 -0.0950 0.2036
(0.1063) (0.0973) (0.1144) (0.1101)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1802 0.1240 -0.1255 0.2225
(0.1039) (0.0961) (0.1080) (0.1104)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1970 0.0493 -0.2320 0.1174
(0.1045) (0.0926) (0.1035) (0.1032)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1416 -0.0131 -0.3782∗ 0.1619
(0.1013) (0.0857) (0.1080) (0.1056)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.19.D: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (around event 4, using
SO2 as control)
Dependent variable is log avg daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2845∗ -0.1032 -0.1458∗ 0.2727∗
(0.0562) (0.0469) (0.0450) (0.0739)
10 weeks before and after event -0.2219∗ -0.1086 -0.1400∗ 0.1656
(0.0551) (0.0444) (0.0430) (0.0691)
20 weeks before and after event -0.2149∗ -0.1137∗ -0.1218∗ 0.3806∗
(0.0509) (0.0421) (0.0435) (0.0706)
26 weeks before and after event -0.1962∗ -0.0768 -0.0817 0.4327∗
(0.0512) (0.0421) (0.0468) (0.0686)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1792∗ -0.0705 -0.0739 0.4574∗
(0.0522) (0.0430) (0.0476) (0.0691)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1103 -0.1085 -0.0751 0.4186∗
(0.0517) (0.0435) (0.0502) (0.0677)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1249 -0.0709 -0.0193 0.4227∗
(0.0530) (0.0445) (0.0521) (0.0669)
Dependent variable is log max daily pollution for:
O3 CO NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.3994∗ -0.1636∗ -0.1834∗ 0.2693∗
(0.0613) (0.0603) (0.0472) (0.0929)
10 weeks before and after event -0.3533∗ -0.1554∗ -0.1456∗ 0.1808
(0.0604) (0.0569) (0.0442) (0.0870)
20 weeks before and after event -0.2819∗ -0.1601∗ -0.1434∗ 0.3803∗
(0.0585) (0.0522) (0.0456) (0.0871)
26 weeks before and after event -0.2642∗ -0.1306∗ -0.0934 0.4437∗
(0.0596) (0.0516) (0.0496) (0.0833)
30 weeks before and after event -0.2395∗ -0.1255 -0.0844 0.4783∗
(0.0603) (0.0520) (0.0511) (0.0826)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1537∗ -0.1722∗ -0.0869 0.4518∗
(0.0591) (0.0521) (0.0533) (0.0807)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1501∗ -0.1322∗ -0.0363 0.4582∗
(0.0600) (0.0527) (0.0553) (0.0805)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Figure 3.14.A: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 1 (daily average pollu-
tion)
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Figure 3.14.B: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 2 (daily average pollu-
tion)
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Figure 3.14.C: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 3 (daily average pollu-
tion)
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Figure 3.14.D: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 4 (daily average pollu-
tion)
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Figure 3.15.A: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 1 (daily maximum
pollution)
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Figure 3.15.B: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 2 (daily maximum
pollution)
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Figure 3.15.C: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 3 (daily maximum
pollution)
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Figure 3.15.D: Local linear residual plots 20 weeks before and after event 4 (daily maximum
pollution)
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Table 3.20.A: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
event 1)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.0400 -0.4243 -0.2661∗ 0.2648 -0.5540∗
(0.2738) (0.1864) (0.0903) (0.2968) (0.2119)
10 weeks before and after event -0.0102 -0.4790∗ -0.2210 0.1090 -0.5456
(0.2252) (0.1627) (0.0894) (0.3163) (0.2259)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0504 -0.3942∗ 0.0213 0.3440 -0.2359
(0.1515) (0.1473) (0.0832) (0.2784) (0.1196)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0564 -0.3517 -0.0149 0.3153 -0.4396∗
(0.1576) (0.1434) (0.0869) (0.2815) (0.1560)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0488 -0.3816 -0.0184 0.3344 -0.4868∗
(0.1735) (0.1482) (0.0880) (0.2873) (0.1670)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0379 -0.3594∗ -0.0480 0.3736 -0.5222
(0.1854) (0.1391) (0.0919) (0.2867) (0.2029)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2804 -0.7085∗ -0.2355 0.1214 -0.7877∗
(0.2038) (0.2075) (0.1666) (0.3183) (0.2225)
10 weeks before and after event -0.2299 -0.7851∗ -0.2060 -0.0878 -0.7365∗
(0.1839) (0.2129) (0.1626) (0.3701) (0.2245)
20 weeks before and after event -0.1555 -0.6346∗ 0.0054 0.2779 -0.5550∗
(0.1356) (0.1608) (0.1030) (0.2919) (0.1705)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1695 -0.6043∗ -0.0389 0.2651 -0.6388∗
(0.1352) (0.1588) (0.1066) (0.2931) (0.1957)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1621 -0.6903∗ -0.0231 0.2816 -0.5407∗
(0.1387) (0.1999) (0.1055) (0.3030) (0.1549)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1722 -0.6757∗ -0.0569 0.3353 -0.4681∗
(0.1445) (0.1828) (0.1108) (0.3046) (0.1452)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.20.B: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
event 2)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.1424 -0.3042 -0.1714 0.0585 0.1004
(0.1135) (0.1446) (0.1094) (0.1368) (0.1835)
10 weeks before and after event -0.1457 -0.0793 -0.1681 0.0426 -0.0477
(0.1146) (0.1180) (0.1089) (0.1265) (0.1237)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0420 -0.1486 -0.0893 0.1098 0.0777
(0.0817) (0.0806) (0.0589) (0.0901) (0.1053)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0973 -0.1584 -0.0494 0.1528 0.1912
(0.0548) (0.0728) (0.0568) (0.0868) (0.0911)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1554∗ -0.1603∗ -0.1242∗ 0.1934 0.1411
(0.0462) (0.0583) (0.0391) (0.0845) (0.0766)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1546∗ -0.1893∗ -0.1308∗ 0.1967 0.1737
(0.0452) (0.0540) (0.0382) (0.0843) (0.0801)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.1710 -0.2160 -0.2403∗ -0.1136 0.1065
(0.1264) (0.1393) (0.0885) (0.1861) (0.1802)
10 weeks before and after event -0.1804 -0.0819 -0.2488∗ -0.1087 -0.0115
(0.1313) (0.1280) (0.0893) (0.1309) (0.1398)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0322 -0.1649 -0.1503∗ 0.1122 0.0842
(0.0854) (0.0914) (0.0525) (0.1093) (0.1157)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1290 -0.1589 -0.1079 0.1800 0.1841
(0.0560) (0.0835) (0.0507) (0.1060) (0.0925)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1684∗ -0.1653 -0.1345∗ 0.2270 0.0377
(0.0494) (0.0819) (0.0345) (0.1035) (0.0779)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1451∗ -0.2408∗ -0.1295∗ 0.2595 0.0500
(0.0448) (0.0630) (0.0352) (0.1015) (0.0793)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.20.C: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
event 3)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.0785 0.1393 0.1070 -0.1523 -0.2400
(0.1195) (0.1148) (0.1266) (0.0783) (0.1381)
10 weeks before and after event 0.1574 0.1261 0.1169 -0.2162 -0.2487
(0.0850) (0.1097) (0.1053) (0.0998) (0.1353)
20 weeks before and after event 0.0951 0.0882 0.1078 -0.1282 -0.0498
(0.0600) (0.0841) (0.0989) (0.0721) (0.0798)
30 weeks before and after event 0.0690 0.1058 0.0509 -0.1319 -0.0684
(0.0504) (0.0677) (0.0802) (0.0632) (0.0731)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0704 0.0251 0.0480 -0.1619∗ -0.0027
(0.0527) (0.0528) (0.0787) (0.0528) (0.0511)
50 weeks before and after event 0.0650 0.0145 0.0828 -0.1685∗ 0.0123
(0.0464) (0.0500) (0.0602) (0.0463) (0.0493)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.0384 0.2325 0.2229 -0.2822∗ -0.2303
(0.1446) (0.1083) (0.1314) (0.1072) (0.1411)
10 weeks before and after event 0.1767 0.2333 0.1957 -0.2559∗ -0.1272
(0.0963) (0.1084) (0.1175) (0.0859) (0.1150)
20 weeks before and after event 0.1136 0.1553 0.1915 -0.1848∗ -0.0599
(0.0683) (0.0817) (0.1048) (0.0672) (0.0856)
30 weeks before and after event 0.0974 0.1782 0.1108 -0.1811∗ -0.0722
(0.0585) (0.0739) (0.0799) (0.0618) (0.0772)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0939 0.0356 0.0673 -0.1967∗ 0.0309
(0.0626) (0.0495) (0.0736) (0.0571) (0.0516)
50 weeks before and after event 0.1013 0.0415 0.0492 -0.2058∗ 0.0162
(0.0537) (0.0521) (0.0581) (0.0496) (0.0544)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.20.D: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
event 4)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.1133 -0.2013 0.0353 0.0095 0.4661∗
(0.0830) (0.1080) (0.1591) (0.0971) (0.1222)
10 weeks before and after event 0.0011 -0.1854 -0.0958 0.0004 0.4871∗
(0.0606) (0.0779) (0.1373) (0.0849) (0.1218)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0170 -0.2232∗ -0.1249 -0.0167 0.3949∗
(0.0502) (0.0718) (0.0742) (0.0439) (0.0922)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0605 -0.1905∗ -0.1464 -0.0021 0.0846
(0.0398) (0.0551) (0.0622) (0.0428) (0.0461)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0644 -0.1419∗ -0.1544∗ -0.0134 0.1096
(0.0370) (0.0468) (0.0595) (0.0399) (0.0469)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0826 -0.0860 -0.1389 -0.0201 0.1299∗
(0.0383) (0.0402) (0.0755) (0.0379) (0.0344)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.1572 -0.1297 -0.0449 -0.0057 0.3390
(0.1048) (0.0901) (0.1351) (0.1188) (0.1526)
10 weeks before and after event 0.0660 -0.1291 -0.0741 -0.0330 0.0625
(0.0830) (0.1113) (0.1293) (0.1000) (0.0805)
20 weeks before and after event 0.0130 -0.2921∗ -0.1402 -0.0409 0.0966
(0.0696) (0.0600) (0.0632) (0.0697) (0.0823)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0782 -0.2254∗ -0.1589∗ -0.0409 0.1164
(0.0481) (0.0497) (0.0560) (0.0510) (0.0728)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0874 -0.2530∗ -0.1603∗ -0.0559 0.1135
(0.0455) (0.0525) (0.0552) (0.0488) (0.0739)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0998 -0.2280∗ -0.1610 -0.0685 0.1102
(0.0424) (0.0524) (0.0693) (0.0428) (0.0453)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.21.A: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
March 28, 2007 as placebo for event 1)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.0391 0.1906 -0.0549 0.3610 -0.0434
(0.1972) (0.2187) (0.3087) (0.4724) (0.3401)
10 weeks before and after event -0.0498 0.2756 -0.1187 0.3585 -0.0851
(0.1742) (0.2213) (0.2786) (0.4032) (0.3014)
20 weeks before and after event -0.2343 0.3323 -0.2428 0.3994 -0.2437
(0.1536) (0.1856) (0.2511) (0.3652) (0.2736)
30 weeks before and after event -0.2349 0.3626 -0.2947 0.4082 -0.2259
(0.1539) (0.1761) (0.2475) (0.3558) (0.2671)
40 weeks before and after event -0.2352 0.2611 -0.3263 0.4952 -0.2129
(0.1581) (0.1967) (0.2389) (0.3432) (0.2566)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1312 0.2021 -0.1861 0.9885∗ -0.0496
(0.1583) (0.2081) (0.2359) (0.3567) (0.2661)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.2506 0.0166 0.0479 0.5355 -0.1141
(0.2212) (0.4022) (0.3294) (0.5902) (0.3239)
10 weeks before and after event 0.0833 0.2110 -0.0200 0.5584 -0.1627
(0.1959) (0.3384) (0.3001) (0.5170) (0.2919)
20 weeks before and after event -0.3343 0.4222 -0.1355 0.6726 -0.4169
(0.1495) (0.2836) (0.2767) (0.4678) (0.2592)
30 weeks before and after event -0.2758 0.4499 -0.1561 0.6418 -0.3781
(0.1484) (0.2630) (0.2767) (0.4622) (0.2528)
40 weeks before and after event -0.4909∗ 0.2143 -0.2465 0.7406 -0.2946
(0.1486) (0.2871) (0.2674) (0.4503) (0.2478)
50 weeks before and after event -0.4538∗ 0.1538 -0.1458 1.2485∗ -0.1357
(0.1464) (0.2949) (0.2584) (0.4394) (0.2510)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local linear polynomial. Significance code:
∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing.
177
Table 3.21.B: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
June 21, 2008 as placebo for event 2)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.3626 0.0655 0.0593 0.0532 0.3397
(0.1763) (0.1672) (0.1285) (0.1742) (0.1721)
10 weeks before and after event -0.3727 0.0547 0.0468 0.0950 0.2120
(0.1656) (0.2102) (0.1297) (0.1578) (0.1308)
20 weeks before and after event 0.0128 0.0269 0.0975 0.1111 -0.0527
(0.1024) (0.1270) (0.0992) (0.1335) (0.0853)
30 weeks before and after event 0.0493 0.0271 0.1026 0.1278 -0.0309
(0.0919) (0.1071) (0.0991) (0.1203) (0.0768)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0544 0.0276 0.0867 0.1372 -0.0388
(0.0905) (0.1068) (0.0981) (0.1185) (0.0770)
50 weeks before and after event 0.0338 0.0259 0.0817 0.2225 -0.0432
(0.0690) (0.0790) (0.0895) (0.1184) (0.0761)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2260 0.0228 0.1192 -0.0517 0.1823
(0.2032) (0.2630) (0.2068) (0.2097) (0.1867)
10 weeks before and after event -0.2226 0.0153 0.0771 -0.0003 -0.0158
(0.1719) (0.2807) (0.1823) (0.1792) (0.1274)
20 weeks before and after event 0.0213 0.0493 0.1075 0.0953 -0.0277
(0.1089) (0.1546) (0.1181) (0.1441) (0.1025)
30 weeks before and after event 0.0338 0.0463 0.0714 0.0976 0.0202
(0.0860) (0.1311) (0.1112) (0.1329) (0.0859)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0380 0.0265 0.1126 0.1136 0.0140
(0.0840) (0.1163) (0.1152) (0.1285) (0.0867)
50 weeks before and after event 0.0017 0.0545 0.0907 0.1861 0.0675
(0.0773) (0.0918) (0.1037) (0.1286) (0.0804)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local linear polynomial. Significance code:
∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing.
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Table 3.21.C: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
January 31, 2013 as placebo for event 3)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.2663∗ 0.1274 0.2175 0.2027 0.4197∗
(0.0843) (0.0973) (0.0920) (0.1119) (0.0747)
10 weeks before and after event 0.2933∗ 0.1258 0.2294 0.2636 0.4145∗
(0.0813) (0.0973) (0.0944) (0.1204) (0.0732)
20 weeks before and after event 0.0338 0.1231 0.1378 0.2352 0.4462∗
(0.0365) (0.0990) (0.0836) (0.1177) (0.0676)
30 weeks before and after event 0.0726 0.0863 0.0632 0.0617 0.4560∗
(0.0406) (0.0828) (0.0728) (0.0816) (0.0685)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0343 0.0770 -0.0196 -0.0442 0.3952∗
(0.0356) (0.0826) (0.0486) (0.0518) (0.0574)
50 weeks before and after event 0.0266 -0.0553 -0.0012 -0.0142 0.0380
(0.0289) (0.0541) (0.0540) (0.0612) (0.0329)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.2742∗ 0.1089 0.2857∗ 0.2998∗ 0.3769∗
(0.0840) (0.1006) (0.0942) (0.1162) (0.0812)
10 weeks before and after event 0.2795∗ 0.1061 0.3000∗ 0.3369∗ 0.3730∗
(0.0831) (0.1006) (0.0994) (0.1212) (0.0810)
20 weeks before and after event 0.3075∗ 0.1055 0.0394 0.3240∗ 0.3709∗
(0.0594) (0.1017) (0.0681) (0.1201) (0.0761)
30 weeks before and after event 0.1301∗ 0.0590 0.1446 0.1357 0.4033∗
(0.0457) (0.0863) (0.0783) (0.0894) (0.0810)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0793 0.0577 -0.0241 -0.0474 0.3400∗
(0.0368) (0.0860) (0.0529) (0.0514) (0.0600)
50 weeks before and after event 0.0723∗ -0.0835 -0.0274 0.0810 0.0639
(0.0262) (0.0577) (0.0544) (0.0754) (0.0388)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local linear polynomial. Significance code:
∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing.
179
Table 3.21.D: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
July 16, 2014 as placebo for event 4)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.2829 0.2351 0.1102 0.0266 -0.1749
(0.1210) (0.1247) (0.2588) (0.2259) (0.1600)
10 weeks before and after event 0.3336∗ 0.2086 0.2327 -0.0394 -0.2276
(0.0942) (0.1105) (0.1975) (0.2009) (0.1482)
20 weeks before and after event 0.3601∗ 0.1736 0.1484 0.0637 -0.1417
(0.0904) (0.0859) (0.1458) (0.1440) (0.1078)
30 weeks before and after event 0.3131∗ 0.0781 0.0239 0.0066 0.2366∗
(0.0717) (0.0595) (0.1015) (0.1335) (0.0632)
40 weeks before and after event 0.3386∗ 0.0863 -0.0017 -0.0453 0.2917∗
(0.0778) (0.0668) (0.0815) (0.1204) (0.0561)
50 weeks before and after event 0.2033∗ 0.1662∗ -0.0458 -0.0056 0.2865∗
(0.0555) (0.0591) (0.0758) (0.1217) (0.0476)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 SO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.3843 0.1287 0.2225 0.6160∗ -0.0096
(0.1622) (0.1647) (0.2771) (0.2170) (0.1688)
10 weeks before and after event 0.4097∗ 0.1285 0.3253 0.5703∗ 0.1006
(0.1276) (0.1549) (0.2193) (0.2161) (0.2077)
20 weeks before and after event 0.4656∗ 0.2211 0.1961 0.6376∗ 0.2591∗
(0.1105) (0.1009) (0.1616) (0.1990) (0.0995)
30 weeks before and after event 0.4484∗ 0.1236 -0.0096 0.3082 0.2759∗
(0.0947) (0.0677) (0.0986) (0.1391) (0.0719)
40 weeks before and after event 0.4527∗ 0.1024 -0.0340 0.4000∗ 0.3043∗
(0.0986) (0.0611) (0.0875) (0.1515) (0.0687)
50 weeks before and after event 0.3611∗ 0.2091∗ -0.0367 0.1792 0.2713∗
(0.0820) (0.0667) (0.0820) (0.1191) (0.0459)
Notes: This table reports estimates from five separate regression using local linear polynomial. Significance code:
∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing.
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Table 3.22.A: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 1)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.0441 -0.3989 -0.2495 -0.5606∗
(0.2626) (0.1969) (0.1216) (0.2097)
10 weeks before and after event -0.0538 -0.4253 -0.2217 -0.5379
(0.2148) (0.1976) (0.1164) (0.2245)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0046 -0.3589 -0.1027 -0.5281∗
(0.1713) (0.1590) (0.0893) (0.1852)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0450 -0.3121 -0.0614 -0.5714∗
(0.1751) (0.1661) (0.0829) (0.2049)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0138 -0.3641 -0.0653 -0.5712∗
(0.1684) (0.1626) (0.0845) (0.1778)
50 weeks before and after event 0.0432 -0.3716 -0.0169 -0.5342∗
(0.1622) (0.1542) (0.0711) (0.1614)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2208 -0.6731∗ -0.1910 -0.7015∗
(0.3146) (0.1982) (0.1891) (0.2119)
10 weeks before and after event -0.2551 -0.6931∗ -0.1762 -0.6831∗
(0.2358) (0.2411) (0.1674) (0.2205)
20 weeks before and after event -0.1396 -0.6810∗ -0.0129 -0.6182∗
(0.1737) (0.1969) (0.0911) (0.1992)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1360 -0.6577∗ -0.0321 -0.6594∗
(0.1657) (0.2015) (0.0976) (0.1987)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0935 -0.7091∗ -0.0296 -0.6703∗
(0.1590) (0.2014) (0.0899) (0.1994)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0652 -0.7246∗ -0.0461 -0.6511∗
(0.1444) (0.1908) (0.1038) (0.2005)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
181
Table 3.22.B: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 2)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.2207 -0.5050∗ -0.0850 0.2613∗
(0.1476) (0.1667) (0.1061) (0.0720)
10 weeks before and after event -0.1679 -0.2921 -0.0785 0.1482
(0.1212) (0.1243) (0.1019) (0.0625)
20 weeks before and after event -0.2071∗ -0.3330∗ -0.1041 0.0222
(0.0644) (0.0920) (0.0676) (0.0529)
30 weeks before and after event -0.1990∗ -0.3888∗ -0.2137∗ 0.0368
(0.0629) (0.0784) (0.0414) (0.0440)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1988∗ -0.3093∗ -0.2170∗ -0.0361
(0.0645) (0.0623) (0.0416) (0.0422)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1649∗ -0.3353∗ -0.2044∗ 0.0209
(0.0434) (0.0658) (0.0405) (0.0427)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event -0.3006 -0.5244∗ -0.1414 0.3379∗
(0.1640) (0.1517) (0.0924) (0.0986)
10 weeks before and after event -0.2130 -0.2770 -0.1339 0.0811
(0.1357) (0.1254) (0.0904) (0.0900)
20 weeks before and after event -0.1674 -0.4287∗ -0.1536 0.0665
(0.0810) (0.1015) (0.0649) (0.0741)
30 weeks before and after event -0.2258∗ -0.4610∗ -0.2094∗ 0.1209
(0.0682) (0.0800) (0.0387) (0.0653)
40 weeks before and after event -0.2248∗ -0.4428∗ -0.2162∗ -0.0379
(0.0700) (0.0806) (0.0382) (0.0565)
50 weeks before and after event -0.2204∗ -0.4009∗ -0.1993∗ -0.0155
(0.0616) (0.0741) (0.0364) (0.0556)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.22.C: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 3)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.0918 0.1329 0.1860 -0.0941
(0.1588) (0.1002) (0.2429) (0.2386)
10 weeks before and after event 0.0185 0.1189 0.1850 -0.1112
(0.1207) (0.0975) (0.2092) (0.2335)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0153 0.0607 0.1829 0.0242
(0.1031) (0.0987) (0.1634) (0.1669)
30 weeks before and after event 0.0137 -0.0190 0.1430 0.1803
(0.0849) (0.0678) (0.1396) (0.1123)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0220 -0.0288 0.1841 0.2040
(0.0791) (0.0691) (0.1189) (0.1037)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0151 0.0574 0.3245∗ 0.0000
(0.0792) (0.0556) (0.1054) (0.0785)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.0248 0.1190 0.2518 -0.0242
(0.1878) (0.0913) (0.2205) (0.1843)
10 weeks before and after event 0.0598 0.1045 0.2266 0.0247
(0.1307) (0.0914) (0.1869) (0.1699)
20 weeks before and after event 0.0417 0.0523 0.1419 0.0934
(0.1151) (0.0920) (0.1290) (0.1315)
30 weeks before and after event 0.0605 -0.0724 0.2052 0.1274
(0.1016) (0.0634) (0.1470) (0.1008)
40 weeks before and after event 0.0813 -0.0540 0.1104 0.1876
(0.0859) (0.0548) (0.1160) (0.0924)
50 weeks before and after event 0.1237 -0.0074 0.2420∗ 0.0308
(0.0878) (0.0550) (0.0958) (0.0607)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.22.D: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 4)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log avg daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.0361 -0.1912 -0.1513 0.5497∗
(0.0780) (0.1260) (0.1518) (0.1344)
10 weeks before and after event -0.0427 -0.2043 -0.1695 0.5523∗
(0.0602) (0.0875) (0.1459) (0.1371)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0517 -0.2525∗ -0.1061 0.3552∗
(0.0487) (0.0798) (0.0821) (0.0985)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0791 -0.2617∗ -0.1160 0.1488∗
(0.0425) (0.0666) (0.0646) (0.0586)
40 weeks before and after event -0.0773 -0.1846∗ -0.0972 0.2293∗
(0.0405) (0.0521) (0.0703) (0.0615)
50 weeks before and after event -0.0910 -0.1810∗ -0.1214 0.1101
(0.0387) (0.0517) (0.0744) (0.0548)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 NO2 PM10
8 weeks before and after event 0.1346 -0.2226∗ -0.1694 0.3801
(0.1140) (0.0878) (0.1226) (0.1724)
10 weeks before and after event 0.0799 -0.1774 -0.1292 0.2156
(0.0952) (0.1292) (0.1341) (0.0993)
20 weeks before and after event -0.0260 -0.3423∗ -0.1116 0.1255
(0.0736) (0.0755) (0.0764) (0.0956)
30 weeks before and after event -0.0895 -0.3714∗ -0.1204 0.2195∗
(0.0547) (0.0684) (0.0597) (0.0815)
40 weeks before and after event -0.1022 -0.3328∗ -0.0998 0.2106∗
(0.0503) (0.0573) (0.0657) (0.0825)
50 weeks before and after event -0.1156 -0.2868∗ -0.1248 0.1353
(0.0472) (0.0518) (0.0686) (0.0649)
Notes: This table reports estimates from four separate regression using local polynomial. Significance code: ∗
indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3.23.A: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
event 1)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
10 weeks before and after 0.0906 -0.4516 -0.0233 -0.7891
(0.1168) (0.2792) (0.2564) (0.3711)
20 weeks before and after 0.0125 -0.5018∗ -0.1521 -0.9236
(0.5996) (0.0931) (0.1917) (0.4596)
30 weeks before and after 0.0140 -0.5265∗ -0.1508 -0.8935∗
(0.1179) (0.1010) (0.1865) (0.1028)
40 weeks before and after 0.0175 -0.5313∗ -0.1539 -0.9015∗
(0.1104) (0.1104) (0.1816) (0.1063)
50 weeks before and after 0.0173 -0.5352∗ -0.1540 -0.9035∗
(0.1230) (0.1179) (0.1785) (0.1093)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
Table 3.23.B: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (augmented local linear
around event 2)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
10 weeks before and after -0.0540 -0.1297 -0.1012 -0.0158
(0.0691) (0.1049) (0.1021) (0.1401)
20 weeks before and after -0.0766 -0.2776∗ -0.1698 -0.1463
(0.0851) (0.1196) (0.1405) (0.0951)
30 weeks before and after -0.2700∗ -0.2693 -0.1732 -0.3207∗
(0.1196) (0.1338 ) (0.1926) (0.0926)
40 weeks before and after -0.2805∗ -0.2753∗ -0.1953 -0.4502∗
(0.0992) (0.0849) (0.1692) (0.1059)
50 weeks before and after -0.2818∗ -0.2713∗ -0.2001 -0.4234∗
(0.1187) (0.0671) (0.1472) (0.0698)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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Table 3.23.C: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
event 3)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
10 weeks before and after 0.1071 -0.0666 -0.0100 0.1806
(0.1273) (0.2687) (0.2151) (0.0835)
20 weeks before and after 0.1081 -0.0341 0.1251 0.1926
(0.0603) (0.1936) (0.1415) (0.1752)
30 weeks before and after 0.1490∗ 0.0284 0.1395 0.0701
(0.0502) (0.1469) (0.1140) (0.1235)
40 weeks before and after 0.1361∗ 0.0129 0.1310 0.0796
(0.0494) (0.1439) (0.1599) (0.0742)
50 weeks before and after 0.1342∗ 0.2586∗ 0.1499 0.3367∗
(0.0471) (0.0802) (0.2882) (0.1277)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
Table 3.23.D: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear around
event 4)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
10 weeks before and after 0.0436 -0.3381∗ -0.0092 -0.3262∗
(0.0289) (0.0703) (0.0728) (0.1048)
20 weeks before and after 0.0351 -0.0315 -0.0334 -0.2756∗
(0.0651) (0.1255) (0.0662) (0.0725)
30 weeks before and after -0.0199 -0.1067 -0.0410 -0.2999∗
(0.0824) (0.1040) (0.0942) (0.0816)
40 weeks before and after -0.0195 -0.0555 -0.0193 -0.2757∗
(0.0764) (0.0895) (0.0603) (0.0490)
50 weeks before and after -0.0140 -0.1350 -0.0216 -0.3083∗
(0.0606) (0.0695) (0.0504) (0.0572)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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Table 3.24.A: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 1)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
30 weeks before and after 0.0320 -0.1455
(0.0884) (0.2416)
40 weeks before and after 0.0321 -0.4723∗ -0.1481 -0.8471∗
(0.0912) (0.0668) (0.2067) (0.0696)
50 weeks before and after 0.0284 -0.4881∗ -0.1314 -0.8094∗
(0.1160) (0.0620) (0.2003) (0.0894)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
Table 3.24.B: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 2)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
30 weeks before and after -0.4201∗ -0.4270∗
(0.1787) (0.1864)
40 weeks before and after -0.4150∗ -0.4388∗ -0.4271∗ -0.6477∗
(0.1670) (0.1358) (0.1353) (0.1501)
50 weeks before and after -0.3594∗ -0.4607 ∗ -0.2707 -0.6436∗
(0.1504) (0.1548) (0.1401) (0.2317)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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Table 3.24.C: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 3)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
30 weeks before and after 0.1942 0.4186
(0.8389) (0.2134)
40 weeks before and after 0.2521 0.1920 0.5233
(0.2031) (0.1666) (0.2467)
50 weeks before and after 0.2432 0.4233∗ 0.5439 0.5760
(1.0932) (0.1161) (0.6290) (0.8934)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
Table 3.24.D: Effects of Removing Subsidies on Pollution Levels in Tehran (local linear with SO2
as control around event 4)
Dependent variable is predicted residuals from regression of:
log avg daily pollution for: log max daily pollution for:
CO O3 CO O3
30 weeks before and after 0.0313 -0.0431
(0.0730) (0.0918)
40 weeks before and after 0.0082 -0.0253 -0.0312
(0.0549) (0.1044) (0.0647)
50 weeks before and after 0.0005 -0.0262 0.0126 -0.2592∗
(0.0386) (0.1005) (0.0602) (0.0705)
Notes: This table reports estimates from two sets of two separate regression using local polynomial. Significance
code: ∗ indicates significant at a 5% level after applying the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple hypothesis
testing. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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